

DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION IN EUROPE: EVOLVING  
MILITARY ROLES

## NATO Security through Science Series

This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme for Security through Science (STS).

Meetings supported by the NATO STS Programme are in security-related priority areas of Defence Against Terrorism or Countering Other Threats to Security. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO STS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy.

**Advanced Study Institutes** (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience

**Advanced Research Workshops** (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action

Following a transformation of the programme in 2004 the Series has been re-named and re-organised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series.

The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

### Sub-Series

A. Chemistry and Biology	Springer Science and Business Media
B. Physics and Biophysics	Springer Science and Business Media
C. Environmental Security	Springer Science and Business Media
D. Information and Communication Security	IOS Press
E. Human and Societal Dynamics	IOS Press

<http://www.nato.int/science>

<http://www.springeronline.nl>

<http://www.iospress.nl>



# Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles

Edited by

Timothy Edmunds

*University of Bristol, UK*

and

Marjan Malešič

*University of Ljubljana, Slovenia*

**IOS**  
Press

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC

Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on The Challenge of  
Defence Transformation in Europe  
Brdo, Slovenia  
27–30 May 2004

© 2005 IOS Press.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,  
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher.

ISBN 1-58603-541-X  
Library of Congress Control Number: 2005930248

*Publisher*

IOS Press  
Nieuwe Hemweg 6B  
1013 BG Amsterdam  
Netherlands  
fax: +31 20 687 0019  
e-mail: [order@iospress.nl](mailto:order@iospress.nl)

*Distributor in the UK and Ireland*

IOS Press/Lavis Marketing  
73 Lime Walk  
Headington  
Oxford OX3 7AD  
England  
fax: +44 1865 750079

*Distributor in the USA and Canada*

IOS Press, Inc.  
4502 Rachael Manor Drive  
Fairfax, VA 22032  
USA  
fax: +1 703 323 3668  
e-mail: [iosbooks@iospress.com](mailto:iosbooks@iospress.com)

LEGAL NOTICE

The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

## Preface

The chapters in this book were first presented at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop on *The Challenge of Transformation in Europe*, held at Brdo in Slovenia between 27–30 May 2004. The Workshop was jointly organised by the Governance Research Centre of the University of Bristol and the Defence Research Centre of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, and financed by the NATO Science Programme (Grant No. SST.ARW.979967). The aim of the workshop was to provide a forum for expert discussion of the defence transformation challenges facing European countries today: in particular, the military, political, budgetary and societal implications of the changing nature of the defence of national territory imperative. Workshop participants were drawn from a range of different groups involved in defence transformation processes, including academic experts, analysts from think tanks, journalists, policy makers and serving military officers.

A key assumption underlying the workshop was that there are a number of themes in this area that transcend the traditional divisions between western and postcommunist Europe. The workshop was themed around eight different sessions, each focused around a particular area of military role evolution and illustrated by the experiences of a specific country exemplar. These included: the changing nature of the defence of national territory role; expeditionary warfare; peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention; defence diplomacy; domestic military assistance; and internal security. The chapters in this volume present a cross section of country case studies in each of these areas, including the experiences of the United States, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Turkey. The contributions by Marjan Malešič, Timothy Edmunds and Anne Aldis, build on these case studies – as well as the workshop discussion – to provide a wider overview of defence transformation in Europe today.

Timothy Edmunds and Marjan Malešič

This page intentionally left blank

# Contents

Preface	v
<i>Timothy Edmunds and Marjan Malešič</i>	
Introduction: The Challenge of Defence Transformation in Europe	1
<i>Marjan Malešič</i>	
A New Security Environment? The Evolution of Military Roles in Post-Cold War Europe	9
<i>Timothy Edmunds</i>	
Military Systems in the 21st Century: Changes and Continuities	19
<i>Charles Moskos</i>	
The Defence of National Territory: The German Experience	27
<i>Wilfried von Bredow</i>	
Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation After the Cold War	35
<i>Peter Viggo Jakobsen</i>	
Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance: The Contribution of Hungary	47
<i>Pál Dunay</i>	
Defence Diplomacy: The Bulgarian Experience	57
<i>Valeri Ratchev</i>	
Domestic Military Assistance: The Case of Slovenia	83
<i>Ljubica Jelusič</i>	
Defence Transformation and Internal Security: The Turkish Experience	91
<i>Bill Park</i>	
Defence Transformation in Europe Today: Implications for the Armed Forces	103
<i>Anne Aldis</i>	
Author Index	113

This page intentionally left blank

# Introduction: the Challenge of Defence Transformation in Europe

Marjan MALEŠIČ  
*University of Ljubljana*

Changes in international security and political environment of contemporary states as well as internal changes in their societies have brought about a number of changes within European armed forces. Of these, perhaps the most important is their changed functionality. Unlike during the Cold War when the defence of national territory was the main role and mission of the armed forces, today armed forces are preoccupied with other missions like coping with asymmetric threats and terrorism, peace support operations and humanitarian assistance, defence diplomacy, domestic military assistance and internal security. This is not to say that the defence of national territory mission has become obsolete or irrelevant, nor that other missions were not there in the past: it is more a matter of prioritisation of different missions and the intensity of performing them.

This NATO Advanced Research Workshop addressed the topic of defence transformation in Europe since the end of the Cold War. It was held between 27-30 May 2004 at Brdo, Slovenia and jointly organised by the Defence Research Centre of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and the Department of Politics of the University of Bristol. More than 30 experts and practitioners from Europe and USA attended the workshop, presenting 16 papers.

The point of departure for the workshop was a recognition that changes in the international and social environment of contemporary states have had important impacts on armed forces. The end of the Cold War, democratisation of former communist countries, the NATO and EU enlargement processes, prevalence of predominantly intra-state armed conflicts, new peacekeeping missions, and the 'war on terror' have all profoundly influenced military reform processes. Similarly, internal social factors have also been significant. These include: increasing pluralism and individualism within societies, the increasing specialisation and professionalisation of different social roles, and changing value orientations amongst the (particularly young) population, to mention only the most evident features of many contemporary European societies.

The discussion suggested that there are several trends typical for the development of the armed forces in Europe after the end of the Cold War:

- First, *professionalisation*. This includes both abolishing conscription and introducing an all-volunteer force, as well as achieving higher professional standards within the armed forces however they are manned;
- Second, *changed functionality*. In the past the armed forces tended to be focused on the defence of national territory whereas today they have for the most part assumed non-traditional missions such as peace support operations, humanitarian interventions and crisis management;<sup>1</sup>
- Third, the *internationalisation of missions*. Military missions are now increasingly carried out in multinational contexts;

- Fourth, *increasing military legitimisation*. The popular legitimacy of the armed forces is increasing across Europe, and particularly in the former communist region. However this trend is not necessarily reflected in recruitment levels.
- Fifth, *declining readiness to join the armed forces*. With the introduction of an all-volunteer structure, the military often finds itself having to compete with other enterprises and institutions in the labour market for high-quality personnel. In addition, educated young people appear increasingly unwilling to join the armed forces.
- Sixth, the *diminishing socialisation role of the armed forces*. As a consequence of the introduction of all-volunteer forces or simply because of reduced need to draft the entire cohort of eligible young people, less and less young people are socialised by the military.<sup>2</sup>
- Finally, the *complex nature of civil-military relations*. The armed forces are increasingly compelled to cooperate with the civilian sector, especially in the areas of training, personnel and services.

These changing circumstances have caused some other changes within the military itself: a structural and cultural overlap of civilian and military spheres, a decreasing sense of difference within the military based upon branch, rank or role, and internationalisation of military forces.<sup>3</sup> There are also some specific and non-traditional military reform challenges that armed forces face in a number of – particularly West European – states. These include issues such as the integration of minorities into the military, gender integration, the issue of homosexuals, the integration of different races, and the increasing role of the civilians within the military due to outsourcing. As a consequence of these challenges, workshop participants agreed that personnel issues are increasingly important in European military reform processes, often more so than strategic or technological challenges.<sup>4</sup>

### **Roles and Missions for Armed Forces**

The framework for the analysis of defence transformation in Europe was based around the changing nature of military roles and missions in contemporary society.<sup>5</sup> It concentrated in particular on six evolving military roles:

- First, the *defence of national territory*;
- Second, *expeditionary warfare*;
- Third, *peace support operations and humanitarian assistance*;
- Fourth, *defence diplomacy*;
- Fifth, *domestic military assistance*;
- And finally, *internal security tasks*.

The subsequent discussion suggested that these missions are not always strictly separated and often complement each other. For example, the ‘fight against terrorism’ could be seen also as a defence of national territory as it was proved by 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA. Similarly, the participation of the military in peace support operations can be seen not only as a contribution to international peace and stability but also as a way of improving national security. International military cooperation during peace support operations can also have an important defence diplomacy element. Finally, domestic military assistance is often an important element of internal security provision.

#### *The Defence of National Territory*

Wilfried von Bredow introduced the defence of national territory session with a case study of the German experience. The German armed forces were established at the peak of the Cold War at a time when the main threat was of a massive conventional attack by the forces of the Soviet block. The armed forces were thus established to provide for the defence of the state, primarily through deterrence supported by allies. An important variable in this effort was a nuclear dimension of West-East confrontation, which exposed Germany as the main potential battlefield. The national defence mission had a huge impact on the structure of the German armed forces, both in relation to their size and composition. Moreover, the end of West-East conflict brought about some enthusiastic ideas in German society to achieve a non-military Federal Republic – a state without conventional armed forces at all. This was a trend mirrored in Switzerland in 1989, where a referendum was held on abolishing the armed forces and in Slovenia until May 1991, where the debate on the demilitarisation of the country was also very strong.<sup>6</sup> The Gulf war in 1991 came as a shock for German public and caused even the peace activists to reconsider their position on the military, changing their views to focus on the reduction of German military potential rather than complete disarmament. Subsequent events, especially in former Yugoslavia, swept away even these ideas and in 1994 the Constitutional court enabled the government – with the consent of the majority of the Parliament – to deploy the armed forces externally in the framework of international peace operations.

As a consequence of these decisions there have been several reforms of the German armed forces goals, missions and structures over the past decade. The traditional mission of defending the country against a military attack is increasingly viewed to be not in conformity with actual security policy requirements. The armed forces have been reduced in size and restructured into three elements – response, stabilisation and support forces – as a result. This is seen as a ‘silent farewell’ to the armed forces’ traditional defence of the national territory role, the mission being superseded by the contribution the military can make to global security and supporting international cooperation and integration.

Alexander Golts discussed the role of the defence of national territory mission for the Russian armed forces. He argued that these are characterised by a number of serious problems ranging from poor civilian control of the military and low professional standards to corruption, crime, frequent accidents and abuse of the conscripts. The move towards volunteer forces rather than conscripts has been problematic. Professional soldiers tend to be viewed as synonymous with mercenaries, while their educational and training programmes remain of the same length (6 months) and quality (poor) as those of the conscripts. The professionalism of officers is also rather limited whereas retention rates amongst the younger officer corps are poor. The military doctrine remains very similar to that of the Soviet period, while the military top brass is not ready to abandon their traditional thinking and behaviour. NATO is still viewed as an enemy while nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence remain extremely important. Golts argued that part of military elite needs an ‘adversary’ to retain the old doctrinal views and to mobilise the public. Declaratively they do accept some non-traditional military missions but have not reorganised the military correspondingly. For Golts, the greatest threat to the Russian military today is the military itself. There is a degree of political will to reform the armed forces, but the military itself is resistant to this.

The subsequent debate stressed that Russian case should be viewed in the context of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) specifically rather than the central and eastern European region more widely. In particular, there is a lack of money to make substantial reforms and the armed forces continue to wage a war for the territorial integrity of their country in Chechnya. In addition, Russian society is confronted with huge demographic problems. However, international cooperation with Russia in the defence sphere is quite

high and situation in the Russian armed forces could gradually improve if the European integration processes will touch Russia as well.

### *Expeditionary Warfare*

The expeditionary warfare mission presents a considerable challenge to armed forces development. Michael Clarke introduced the British experience in this area, focusing particularly on the British armed forces' involvement into the Iraqi war. Here, military operations were both financially expensive and organisationally demanding. Indeed, in practice – given the demands of training, leave and recovery – five soldiers are required for every one deployed in an active role on the ground. Operations like that in Iraq are very demanding in logistical terms, which in turn slowed operations on the ground. Furthermore, the fact that the operation was an international one also required a certain level of inter-operability of forces. It became clear during the attack of NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 that the European armed forces were not inter-operable with the US forces. This realisation produced a sobering effect in European countries and has led to a series of attempts to reform their armed forces (or at least elements of them) to make them more interoperable with their US counterparts.

Charles Moskos provided an analysis of the American experience in Iraq. He agreed that such operations are especially demanding. In particular he noted that armed forces are often required to carry out a mixture of different tasks in one operation and in the same limited area. These tasks might include fighting, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, constabulary work and humanitarian assistance.

### *Peace Support Operations and Humanitarian Assistance*

According to Peter Viggo Jakobsen, participation in peace operations has been the single most important driver of defence transformation in Denmark since the end of the cold war. The transformation of the military from one focused on invasion defence (defence of national territory) to the expeditionary force structure began in 1992. One of the features of this process was the strong national consensus on the legitimacy of this change amongst civil society, the military and the political establishment. As a consequence, the military became extremely internationalised in the last decade. The importance of peace operations in Danish security considerations is illustrated by four indicators: their prominence in Danish defence and foreign policy; their actual size in terms of deployed personnel and costs; their influence on the armed forces structure; and their impact on armed forces procurement policy.

Although the Danish armed forces participated in nine out of thirteen peacekeeping and observation missions conducted by the UN in the period of 1948-87, the defence of national territory dominated in that period. Participation in peacekeeping operations was modest and was not appreciated by military officers: it had no influence on their promotion. Today, peace operations have a leading position in the Danish foreign policy doctrine known as 'active internationalism', while the defence policy identifies peace operations as 'the main task of the armed forces'. The political and public support for the international deployments of the military was very high with the exception of American-led war against Iraq in 2003. Later participation of Danish armed forces in post-war stabilisation of Iraq was again supported by the majority of Parliament members and the public. The number of Danish military personnel deployed in peace operations increased from 831 in 1990 to 2,129 in 2002, including Navy and Air Force personnel on a regular basis. Over the past

decade the amount of money allocated to international operations by the Danish exchequer has risen.

Despite the fact that the Danish armed forces are completely involved in peace operations, they maintain conscription as a way of manning the armed forces. However, this decision should not be viewed as unwillingness to adopt a more expeditionary type of the armed forces. On the contrary, the Danish military believe that retaining a four-month conscription is the best way to introduce young people to the military and so ultimately recruit high-quality personnel in sufficient numbers for participation in international missions. These missions are very prestigious within the military today and viewed in terms of a contribution to national security. Indeed, even military procurement is almost exclusively shaped by the criteria of usability in international deployments. The success story of the Danish armed forces in peace operations could be only jeopardised by the unwillingness of the Danish society to spend more than 1.6 GDP on defence and by recruitment problems. In particular, it is questionable whether the Danish armed forces will be able to enlist enough soldiers to keep any more than a 2000 soldiers deployed abroad at any one time.

The Hungarian experience in this area, as presented by Pál Dunay, has been rather different. In common with most former communist countries, Hungary is a newcomer to peace operations with little experience in the field. Domestically, the entire security environment of Hungary as far as military threats are concerned has changed and it could be described as 'threat-free environment'. Consequently, there is no need for the defence of national territory, and even the armed forces' traditional disaster relief mission has declined in importance. As a consequence, the Hungarian armed forces have no mission to accomplish on their national territory any more, exposing international cooperation as the only option for the armed forces to be engaged in. Maintaining international peace and security, preventing or resolving regional, interstate and internal armed conflicts in accordance with the UN Charter and the international norms are now viewed as core national security goals in Hungary.

In the last decade Hungary has carried out three types of activities related to peace operations. These are host country support for the activities of the international forces active on the territory of former Yugoslavia; providing transit support for peacekeeping force passing through Hungarian territory; and directly contributing Hungarian troops abroad. The number of soldiers deployed abroad was approximately 1000 in 2004. This figure declined to 775 in 2005, mainly due to withdrawal of the transport battalion from Iraq. However, there are a number of factors that threaten Hungarian participation in international peace operations. These include increased risks of taking casualties in unsettled or dangerous environments, a limited capacity to sustain troops at large distance, and lack of public and political support. However, reduced international engagement on the part of the Hungarian military could hamper its image amongst its allies and deprive the military of valuable professional experience that the peace operations offer.

### *Defence Diplomacy*

According to Valeri Ratchev, Bulgaria has a long and successful record of defence diplomacy activities towards other countries. The main field of defence diplomacy has been building strategic partnerships, the use of foreign consultancy, enhancing regional cooperation in the defence field, creating multinational military formations and military diplomacy. The main characteristics of defence diplomacy in Bulgaria are strong regional cooperation and a lot of contact with NATO. Ratchev went on to argue that it is important for the peace and stability to develop communication with military forces in the region and

to build up overall confidence among the countries. In foreign policy of the contemporary state the military substance should not be absent.

Anthony Forster examined the British defence diplomacy in the last decade, and asserted that despite the huge amount of defence diplomacy activity carried out by the British armed forces since 1997, it was unlikely to replace war-fighting as the core driver for British military development. However, British defence diplomacy remains an important foreign and security policy tool. It consists of cooperation with allies, transition states, 'allies of convenience' and former enemies. The main purpose of defence diplomacy should be a creation of common philosophy among the militaries and 'inter-operability of minds', as Lord Robertson, former Secretary General of NATO, put it.

### *Domestic Military Assistance*

As argued by Marie Vlachova, the provision of military assistance to the civilian authorities has emerged – together with the defence of the state territory and cooperation in peacekeeping operations – one of the main tasks of the Czech armed forces. Assistance to the civilian authorities refers mainly to rescue and humanitarian operations, police operations especially border control and other police activities, guarding important civilian buildings, and air transportation of medical and civilian personnel. The armed forces are fully integrated into the rescue system, which was very well proved during the catastrophic floods in Czech Republic in Summer 2002.

The situation is similar in Slovenia, as Ljubica Jelušič has argued. The main tasks of the military are military education and training for armed conflict and other forms of military defence, providing military readiness, protection and rescue in case of natural and other disasters and fulfilling the obligations that the state accepted in international organisations and by international contracts. The Slovenian public perceives the disaster relief as the most important military task, even before the defence of the country. Disaster relief, together with cooperation in peace operations, became an important legitimisation factor of the Slovenian armed forces after their creation and there is frequent competition of both military and civilian authorities in the disaster relief domain.

In both countries, there are strong legal restrictions about the rules of engagement of the armed forces in domestic operations: the military is allowed to intervene in disaster relief only when it is called up by the civilian authorities. One of the issues still to be properly addressed by the authorities however, is the level of disaster relief skills and equipment the military is capable to provide – often this is only of a very general and non-specialist kind.

### *Internal Security*

Although a limited 'police' role, as we could see in some presented cases, is not a completely alien role for European armed forces, Bill Park argued that the experience of the Turkish military was a special case in this area. The Turkish General Staff emphasises the internal security role of the military in two areas. First, in the fight against 'Kurdish separatism' and second in the fight against political Islam. In the last 20 years the fight against Kurdish separatism has produced more than 30,000 victims and millions of Kurdish refugees and internally displaced persons. Thousands of villages in the southeast Turkey were destroyed due to their alleged harbouring of pro-separatist activists or even only sentiment. Turkish military and gendarmerie forces fighting against the Kurdish PKK activities have increased five-fold in that area in the period in question. Political Islam is

another important target of the military's internal security role. The Turkish armed forces see themselves as the self-appointed guardians of the legacy of Kemal Atatürk who sought to create a secular state in Turkey and make Islam a private domain. The intrusion of Islam into Turkish economic and political life is still viewed as an obstacle to the modernisation of the country. As such, Islamist political leaders (and their parties) were frequently subjected to political restrictions and were expelled from political life or even imprisoned. Both internal security threats, as perceived by Turkish military, also have an international dimension. The PKK have been supported from abroad, especially from Northern Iraq, whereas Turkish Islamist extremists are allegedly supported by Iran. This provides an important external dimension to the Turkish military's internal fight against Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.

The strong internal security role of the Turkish military is partly a consequence of insufficiently developed civilian institutions. Turkish courts, political parties, civil society organisations, mass media and administration can be weak, and shaky in their protection of the rule of law and democratic order. Although Turkish military is not entirely immune to these problems, it seems that occasionally they can play a positive role in preventing negative social and political phenomena in the society.

## **Conclusion**

The changes in international security and political environment of contemporary states as well as internal changes in their societies have brought about a number of changes within European armed forces. Of these, perhaps the most important is their changed functionality. Unlike during the Cold War when the defence of national territory was the main role and mission of the armed forces, today armed forces are preoccupied with other missions like coping with asymmetric threats and terrorism, peace support operations and humanitarian assistance, defence diplomacy, domestic military assistance and internal security. This is not to say that the defence of national territory became obsolete or irrelevant, nor that other missions were not there in the past: it is more a matter of prioritisation of different missions and the intensity of performing them.

The cases analysed at the workshop demonstrated that peace support operations and domestic military assistance have emerged as important legitimising factors of the armed forces in respective countries. In many cases these military missions predominantly shape the size, structure, way of manning, education and training, and procurement of contemporary European armed forces.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Marjan Malešič (ed), *Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> The UK experience is perhaps the most pronounced in this area. See, for example, Alex Ward, 'The British Experience in Moving from Conscription to an All-Regular Army', paper presented at the 4th International Conference *Military Professionalization, 1900-1999: The Quest for Excellence*, Budapest (29 March- 02 April 2, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> Matthew J. Morgan, 'The Reconstruction of Culture, Citizenship, and Military Service', *Armed Forces and Society*, 29(3) Spring 2003

<sup>4</sup> Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, 'Diversifying the Uniform? The Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services', *Armed Forces and Society*, 29(4) Summer 2003.

<sup>5</sup> See Timothy Edmunds' contribution, 'A New Security Environment? The Evolution of Military Roles in Post-Cold War Europe' elsewhere in this volume.

<sup>6</sup> See Anton Grizold, Ljubica Jelušič and Tomo Korošec (eds.), *Demilitarizacija Slovenije in nacionalna varnost (Demilitarisation of Slovenia and National Security)*, (Ljubljana: ZPS, 1991).

# **A New Security Environment? The Evolution of Military Roles in Post- Cold War Europe**

Timothy EDMUNDS  
*University of Bristol*

The evolution of military roles in Europe since the end of the Cold War poses a series of important challenges for armed forces. For a number of states, the declining saliency of the external defence role has been replaced by an emerging focus on new – or at least newly re-emphasised roles and missions. These include power projection for both war fighting and peacekeeping purposes as well as internal security tasks in response to new security challenges and the continued importance of nation building and domestic military assistance role. However, the organisational and financial demands of these roles are high and often conflictual. Most European countries simply cannot ‘do everything’ with their armed forces therefore. They need to make hard choices about what they are *actually for* and structure their military reform programmes on this basis.

Until 1989, the Cold War confrontation dominated the European security landscape and – at least as far as most continental armed forces were concerned – provided the relatively uncontested rationale for their existence, force structures and defence budgets. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, challenged many of these assumptions to the very core, while so-called ‘new security’ threats – ethnic conflict in the Yugoslavia and more recently international terrorism – asked new kinds of questions of armed forces and placed new kinds of organisational demands on them.

At the same time, we have witnessed a truly remarkable process of political and military integration across much of Europe over the same period. Today, much of the formerly communist region has joined NATO and the EU, while security cooperation with those left outside the formal accession process is wider and deeper than ever before through programmes like NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plans. As a consequence it is increasingly problematic to divide the challenges faced by defence establishments and armed forces in Europe along the old East/West lines. Certainly, the former communist region does still share a number of quite specific themes and issues in this area – in relation to, for example, the relatively smaller size of their economies in relation to their western neighbours or the particular organisational legacies of communist-era mass armies. Nevertheless, many of the defence transformation challenges faced in the ‘east’ have converged increasingly with those of the ‘west’. These in turn go to the very heart of the question of ‘what *are* armed forces for?’

## **Changing Military Roles**

What then are the emergent challenges in European security that armed forces face today in east and west? First, and perhaps most significantly over the long term, is the *changing*

*nature of the defence of national territory imperative.* During the Cold War, this core mission remained at the heart of what armed forces were for in Europe. It provided the rationale for their force structures, budgets and legitimacy in society. Today, the centrality of this role is no longer so obvious and for most European states, the prospect of an external state-based military threat to their existence has receded so far from their immediate security concerns that it has ceased to provide the uncontested rationale for their armed forces' organisation and force structure. This change in emphasis has also been reflected in societal threat perceptions, which tend to downplay the importance of military threats and instead stress issues such as terrorism, organised crime or economic decline as the primary sources of insecurity.

Nevertheless, the role of the military as the ultimate guarantor of state security has not disappeared and is not likely to any time soon. Across Europe, defence reviews and national security documents almost universally retain some interpretation of this role as the foundational justification for their armed forces and their defence budgets. The defence of national territory role remains firmly rooted in the institutional legitimacy of armed forces themselves, both in terms of how military personnel view their role and also in relation to the expectations their societies have of them.<sup>1</sup> These influences have made it difficult for European armed forces to abandon or de-prioritise their defence of national territory roles and responsibilities. Indeed, the defence procurement strategies of many European states have continued to focus on high value equipment purchases – such as fighter aircraft – that are predicated specifically on defence of national territory tasks. This is despite the disproportionate cost of these assets, their questionable utility in the new European security environment, and the difficulty that many states have in deploying or using them effectively.<sup>2</sup>

Second, the period since the end of the Cold War has seen a significant shift in the kinds of missions that armed forces are expected to carry out, including in particular contributing to multinational power projection missions such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan or to peacekeeping missions such as those in the former Yugoslavia. This is not of course a wholly new development and the ability to project military power abroad has been a feature of military organisations for almost as long as military organisation itself. What has changed is the nature of the security challenges that these capabilities are being developed in response to; the emergence of new military technologies that enhance the capacity of armed forces to fulfil this role; and the increasing influence of the power projection orientation in military reform programmes across a broad range of different countries. The current turn towards power projection emerges from a reading of post-Cold War global security that argues that the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are unlikely to take the form of direct territorial threats to the state itself. Instead, they are more likely to relate to issues such as threats to the supply of strategic resources, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to hostile regimes or 'rogue states', regional instability caused by intra-state conflict and the spread of international terrorism.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, states' must be able to deploy their military power swiftly and effectively to wherever it is needed in order to address these challenges. Changes in military technology enable states to fulfil power projection missions more effectively, by, for example, providing the ability to conduct accurate strikes from long ranges.<sup>4</sup> This also has had the effect of raising the cost of military reform processes as procurement programmes have struggled to keep pace with the rising financial demands of new military technologies.

The organisational implications of the contemporary power projection role and are significant, necessitating flexible and technologically advanced force structures capable of being swiftly deployed to areas of crisis beyond national territory.<sup>5</sup> Armed forces of this type tend to be expensive and require high skill levels from soldiers of all ranks, a factor which predicated a shift towards all-volunteer, professional forces – very different from the

conscript-based mass armies of the Cold War period.<sup>6</sup> The trend towards military professionalisation along these lines has been visible in the UK and US for a number of decades, the UK ending conscription in 1960 and the US in 1973. It has been intensified since the end of the Cold War however, by the scaling back of forces in mainland Europe and elsewhere and an increasing concentration on the development of rapid reaction forces that are able to be quickly deployed to trouble spots around the globe.<sup>7</sup> More recently other European countries have followed suit, with France abolishing conscription in 2001, Spain in 2001, and a number of other states including Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary all planning to do so over the next five years. In Europe more widely, NATO programmes such as the Partnership for Peace and Membership Action plans, and the EU's 1999 Helsinki Headline Goals, all encourage states to engage in military reform programmes along these lines – with the emphasis on flexible, deployable force structures.<sup>8</sup>

Peacekeeping provides an alternative justification for the development of power projection capabilities in armed forces. Peacekeeping operations, particularly those that entail the use of coercive force to achieve their ends share many of the organisational requirements of the power projection role. In particular, they require that military forces are able to be deployed for extended periods of time away from national territory often in complex and ambiguous operational environments. This in turn tends to require flexibility and high skill levels from armed forces personnel – factors that help to reinforce the shift from conscript-based force structures to more professional, all-volunteer units. It also requires that armed forces have access to the logistical support structures to enable them to deploy and sustain these units away from. Indeed, where countries with conscript-based armed forces have participated in peacekeeping operations, they have often done so through elite or specialist units drawn from their all-volunteer cadres.

Other aspects of the peacekeeping role make quite different demands on armed forces from war fighting. This is particularly the case once the enforcement stage of an operation is over and peacekeeping forces are required to engage in longer term processes of post-settlement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. For example, the SFOR peacekeeping forces deployed to Bosnia from 1996 onwards have undertaken a number of other wider activities. These have included tasks such as apprehending war crimes indictees and managing refugee returns, and offering assistance and training to local police and military forces.<sup>9</sup> Often for example civilian or paramilitary police units may have a more appropriate skill set for these environments than their military counterparts.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, post-conflict restructuring priorities often include rebuilding key infrastructural capacities such as roads, power stations or water supply networks – tasks to which military peacekeeping forces are generally unsuited but have sometimes been forced into through necessity.

Third, these emergent new missions for European armed forces have taken place in the context of evolving alliance demands and commitments, which have proved an important externally-driven influence on military reform programmes across Europe. This has particularly been the case for those states involved in the NATO accession process, which has created unprecedented pressures for the development of armed forces roles in particular directions, and has had two main implications. First, by increasing pressures towards the development of flexible, interoperable force structures that are capable of participating in multinational military operations. Second by creating a key linkage between foreign policy and defence policy goals. Indeed, military reform programmes across much of Eastern Europe have been often driven as much by the foreign policy demands of NATO accession as they have by the 'objective' national security demands of the country concerned.

NATO (and other western) outreach activity in this area has also been closely linked to democracy promotion initiatives in the former communist region. Loosely labelled

‘security sector reform’ this agenda has attempted to encourage both organisational reform as well as democratic control of armed forces. These security sector reform policies differ from past defence and military assistance programmes in both their breadth and depth. Their linkage with issues of political and economic transformation – and the willingness of ‘donor’ governments to utilise economic conditionality in its promotion (for example as a prerequisite for membership or closer association with NATO) – means that at their widest they can amount to an intrusive, transformative and explicitly normative programme.<sup>11</sup> For this reason, the security sector reform agenda is of great significance to the current redefinition of military roles in Europe. It is predicated on a understanding of what armed forces should be for, how they should be structured and what their relationship with government and society should be. Significantly, however, critical evaluation of question of military role in the post-Cold War environment – an issue that remains at the very heart of the security sector reform agenda – has often been absent. Instead, the definition and redefinition of military roles – and the specific policy recommendations that result from this – have tended to be defined in rather conservative terms, often informed by the specific experience of the ‘donor’ states themselves.<sup>12</sup> The underlying conservatism of the security sector reform agenda has posed significant challenges for ‘recipient’ countries as they have attempted to adapt existing patterns of armed forces roles, military-society relations, and defence budgetary allocations to what amounts to a new, partially externally imposed reform agenda of sometimes questionable domestic relevance.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, the challenge to the traditional defence of national territory imperative, coupled with declining societal threat perceptions have forced armed forces across Europe to look for new missions and new bases for legitimacy in their societies. These new missions have often focused on a reemphasis on internal roles for the military: both in relation to the demands of countering so-called ‘new’ security threats such as terrorism or transnational crime. For example, the emergence of non-state based security challenges such as international terrorism or drugs trafficking has reprioritised internal security issues for armed forces across Europe. These ‘new’ security challenges have had an impact on armed forces roles in two main areas. First, across Europe they have increasingly encouraged the utilisation of armed forces in a variety of different internal security roles. For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the UK has deployed military personnel in a number of internal security capacities, including patrolling at airports and providing maritime counter-terrorist activities. Similarly, the Spanish and Italian armed forces have recently established a joint amphibious brigade whose tasks include combating illegal immigration and drugs smuggling as well as the provision of domestic military assistance at during national disasters.

These developments are a reflection of changing security priorities and demands and in many respects represent a natural evolution rather than a dramatic shift in most western European armed forces’ roles. Nevertheless, current western preoccupations with non-state-based security threats have also had an important secondary impact. This has taken the form of a new emphasis on the internal security role for armed forces in their security sector reform and defence assistance programmes. For example, NATO’s eastern outreach programmes stress the importance of building the military capabilities of both the Alliance and its partners in relation to non-traditional and transnational security threats such as drugs and weapons smuggling, illegal migration and international terrorism.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, EU, NATO and OSCE security sector reform initiatives in the former Yugoslavia emphasise the importance of addressing ‘new’ security challenges in the region. In doing so, they often implicitly and explicitly encourage more closer integration and coordination between military and police activities.

Nation building and domestic military assistance roles also remain strong and are strengthening in much of Europe in the absence of clear threat. In much of central and eastern Europe, for example, recent defence reviews have identified domestic military assistance as a key task for reforming armed forces. This role is emerging as an important mechanism for legitimating armed forces institutional existence and budgets in society. In the Czech Republic, the armed forces' public image improved significantly in the wake of their actions in support of the civil-community during the severe flooding which affected the country in 1998 and 2002.<sup>15</sup> Under other circumstances, the armed forces can also be used as a parallel or substitute provider of state goods – such as welfare, labour, medical care and so on – where other government departments are not able to do so effectively. In states undergoing major socio-economic change, the social role of the military also remains important. The Croatian government, for example, has until recently resisted moves towards downsizing its armed forces, despite retaining a force structure that most observers consider to be unaffordable, overstuffed and whose soldiers are on average too old. This has occurred primarily because of the social, economic and political costs of demobilising soldiers into a civilian environment of high unemployment and limited welfare protection.<sup>16</sup>

### **Challenges for Armed Forces**

These emergent trends in European military roles have important implications for armed forces themselves and are not without problems. They also raise wider questions about the nature of European security today and the role that armed forces can and should play within this.

Perhaps the most significant challenge faced by European armed forces is that new military roles that are emerging for them are not all easily compatible, particularly given the severe defence budgetary constraints many states currently face. The conscript-based forces which suit the defence of national territory mission so-well are often ill suited for power projection tasks like peacekeeping and war fighting – and vice-versa for smaller, all-volunteer cadres. Indeed, for most countries in Europe the functional relevance of the power projection model remains restricted or peripheral for most countries in Europe. The financial and technological costs of this role mean that the ability to unilaterally engage in war fighting activities beyond national territory remains limited for most states, even within their own regions. The UK armed forces – often cited as the most advanced European exemplar of this model – have only been able to deploy in this capacity in the framework of wider US operations, as evidenced by the experience of both the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars. Even for those richer states with a tradition of projecting military power abroad therefore, the power projection model in its purest war fighting sense is of limited utility outside the context of combined military operations with the US. Elsewhere, the significance of the power projection imperative is even less apparent. Russia, for example, has Europe's largest armed forces and inherited the bulk of the military capabilities of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nevertheless, Russian military capabilities have suffered badly since this time as a result of deep budgetary cuts and an absence of military reform.<sup>17</sup> As a consequence, the ability of the Russian armed forces to project power beyond the confines of the former Soviet Union remains highly questionable.<sup>18</sup> A number of other formerly communist states – in particular Poland and Romania – have participated in some strength in the US-led power projection operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they have only been able to do so as small components of much wider multinational forces and have often been dependent on the logistical support of other allied armed forces.

Similarly, while it differs from war fighting in a number of important ways discussed above, many aspects of the peacekeeping role also operations make similar – if

less extreme demands on armed forces. It requires the development of expensive new forces structures and capabilities that are often at odds with other core demands – notably the defence of national territory role. However, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has provided one of the key mechanisms through which armed forces have legitimised their institutional existence and their budgetary demands in the context of the declining saliency of war fighting imperatives. This trend has been particularly visible in smaller states with low domestic threat perceptions, such as Denmark or Hungary.<sup>19</sup> In much of postcommunist Europe, participation in peacekeeping activities has been closely linked to the demands of the NATO accession process – in order to illustrate both a commitment to the wider goals and activities of the alliance even if the size of the forces commitment has often been small relative to the operation as a whole. In these respects, the development of peacekeeping capacities in armed forces has occurred less as an objective response to evolving international security challenges than as a consequence of domestic and international socio-political pressures.

Across Europe, therefore, the power projection model military organisation – whether for war-fighting or peacekeeping purposes – has emerged as an influential – though organisationally problematic and financially expensive – framework for military restructuring. Its technical and human resource demands mean that for many countries, it is only elite cadres within their armed forces that can hope to effectively contribute to it. Because of this, its utility for most states is inherently limited, and primarily related to fulfilling narrow alliance commitments in support of sometimes rather vague collective security and foreign policy goals rather than as a clear unilateral response to specific threat. However, the emergence of a discourse specifically equating power projection with what ‘modern’ armed forces *should* look like has helped to shape how armed forces and defence policy makers view their own military restructuring priorities. These trends have also been reinforced by the security sector reform initiatives of western states, which often equate military ‘modernisation’ with power projection in a relatively uncontested manner.<sup>20</sup> In the context of NATO’s eastward expansion, this conception of military modernisation has had even more intrusive implications, explicitly and implicitly tying military reform and restructuring programmes to the development of power projection cadres through the use of defence assistance and conditionality.<sup>21</sup> Even so, it remains difficult for many states to directly link the war fighting aspect of the power projection model to their own immediate security circumstances.

Other new roles also pose important challenges. For example, incorporating a strong internal security role for armed forces remains problematic for two reasons. First, the current concentration on internal security themes in western security sector reform and military assistance programmes may be detrimental to wider democratisation objectives. This is particularly in authoritarian or formerly authoritarian states where governance patterns may leave the internal security role vulnerable to abuse. Long experience from Latin America and elsewhere for example suggests that reinforcing internal security roles for armed forces carries the strong risk of politicising the military and increases the likelihood of their intervention in domestic politics.<sup>22</sup> These problems are perhaps most visible beyond Europe in states such as Uzbekistan where efforts to bolster the internal security capacity of the state in response to Islamist terrorism have been accompanied by widespread human rights abuses at the hands of the security forces.<sup>23</sup> However, they are also of relevance closer to home. For example, Watts argues that the deployment of the Romanian military in an internal security capacity against protesting miners in 1999 risked its politicisation and had extremely negative implications for the evolution of democratic civil-military relations in the region.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro (VSCG) have identified ‘combating terrorism’ as one of their key future tasks, largely in response to continued unrest and violence in South Serbia since 2000. However,

the evolution of this internal security role remains potentially highly problematic given the VSCG's contentious record in this field during the Yugoslav conflict.<sup>25</sup>

Second, internal security tasks make institutional demands on armed forces that may conflict with those of their other emergent roles and question whether they are the most appropriate organisations to fulfil them. In democratic societies, many of the operational requirements of these roles – such as border control, intelligence gathering and monitoring international money transfers – fall primarily under the remit of civil agencies such as the police or intelligence services. As a consequence, and apart from specific operations such as the intervention against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan the utility of regular armed forces for addressing the security challenges posed by terrorism may be limited in the long term.

The nation-building role also has important organisational implications for armed forces – which may in turn conflict with other emergent roles. Indeed, while all types of armed forces can be utilised in nation building activities for many countries conscription remains a particularly important element of this role. Under these circumstances, moving towards alternative force structures predicated around all volunteer forces is problematic and unlikely to be uncontested. As with the internal security role, questions also remain as to whether the armed forces are the most appropriate organisations to fulfil many of the domestic military assistance aspects of this role – particularly if they have been structured and equipped primarily in response to external threat. Indeed, many of the tasks of the national building role may well be more effectively and efficiently carried out by a dedicated civil defence structure. The continued importance of nation building roles for armed forces indicates the strong influence of the domestic political context in helping to shape perceptions of what their purpose is. It is significant that for most countries, the answer to this question lies not in an objective, functional response to threat, but remains deeply embedded in their domestic and international circumstances.

## Conclusion

The evolution of military roles in Europe since the end of the Cold War poses a series of important challenges for armed forces. For a number of states, the declining saliency of the external defence role has been replaced by an emerging focus on new – or at least newly re-emphasised roles and missions. These include power projection for both war fighting and peacekeeping purposes as well as internal security tasks in response to new security challenges and the continued importance of nation building and domestic military assistance role. However, the organisational and financial demands of these roles are high and often conflictual. This is significant given the economic constraints all European countries face in relation to their defence budgets, but they are especially keenly felt in the former communist region. For example, Creating armed forces that are capable of power projection missions – whether to fulfil NATO's demands or to participate in new missions – is an extremely expensive process – and one that has to be balanced against the continuing significance of defence of national territory missions and the demands of other areas of state spending. The decisions to be made between spending on for example health, education or defence for example are real ones and have a real impact in the countries themselves. Indeed, given the significantly more benign European security environment that we find ourselves in today – it is wholly legitimate for governments and populations to scrutinise defence spending and ask hard questions about why money is being spent where it is and whether that could be used elsewhere. Most European countries simply cannot 'do everything' with their armed forces therefore. They need to make hard choices about what they are *actually for* and structure their military reform programmes on this basis.

This fundamental question of *what armed forces are for* in Europe today underlies all these other themes – and also goes to the heart of questions about the future of NATO. Indeed, we seriously cannot ask what states should contribute to the NATO without being clear in much more explicit terms about what it is that they are actually contributing to do and for what reasons. This is important because the role of NATO in Europe is reflective of wider trends and issues in European security, which have an influence that goes beyond just its member states and membership applicants. On the surface these questions may seem straightforward but in practice they are anything but. Should we, for example, think about NATO in terms of its traditional role as defensive military Alliance – and if so against whom is it defending? Should we think of it as a crisis management organisation from which coalitions of the willing can be drawn for specific operations – such as that in Afghanistan – drawing on its particular strengths such as interoperability and joint command and control? Or should we think of it in much wider terms – in the context of an evolving European security community – where membership has as much to do with the spread of democratic norms and values – as it does with technical military capabilities. These visions of what NATO is – or at least the relative balance between them - are presently contested, and are illustrative of the continuing transitional state of the European security environment.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Christopher Dandeker, 'On "The Need to be Different": Recent Trends in Military Culture', in H. Strachan (ed), *The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 174-175; Martin Edmunds, *Armed Services and Society* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), p. 43; Chris Smith, 'Security Sector Reform: Institutional Engineering or Development Breakthrough?', *Conflict Security and Development*, 1(1), 2001, p. 16.
- <sup>2</sup> For a discussion of this issue in relation to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, see Edmunds, 'NATO and its New Members', pp. 159-160; For an excellent examination of these dilemmas as they have applied to Croatia see Ozren Žunec, 'Croatia's Decision to Abandon the Upgrade of Mig-21 Aircraft with the Israeli Company', TBC.
- <sup>3</sup> Charles C. Moskos, 'Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States' in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 9-10.
- <sup>4</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper 318 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 11-15; Karl W. Haltiner, 'The Definitive End of the Mass Army in Western Europe', *Armed Forces and Society*, 25(1) Fall 1998.
- <sup>5</sup> Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, 'Introduction: The Professionalisation of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe', in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds), *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 2-5, 8-12.
- <sup>6</sup> Freedman, *The Revolution*, p. 15.
- <sup>7</sup> See, for example, Moskos et al. *The Postmodern Military*.
- <sup>8</sup> Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, 'Reforming Postcommunist Militaries', Forster et al. *The Challenge of Military Reform*, pp. 247-248.
- <sup>9</sup> SFOR, *SFOR Factsheets*, <http://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/factsheet.htm>.
- <sup>10</sup> Annika Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, Adelphi Paper 343, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 15-31; Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, 'Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq', *International Affairs*, 79(2) 2003, pp. 303-306.
- <sup>11</sup> Timothy Edmunds, 'Political Conditionality and Security Sector Reform in Postcommunist Europe', *Journal of Conflict Security and Development*, 3(1) 2003, pp. 139-144.
- <sup>12</sup> In much of postcommunist Europe for example, western defence diplomacy activity has sometimes been criticised for and over-reliance on US conceptions of military professionalism.
- <sup>13</sup> For a good exploration of these themes in relation to Africa and Central America, see Hills, 'Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform', pp. 52-62.
- <sup>14</sup> See for example, NATO, *Report on the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism*, 23 June 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b040623be.htm>.
- <sup>15</sup> Marie Vlachová, 'The Integration of the Czech Armed Forces into Society', in Forster et al. *Soldiers and Societies*, pp. 44, 47-48, 52.
- <sup>16</sup> Edmunds, *Defence Reform*, pp. 40-43.
- <sup>17</sup> See, for example, Alexei G. Arbatov, 'Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles and Prospects', *International Security*, 22(4) Spring 1998, pp. 103-115; Robert W. Duggleby, 'The Disintegration of the Russian Armed Forces', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 11 (2) June 1998; Dale R. Herspring, 'The Russian Military Faces "Creeping Disintegration"', *Demokratizatsiya*, 7(4) Fall 1999.
- <sup>18</sup> Dale Herspring, 'Deprofessionalising the Russian Armed Forces', in Forster et al. *The Challenge of Military Reform*, pp. 207-208.
- <sup>19</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation after the Cold War'; Pál Dunay, 'Peace Operations and the Hungarian Armed Forces', in this volume.
- <sup>20</sup> See for example, 'The Role of Allied Military Forces and the Transformation of the Alliance's Defence Posture', *NATO Handbook*, 8 October 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0204.htm>.
- <sup>21</sup> Edmunds, 'Political Conditionality'; Edmunds, 'NATO and its New Members', pp. 150-152.
- <sup>22</sup> Koonings, 'Political Armies', pp. 125-128; Larry L. Watts, *Whose Professionalism? Separating the Institutional Roles of the Military and Police*, CSRC Report M23 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, November 2001), p. 10.
- <sup>23</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis', *ICG Briefing* (Osh/Brussels: ICG, 28 September 2001), pp. 4-6; International Crisis Group, 'Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security', *ICG Report No. 14* (Osh/Brussels: ICG, 1 March 2001), p. 27; Tamara Makarenko and Daphne Bilouri, 'Central Asian States Set to Pay the Price of US Strikes', *Jane's Intelligence Review* (November 2001), pp. 34-35;
- <sup>24</sup> Watts, *Whose Professionalism?*, pp. 11-12.

---

<sup>25</sup> Timothy Edmunds, *Defence Reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, 2000-03*, Adelphi Paper 360 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 47.

# **Military Systems in the 21st Century: Changes and Continuities**

Charles MOSKOS  
*Northwestern University*

The armed forces of advanced Western democracies at the onset of the 21st century are entering a new organisational format we can term postmodern. The contemporary period is characterised by a decline of wars between states and the rise of a terrorism cutting across national borders as well as more wars within states. Western militaries are also much likely to engage in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations than in times past. The correlates of the postmodern military are manifold. The more obvious include the decline of conscription, a growing percentage of female soldiers, and an acceptance of open homosexuals. Especially noteworthy is the employment of civilian contractors to perform military roles formerly carried out by uniformed service members. A long-standing continuity in armed forces and society must also be noted. Societal acceptance of military casualties is directly related to its leadership being viewed as self-sacrificing. This is a timeless truth.

The argument is that the armed forces of advanced Western democracies at the onset of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are entering a new organisational format. An organisational type we can call postmodern. This compares with earlier major stages that we can term the traditional military and the modern military. Of course, like all generalisations, the contrast between postmodern and earlier military organisations is easy to overdraw. To characterise the armed forces in unilinear terms inevitably does some injustice to social reality. But the social analyst must always use pure types to advance conceptual understanding. Our concern is to grasp the whole, to place the salient fact, and to have a framework to appraise relevant policy. Even though terms like traditional, modern, and postmodern have descriptive limitations, they do contain core connotations that serve to distinguish each from the other.

The traditional military extends from the very late eighteenth century to the end of World War II. Of course, the traditional military can be traced as far back as the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years War and proclaimed the principle of national sovereignty, a principle that has echoed down the three and a half centuries since. But the hallmark of the traditional military is better traced to the *levee en masse* of the French Revolution in 1793, when the concept of citizen soldier entered the European continent. This mass army system lasted, in its basic form, through World War II. Wars were mainly fought by national armies that more or less resembled each other.

The modern military prevailed from the mid-twentieth century into the 1990s and is essentially coterminous with the Cold War. A notable development was the accentuation of military professionalism in the officer class with the increasing importance of advanced education in war and staff colleges as promotion criteria. This in the context of a major reduction in force strength either through the end of conscription or allowing *de facto* exemptions for youth coming from the more privileged classes. And, of course, there occurred a vastly greater technological sophistication of weapons systems.

The postmodern military signifies the new era following the end of the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> Though much of my commentary will deal with changes in the United States, the country with which I am most familiar, it is my intent to phrase these remarks in a more general way as to have relevance for other advanced democracies. The postmodern military is characterised by increasing permeability of civilian and military spheres, both organisationally and culturally. There is also a diminution of differences of security roles between the military and civilian branches of government and, within the military, between combat and support roles. A heterosexual masculine image loses its dominance with the increasing incorporation of women and homosexuals. This is not the place to render a full treatment of postmodernism. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that the operative terms in postmodernism are pluralism, heterogeneity, and ambiguity.<sup>2</sup>

The starting point in any analyses of changes in civil-military relations is the nature of the perceived threat and core mission of the armed forces. For the traditional military the basic threat was seen as an enemy invasion and the basic mission was defence of the homeland. For the modern military in the West was the basic threat was seen as nuclear war coupled with the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The basic mission was support of a defensive alliance, namely NATO. Following the end of the Cold War, military missions increasingly focused on multinational peace and stability operations as symbolised by the NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. This implied further reductions in military manpower strength and budgetary needs.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Western democracies could even envision a warless society.<sup>3</sup> The notion of a future without major war was reincarnation of the beliefs of the founders of modern social thought. Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, among many others, held in common (about the only thing such a diverse did hold in common) the notion that industrial societies were evolving toward greater pacification.

In addition to intra-state violence, other concerns came to occupy in the attention of armed forces in Western states.<sup>4</sup> Threats to national security have transnational dimensions, such as the drug trade, environmental degradation, and uncontrolled immigration. The 1994 American intervention in Haiti was motivated in large part by the desire to prevent illegal Haitian immigration to the United States as well as the 1993 Italian intervention in Albania to stop Albanians entering Italy.

And, in fact, the greatest tensions and violence in the post-Cold War era occurred within states, such as the former Yugoslavia with its ethnic conflicts or African states with starvations and ethnic struggles veering into genocide. This brought about a primacy of international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions on the part of Western armed forces. (The 1991 Gulf War, although not a Cold War conflict, was a war involving states against state and in that sense was a throwback to an earlier period, albeit at an unprecedented levels of high technology on the winning side.) The role of the international military was very evident in the humanitarian mission following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia. In parallel fashion the possibility of an autonomous European Union military superceding its constituent national armies became a growing one.

This relatively benign international scene was abruptly ended on September 11, 2001. The Al-Qaeda attack in New York and Washington D.C. initiated a whole new paradigm on how to strengthen national security in the United States, with ripple effects elsewhere. The previous trend of blurring the lines between military and civilian structures was vastly accelerated. A new government bureaucracy called the Department of Homeland Security was created. Not too long ago, defence of the homeland would have been considered synonymous with the principal mission of the armed forces. The so-called 'Patriot Act' was passed by Congress to give the federal government unprecedented access to the private lives of American citizens. This is all to say that the American war against

terrorism now has essential civilian as well as military components. Will Europe follow this model?

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 had both old and new elements. The rapid defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime in the spring seemed to confirm the effectiveness of small special forces using precision guided munitions and network-centric warfare. This also seemed to be the case of the 2002 war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But subsequent events proved this kind of armed forces was not effective in the post-invasion situation. Indeed in Afghanistan and, especially, in Iraq, the realities of the occupation phase and resilient insurgency have proven to be especially burdensome. Old-fashioned 'boots on the ground' still seem to be the requirement.

The elemental fact remains that the distinguishing feature of the contemporary period is the decline of wars between states the rise of war within states and terrorism that cuts across national borders. In the foreseeable future, organised states are most likely to be in wars against disparate, non-centric revolutionary movements. The permeability between military and civilian organisations has become accelerated and more pronounced. Both the armed forces and civilian entities are increasingly performing parallel missions.

This in turn means that the contemporary political and military leaders must deal with many issues that their predecessor gave little if any thought to. We now turn to three of the most salient: personnel social issues, civilian employees in the defence establishment, and levels of casualty acceptance.

### **Personnel Social Issues**

Conscription is now the exception rather than the rule in Western advanced societies. In 1963, the United Kingdom was the first major country to abolish conscription following World War II. The United States did likewise in 1973 following the end of the Vietnam War. (Perhaps the most notable draftee of all time was Elvis Presley who served in as an American enlisted man in Germany during the late 1950s!) Starting in the late 1990s, conscription has been abolished in Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. Even in those countries where conscription still operates, active-duty military terms are usually less than a year. Conscientious objection for personal as well as religious reasons is customarily granted if the conscriptee is willing to do alternative civilian service. In Germany, close to half of potential male conscriptees perform 'Zivildienst.' The value such civilian servers perform in tending to the disabled, infirm and others needing assistance is considered so valuable that is a major reason the draft remains in effect in Germany.

The end of conscription in the United States is illustrative of major changes that occur in all-volunteer forces. The most obvious is the reduction in force strength. In the early 1960s, prior to the Vietnam War, there were 2.8 million people in uniform. By 2005, the number was 1.4 million. Recruit pay tripled in constant dollars, not counting enlistment bonuses. Owing to the demand for troops in Iraq, American reserve components have been called into active duty in unprecedented numbers, often for repeated tours in the combat area. This in turn has led to severe morale problems causing recruitment and retention shortfalls. Manning the force in light of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to talk of bringing back the draft. This is highly improbable. What will most likely happen to meet manpower needs in the American military is some combination of the following: a lowering of entrance standards for recruits, significant increases in enlistment bonuses, allowing more non-American to enter the military, and more shifting of military jobs to civilian contractors (see below).

A major demographic shift in the emerging military is the growing number and role of women. In the traditional military, women were either excluded or limited to narrow

roles such as in administration or nursing. Where women did serve in significant roles the mode was a separate all-female auxiliary corps. In the modern military, women's role expanded with the entrance of women into military academies (1976 in the U.S.A.) and the demise of all-female units (1978). By the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the postmodern militaries of most Western countries had opened virtually all military roles to women. One of the clearest indications of postmodernism was the 2004 decision in the German military to allow sexual relations between service members regardless of the rank of the parties.<sup>5</sup>

Although the United States is not in the forefront of postmodern developments on gender issues, women are now assigned in all military units except submarines, special operations, and ground combat units. But the war in Iraq has seen the 'co-location' of support units with combat units.<sup>6</sup> In early 2005, women made up 17 percent of all American military personnel, 4 percent of generals, and about 10 percent of those stationed in Iraq. The increasing number of women in the American military has not been free of scandals of sexual intimidation and harassment by male superiors. More noteworthy, the incidence of female casualties in the Iraq war has not caused any exceptional concern in the American public.

The status of homosexuals in the military is another example of change in a postmodern military. In general terms, homosexuals were incarcerated or discharged dishonorably in the traditional military. In the modern military, homosexuals were discretely accepted in many instances, but liable to non-punitive discharges. Although homosexuality still remains somewhat contentious in the postmodern military, the clear trend is toward increased toleration and acceptance. European Union regulations clearly state there must be no discrimination against homosexuals and this is formally the case in Western European militaries. In the Netherlands, there is even an organisation of military members advocating rights for homosexuals. Yet *de facto* discrimination persists and there are few open homosexuals in the combat arms even in advanced European countries. Still the equal treatment of homosexuals is the overriding trend.

In the United States, the policy is invoked in the expression 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell.' This was a Congressional law passed in 1994 in which one proviso is: 'homosexuality is incompatible with military service.' Thus contrary to much commentary, the restriction on homosexuals in the military is not within the power of the military to change. Congress must take such action. Surveys of American military personnel show women soldiers are much more tolerant of homosexuals than are male soldiers. Of interest, white soldiers are more tolerant toward homosexuals than black soldiers. While the debate on the acceptance of homosexuals in the military continues in the United States, it is unlikely to return toward a more restrictive policy.

The family is another personnel issue of the postmodern military that deserves mention. In the traditional and even modern military, a career officer's wife was often regarded as a member of the military community. Indeed, her participation in customary military social functions could even be a factor in the officer's promotion. In the postmodern military, military spouses are much more likely to have employment outside of the home. Fewer and fewer of them – and we are still speaking mainly of wives rather than of husbands – have either the time or the inclination to engage in the social life of military installations.

### **Civilians Employees in the Defence Establishment**

In the traditional military, because of conscription, menial labor was typically performed by military personnel. In the modern military, the role of civilian contractors became an expanding one. Some examples in the United States include: civilian technicians aboard

warships to maintain complex weapons systems starting in the 1940s; a C.I.A. funded airline played a major American role in the Vietnam War; the first U.S. dead in Somalia in 1992 were civilians hired by the Army; the large American military base in Kosovo was built by civilian contractors even before the arrival of American troops.

But the exponential growth of civilian entities in the postmodern era is truly a new paradigm. Little did I realise when I first proposed almost two decades century ago that the military was shifting from an institution to an occupation that private profit-making companies would one day actually do major military jobs.<sup>7</sup> We are now witnessing in the United States more and more functions of the military being performed by completely civilian structures – not just in homeland defence, but also in overseas and war-related missions. It is a vital question to ask if this trend is being replicated in Europe as well.

Private military companies have now engendered their own acronym – PMCs.<sup>8</sup> It is estimated that for-profit firms now enjoy an estimated \$50 billion in business worldwide each year. America and British PMCs train armies in countries as varied, to name a few, as Croatia, Uzbekistan, and Equatorial Guinea. In Colombia, they fly helicopter gun ships to eradicate coca crops. PMCs provide bodyguards for the president in Afghanistan, construct American detention camps in Guantanamo in Cuba, and guard the military bases of the United States and its allies in many parts of Iraq and Kuwait. Though the outsourcing of military roles is, in one sense, a recent development, in another sense it reverts back to the *condottieri* - literally, military contractors - of the Italian city-states of the 14th century.

With the onset of the Iraq War, much attention has been focused on the Halliburton Company, the predominant civilian contractor. Some 20,000 employees accompanied the U.S. forces in the buildup to the 2003 war in Iraq. Once the war started, its subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root performed major military roles such as maintaining communication systems, handling aspects of logistics and identifying key targets. Surely, an important line was crossed in February, 2004, when the American Navy staffed a warship, the U.S.S. Coronado, with a crew that was half civilian and half military sailors.

In a related move, the Pentagon announced in 2003 that it will seek to do away with the civil service rights of most Defense Department employees. DoD argues that these changes are necessary and will provide management with more latitude and efficiency in hiring, promotion, and firing. This certainly implies a de-institutionalisation of a civilian government bureaucracy - or, maybe more accurately, this makes an existing occupation even more occupational. The effect of these trends - the increasing reliance on PMCs and the changed status of civilian employees in defence ministries - on international security is something that definitely requires sociological attention. While currently most pronounced in the United States, these trends must be appraised in a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective with other countries.

### **Levels of Casualty Acceptance**

Perhaps the single most crucial variable in the relationships between the armed forces and society is casualty acceptance. It is generally agreed that casualty acceptance is much lower in Western societies than in times past. Two different conventional wisdoms compete in the explanation of societal acceptance/aversion of combat casualties. In short-hand terms, we can refer to these as the societal change versus the worthwhile cause explanations.

The older conventional wisdom holds that the drop in casualty acceptance is attributed to changes in the social values and culture of advanced Western democracies.<sup>9</sup> Namely, the decline of national patriotism, a diminishing ethos of masculinity, and the rise of individualism. This correlates with widespread material prosperity and new information-age lifestyles. In general terms, those on the conservative side of the political social

spectrum bemoan such changes while those on the liberal side generally see these changes as positive.

Related to the above is Edward Luttwak's theory that a declining birth rate and resultant smaller families make the loss of children in war fighting much more traumatic than in an era with large families.<sup>10</sup> This explanation had a certain surface plausibility. But what are to make of the fact that the birth rate in the United States is higher than in the former Yugoslavia, where ethnic willingness to suffer -- and cause -- casualties has become legendary?

The newer conventional wisdom holds, in opposition to the first, that casualty acceptance is much higher than generally assumed if and when certain conditions are met.<sup>11</sup> A key element is that the public will accept combat deaths when the national interest -- sometimes the adjective 'vital' is interjected -- is clearly at stake. Hence, the quick American departure from Somalia in 1993 once the going got tough. Another condition in the newer paradigm is that there must be a good chance of final victory. From this perspective, the United States was willing to absorb large casualties in World War II, but not in Vietnam once that war developed into a 'quagmire' from which the US wanted to extricate itself. It has become increasingly common in American commentary to compare the current situation in Iraq with that of the Vietnam war.

Both the societal change and worthwhile cause explanations of casualty acceptance have a surface plausibility, but, both are misleading. Rather, attention must be focused on the social composition of those who are serving in the armed forces and those who are not. I propose here that a country accepts long-term casualties only when the leadership is viewed as self-sacrificing. This is true for traditional, modern, and postmodern militaries.

Below is some anecdotal and historical evidence to support the thesis that casualty acceptance -- across diverse societies -- is directly related to the willingness of elite youth to put their lives on the line.

- Theodore Roosevelt resigned his position as assistant secretary of the Navy to join the Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War. In World War I, he stated that wished his own sons should not only serve but even be wounded as mark of valour.
- In both world wars, British nobility had a higher casualty rate than the working class. Winston Churchill's son, Randolph Churchill was wounded several times during WWII taking part in commando operations behind enemy lines. Prince Andrew fought as a helicopter pilot in the Falklands war.
- In World War II, Joseph Stalin's son, a fighter pilot, was shot down over East Europe and captured alive by the Germans. The Germans offered to exchange the son for German generals that were prisoners of the Soviets. Stalin refused and his son was shot when attempting to escape from a prisoner of war camp.
- All of the Kennedy brothers of Boston -- Joseph, John, Robert, and Edward -- volunteered for military service. In the next generation, none of the 15 male Kennedy cousins served in the armed forces.

Even in a hopeless war, the willingness to suffer casualties can be explained only by the willingness of the elite to sacrifice themselves. The proposition that acceptance of high casualties is correlated with expectations of victory is not borne out. Consider the following examples.

- The Confederacy in the American Civil War (1861-65) suffered immense casualties long after the cause was hopeless. The Confederate officer class that suffered disproportionate casualties was mainly constituted from the Southern plantocracy -- the closest America has ever come to having a nobility.
- In what may be the most disastrous war (1865-70) ever fought by a nation state, Paraguay declared war simultaneously on Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. The Paraguayans displayed a suicidal bravery to the end with the loss of 80 percent of the adult male population. Of significance, the despotic ruler, Francisco Solano Lopez, fought in the front lines where he was finally bayoneted to death.
- The Japanese unwillingness to surrender, until the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were dropped, is legendary. This even though their was little chance of victory by 1944. That a disproportionate number of the Japanese aristocracy served in the military is surely not coincidental.
- It would be revealing to compare the class composition of the French and Polish military at the start of World War II. Certainly, the Polish willingness to fight and die in a hopeless war against Germany must take into consideration the high proportion of the Polish nobility serving in their country's military.

I argue that such historical and anecdotal evidence is a better guide to explaining casualty acceptance than surveys based on hypothetical scenarios. Only when the body bags are real do we know the real attitudes of the American public – or any other public – toward casualty acceptance.

The test of my thesis that elite sacrifice is a necessary condition for American resolve and commitment will be the Iraq War and its aftermath. As of December 31, 2004, the number of American dead in Iraq is 1,321, of whom 1,038 were killed in action. Though this number is low by historical standards of war casualties, it has caused a notable deterioration in support of the war. It is noteworthy that of the 535 members of the U.S. Congress and Senate, only eight have children serving in the military.

The low level of casualty acceptance for the Iraq War supports the core proposition that citizens accept hardships only when their leadership is viewed as self-sacrificing. I will go further and say there are rarely exceptions to this rule. The answer to the question of what are national interests is not found in the cause itself, but in who is willing to die for that cause. Only when the privileged classes perform military service does the country define the cause as worth young people's blood. Only when elite youth are on the firing line do war losses become more acceptable. This explains the seeming paradox of why Americans have a lower acceptance of combat casualties with a volunteer military made of working-class youth than we had with a draft army that included the upper classes.

Let us remember that Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter, Iphigenia, to assure good winds for the deployment of his soldiers during Operation Recover Helen of Troy. It is also true that Agamemnon's wife, Clytemnestra, had Agamemnon killed for sacrificing their daughter. The ancient Greeks understood that such a sacrifice was necessary if the troops were to sacrifice themselves. We should not forget this ageless truth.

In brief, there are continuities and well as changes in the sociology of the armed forces as we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## Endnotes

Support from the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) is gratefully acknowledged. The mode and presentation of the data collection are the sole responsibility of the principal investigator and do not necessarily reflect the views of ARI or the U.S. military.

<sup>1</sup> For an extended discussion, see Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams, David R. Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>2</sup> Illustrative of social changes in the contemporary military that would be unheard of just a few years ago are the following. The American military recognises Wiccans as a bona fide religion. The British Navy allows a sailor to perform Satanic rituals aboard his vessel. The Canadian military academy allows two male graduates to hold a same-sex marriage ceremony on the academy grounds.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1991); Frances Fukuyama, *The End of History* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1992).

<sup>4</sup> Excellent recent overviews of European armed forces include: Jean M. Callaghan and Franz Kernic, eds., *Armed Forces and International Security* (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction, 2003); Hans Born, Karl Haltiner, Marjan Malesic, eds., *Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Contemporary Societies* (Bade-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004); and Marie Vlachova and Ljubica Jelusics, eds., *Military-Society Relations in the Countries of Transition*, in press.

<sup>5</sup> 'German Military OKs Fraternalization,' *Army Times*, 6 Sep, 2004, p. 6. The German army was also considering lifting the long-standing prohibition against having sex on military installations. The change was considered because 'there was a feeling that the existing regulations were longer in keeping with the times.' *Army Times*, May 31, 2004, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> 'Bush Pentagon Moving to Force Female Soldiers into New Land Combat Units,' *CMR Report*, Dec. 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization,' *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1(1977), pp. 41-50. For a fuller discussion, see Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* (McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).

<sup>8</sup> The literature on private military companies is expanding rapidly. See, Ken Silverstein, *Private Warriors* (N.Y.: Verso, 2000); Allan Gerson and Nat J. Coletta, *Privatizing Peace* (Ardley, N.Y.: Transnational, 2002); P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

<sup>9</sup> See, Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus* (Rand, 1996); Jeffrey Record, 'Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,' *Parameters* (summer, 2002), pp. 4-23; Leonard Wong, 'Maintaining Public Support for Military Operations,' in John R. Martin ed., *Defeating Terrorism* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (Jan. 2002), pp. 19-31; and Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., 'Kosovo, Casualty Aversion and the American Military Ethos,' *Journal of Legal Studies* (fall 2002), pp. 99-107.

<sup>10</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, 'Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,' *Foreign Affairs*, (May-June, 1995), pp. 109-122; 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy,' *Foreign Affairs*, (July/Aug., 1996), pp. 33-44.

<sup>11</sup> The notable work advancing this viewpoint is Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

# The Defence of National Territory: the German Experience

Wilfried VON BREDOW  
*Philipps-University Marburg*

The article traces back the historical, political and strategic contexts that led to the creation of the German Bundeswehr and their integration into NATO in the mid-1950s. An analysis of official documents and statements by the Federal Ministry of Defence serves to illustrate the changes and continuities in the functions and strategic imperatives that have been ascribed to the Bundeswehr over the last decades. These objectives, however, stood often in contrast to the beliefs and threat perceptions of other parts of society, such as the peace movement, in particular at the beginning of the 1980s and after the end of the East-West conflict. Yet, as current political events demonstrate, these often ideologically heated debates have largely been superseded by more pragmatic, and still ongoing, discussions on the future role of German armed forces in times of a deeply changing international security landscape and the most far reaching reforms and restructuring efforts of the military in the history of the German Bundeswehr.

The West German Bundeswehr was founded in the mid-1950s, at the peak of the Cold War period of the East-West conflict. At that time, the prevalent Western European perception of threat was centred on a Soviet attack with massive conventional forces. The very first mission of the Bundeswehr therefore was to contribute to the defence of NATO's territory, which meant in Central Europe, of course, the defence of West Germany's territory.

There were three complexities that made it rather difficult to paint a clear picture of the politico-military situation in Central Europe.

The historical context generated a considerable amount of uneasiness and mistrust among Germany's neighbours – could one really rely on the 'democratic turn' of the Germans and let them have weapons and armed forces again? In order to appease these fears and feelings the newly founded Bundeswehr was firmly integrated in NATO's military structures. Furthermore, the Federal Republic had to consent to renounce nuclear weapons. This renunciation has been, by the way, renewed in the Two-plus-Four Treaty of 1990.

The political context was especially complex because of Germany's division. Both German states were firmly integrated in the antagonistic structures of the East-West conflict. They were the 'front states' of the East-West confrontation on the European theatre. Any military East-West confrontation in this part of the world would immediately become an intra-German war. Would the Germans fight against their fellow-Germans on the front? In the Federal Republic, traditional national or nationalistic allegiances were in juxtaposition with the new democratic and westernised self-perception.

The strategic context soon became more complex because of nuclear weapons that were regarded as a comparatively cheap substitute for troops. The huge conventional advantage of the Red Army and its allies in the Warsaw Pact was to be counterbalanced by nuclear weapons. The problem with these weapons was, however, that their use on a battlefield in Central Europe would leave great parts of West Germany in ruins. Attempts to design a trans-border defence strategy were frequently made, but failed to materialise. They

ultimately lacked either military or political credibility (or both). These disquieting anticipations of a military confrontation in Central Europe caused the Germans to think of the Bundeswehr as a military instrument of a Cold War policy, which emphasised the need to avoid any direct military confrontation. This implied that the Bundeswehr was primarily regarded as a contribution to the deterrence of the Soviet Union. Territorial defence became a secondary purpose. This was logical because the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic rested on the condition that the Soviet Union abstained from any aggression. Territorial defence could even be interpreted as an ingredient of deterrence, for the anticipation of a functioning military defence augmented the credibility of deterrence.

### **Defence, Deterrence, and Détente**

The constitution of the Federal Republic precedes the foundation of the Bundeswehr. In it, we find some explicit norms about the only legitimate use of the Bundeswehr as an instrument of the country's policy. The armed forces of the Federal Republic are a means for defence (Article 87, section 1). Article 26, section 1 strictly forbids aggression and all preparations for it. The 1975/76 White Paper described the functions of the Bundeswehr in the following way:

The defence function means, primarily, deterrence. The Armed Forces, together with allied troops, are to deter any aggressor from using military force, or from threatening with military force. This demands high morale, efficiency, and combat readiness.

The military missions of the Bundeswehr were derived from this political orientation. During the East-West conflict, the principle of forward defence was, understandably, of great importance to West Germany.

Forward defence requires the capability and intention of NATO to respond without delay and with efficiency. The reaction of NATO must prevent a long period of fighting on the territory of the Federal Republic. Such combat would finally destroy the substance of all the values we are defending.

The army with its combat units was to be ready to respond to a surprise attack at any time. Most of those parts of the army, which depended on mobilisation, had to be operational within three days. The three German army corps had their battle sector positioned between the sectors of allied troops. This 'stratification' was meant as an expression of alliance solidarity and as a political signal to the potential aggressor that any military attack in Central Europe would not only be an attack on West Germany, but on the alliance itself.

### *The Nuclear Dimension*

Historians of the Cold War point to the fact that the nuclearisation of the military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact made this confrontation more dangerous than any other preceding conflict in world history. By the same token, however, the logic of military deterrence exercised a moderating effect on the world powers. Under the auspices of mutual assured destruction, a strategic constellation that developed in the mid 1960s, the actual use of nuclear weapons appeared to incorporate an incalculable risk of self-destruction. The Berlin crisis in August 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in autumn 1962 provided the most critical moments of the Cold War. Later, the East-West conflict became less confrontational and entered its Détente phase. The two Germanies originally had difficulties in adjusting their policies to the new East-West climate. West Germany's new Ostpolitik had various purposes; the reduction of the risk of war figured prominently among them.

The basis of this new orientation in East-West relations is expressed in the Harmel Report of 1967, which underlines the double track function of NATO in promoting both deterrence and détente. This combination allowed for a whole series of multilateral East-West security arrangements (CSCE; MBFR; confidence-building measures). The Federal Republic, after some hesitation, wholeheartedly supported this new orientation, for it stabilised the military situation in Central Europe.

The ongoing so-called arms race generated, on the other hand, some destabilisation in this situation. The late 1970s and the early 1980s saw long and painful military-strategic and political debates in West Germany and other European countries about the most suitable (i.e. less risky) response to the Soviet deployment of 'Euro-strategic' nuclear missiles (the SS 20 in NATO terminology). In West Germany, NATO's double-track decision of December 1979 came under heavy rhetorical fire on the part of pacifists, left wing groups, but also unusually high numbers of persons and organisations from the political centre. The security policy and the military component of this policy were, once again, formulated in a decidedly gentle way. The 'White Paper 1983: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany' stated:

Peace in Europe rests upon military equilibrium between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The direct confrontation in Central Europe of the armed forces of the United States of America and the Soviet Union creates both a measure of stability non-existent in other parts of the world and a unique politico-military situation. The concentration of forces of the two alliances in Europe is part of the global military balance between West and East which has for four decades been the foundation of Western Europe's security and peace in Europe...As far as the situation in Europe is concerned, the ration of military forces directly effective in that region is of essential importance, since it governs the parameters of security of the European countries in the face of potential threats of aggression...Any change in these parameters to the detriment of Western Europe would increase the danger to security.<sup>1</sup>

### *Force Structure*

The strength of the Bundeswehr varied over the decades. In 1984, the year before the very last period of the East-West conflict was to begin and the Soviet Union and communism started to implode, the Bundeswehr had 495.000 soldiers and 180.000 civilian employees. 257.000 soldiers belonged to the category of long-term volunteers (professional soldiers and limited career personnel with between three and fifteen years of active service. The army accounted for the bulk of the armed forces (334.000 soldiers). It had at its disposal eleven divisions together with thirty-six brigades of A 1 status (highest readiness and availability status of NATO forces) and six civil defence brigades. The air force had 110.540 servicemen and the navy 38.059. There was also a mainly neglected 'territorial army' that had to provide infra-structural services and depended mostly on reservists (altogether 850.000 in 1984).

## After the End of the East-West Conflict

In a certain sense, the end of the East-West conflict and the vanishing threat of the Soviet Union also meant an end to the Bundeswehr as it was conceived in the 1950s and developed in the following decades. The *raison d'être* of the Bundeswehr since 1955 had been to contribute to contain Soviet expansionism and to take part in the Western deterrence of the Soviet Union. This goal was attained with surprising success.

### *The Pacifist Moment*

For many Germans, the end of the East-West conflict and Germany's unification symbolised the dawn of a new era of peaceful global politics. This utopian euphoria expressed itself in the political hope for a future without armed forces. On March 9, 1990, the weekly *DIE ZEIT* published the text of an appeal for a 'non-military Federal Republic, a state without armed forces'. The authors of this appeal, mainly intellectuals with a peace movement background, tried to convince the public that now was the right moment to overcome old-fashioned political habits in international politics.

The dramatic events of the previous months have destroyed the final remnants of irrational military scenarios. At least in Europe, a realm without arms and soldiers has become a realistic option. This option offers real security...the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic need neither a Bundeswehr nor a Nationale Volksarmee. Both states should seize the historical opportunity for complete disarmament. This decision will convince their neighbours that we Germans have learned from our history...

This appeal was formulated and published just before the political decision for the acceleration of the unification process. It reflects the hopes and wishes of a minority in West Germany, but of a rather important minority with a comparatively great impact on German political discourse. The majority of Germans in East and West Germany did not share this utopian view; they simply did not care very much for the military.

At the same time, the conflict in the Persian Gulf escalated. This development was certainly not completely missed by the Germans. On the contrary – because of Saddam Hussein's policy of using foreign visitors to Iraq as hostages, there was always a certain amount of public political attention concerning the Gulf crisis. But this crisis was mostly perceived as a nasty political affair and not as a conflict with the potential for vertical and horizontal escalation.

The intervention by the UN coalition in January 1991 came as a shock to the German public. In fact, the weeks that followed will have to be remembered as a time of a collective hysteria in Germany. The peace movement was capable of occupying public opinion by catastrophic, even apocalyptic scenarios. The politicians had difficulties in responding to this general wave of Angst pacifism.

This pacifist moment was soon over. So was the utopian euphoria. A great number of those people who had signed the appeal for a Federal Republic without soldiers in March 1990, published another appeal in *DIE ZEIT* of January 10, 1992 'Our wish for 1992: Disarmament instead of Bundeswehr all over the world!' The slightly more defensive text under this headline reads like this:

Since the annexation (!!) of the GDR by the FRG and since this country has acquired full sovereignty we can hear more and more that the greater Germany has

joined the ranks of the great powers and has to take on more 'responsibility'. This would include participation in international military actions within the framework of UN crisis management. Some politicians, mainly in the CDU/CSU, even demand the use of the Bundeswehr in military conflicts beyond a UN mandate. All this is only possible after an amendment to the Basic Law. We are strictly against such an amendment...The increased significance of our country in international affairs should not mislead us into making military interventions by the FRG abroad easier. The German past should oblige us to reduce our military potential as much as possible – or to disarm completely.

This 'wish for 1992' was swept away by the political developments of the early 1990s. The war in former Yugoslavia between the different ethnic, religious, and political groups escalated into more and more violence. This war and its successors erased all hopes for a harmonious and non-violent global or regional order. The Constitutional Court in Germany, thus, decided in June 1994 that the government with the consent of the majority of the Bundestag can decide to deploy the Bundeswehr in the framework of collective security structures in peace missions.

### *Organisational Changes*

Immediately after the unification, the Bundeswehr had to tackle two problems, first the disbandment of the East German armed forces, the Nationale Volksarmee, and secondly the reduction of its size to no more than 370.000 troops, a number decided upon in the Two-plus-Four Treaty and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 1A Treaty. This reduction was to be realised within four years.

The take-over process of the Nationale Volksarmee has been frequently analysed and evaluated.<sup>2</sup> On the day of the unification, the East German armed forces disposed of about 90.000 soldiers and about 48.000 civilians. Of the 50.000 career regulars and fixed-term volunteers, about one-fifth eventually stayed with the Bundeswehr. Although many of the directly concerned officers and NCOs of the former NVA were not happy with the integration process, it must be regarded as a considerable organisational accomplishment.

This is all the more true as the armed forces were, in a rather short period, to be reduced by roughly one-third which implied re-structuring and re-stationing.

Other steps began in 1996 and were implemented gradually. These included a further reduction in peacetime troop strength to about 340.000, the establishment of crisis-reaction forces, and the reorganisation of conscription along more flexible lines, with terms of service ranging from ten to twenty-three months. The cuts in peacetime troop strength by a total of 32.000 soldiers reduced the active-duty army to 233.400, the air force to 77.400 and the navy to 27.200.<sup>3</sup>

The Socialdemocrat-Green coalition government, in office since 1998, has since continued to reduce the number of soldiers and to alter the structural framework of the armed forces.

### **The Current State of the Bundeswehr Reform**

What can be called Germany's political-military paradox<sup>4</sup> results from the difficulties of the country finding its role in international security policy, from financial restraints, and basically from a general German malaise regarding the necessary and overdue reforms of state

and society. This does not mean that the current situation is characterised by a stalemate. On the contrary, a lot of reforms have been announced, and the two social democratic Defence Ministers Rudolf Scharping (1998-2001) and Peter Struck (since 2001), were busy pushing the transformation of the armed Forces ('Bundeswehr-Reform') ahead. Commissions have been founded, Parliamentary debates have been staged, and especially in the context of the German decision, not to take part in any military intervention in Iraq 2002/2003, the political establishment and the politically interested public seem to have restarted a review of Germany's priorities in security policy and of the profile of the Bundeswehr. A very important factor in these developments is the Europeanisation of the European Union's security policy, symbolised by, among other things, the European Security Strategy of December 2003.

The 'Defence Policy Guidelines' of May 21, 2003 by the German Defence Minister is currently the most authoritative document describing the goals for the missions and structures of the Bundeswehr. This document re-affirms that the concept of security of the German government is multi-dimensional and comprises civilian and military components. It also emphasised the changing nature of the threats to Germany's security, which calls for a security and defence policy that is geared toward the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts. Here are some key statements of the document:

- The Bundeswehr focuses on operations in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management as well as in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory...
- Multinational preventive security measures are one of the basic factors determining German defence policy. With the exception of evacuation and rescue missions, the Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations only together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context.
- Traditional national defence against a conventional attack, which previously solely determined the structures of the Bundeswehr, no longer corresponds with the actual security policy requirements. The capabilities that had been kept available solely for this purpose are no longer required. However, it must be ensured that the ability to conduct national defence operations against a conventional attack can be reconstituted within a foreseeable, albeit prolonged period of time.
- In view of the changed security situation, the tasks of the Bundeswehr will be reprioritised.
- In view of the new international environment, capabilities solely designed for traditional national defence against an adversary using conventional means are no longer needed.
- The Bundeswehr, as an instrument of a comprehensive and proactive security and defence policy,
  - safeguards the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy,
  - contributes to stability on a European and global scale,
  - ensures national security and defence and helps defend allies,
  - supports multinational cooperation and integration.

### **A Farewell to the Defence of National Territory?**

This approach to the future of the Bundeswehr implies a silent farewell to the traditional task of the defence of the nation's territory, or to be more precise: a farewell to the territorial conceptualisation of Germany's national security interests. Every security policy document in Germany that refers to the re-structuring of the Bundeswehr does not omit mentioning the necessity to restore the national defence readiness in the case of deterioration in the

political situation around Germany. This is, however, not more than a rhetorical device for two kinds of potential oppositions, first the conservatives who have difficulties in departing from a territorial concept of national security interests, and secondly the left-wing of governing parties in which the out-of-area missions of the Bundeswehr are often interpreted as renewed imperialism. Germany is, in fact, surrounded by friendly neighbours, a situation which became even more evident with the EU enlargement on May 1, 2004.

According to recent announcements of the Defence Minister, the Bundeswehr will be subdivided into:

- response forces (about 35.000) for multinational high-intensity operations,
- stabilisation forces (about 70.000) for peace stability measures in low- and medium-intensity operations,
- support forces (137.000 personnel, including 40.000 undergoing training at any given time) to support all operations and ensure routine duty operations of the Bundeswehr at home.<sup>5</sup>

So the size of the Bundeswehr will further shrink to 242.000 troops. The number of barracks will also be reduced, from over 600 that existed in 2003 to approximately 400 in the next few years.

The now nine-month basic military service will, according to the Minister, not be abolished, but adjusted to the 'changed task spectrum'. Whether conscription will continue to function as a basic recruitment channel for the Bundeswehr, remains to be seen.

The changed task spectrum of the armed forces and the changed concept of security, the emergence of a European security and defence policy and the still growing gap in arms technology within NATO have yet to converge into a coherent politico-strategic vision for the Bundeswehr. Therefore, the processes of transformation and reform may even have to accelerate.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> *White Paper 1983: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Bonn: The Federal Minister of Defence, 1983), pp.13-14.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick Zilian, Jr., *From Confrontation to Cooperation. The Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Dale R. Herspring, *Requiem für eine Armee. Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee der DDR* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> Bernhard Fleckenstein, 'Germany: Forerunner of a Postnational Military?', in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 84.

<sup>4</sup> Martin Agüera, 'Ambitious Goals, Weak Means? Germany's Project "Future Bundeswehr" is Facing Many Hurdles', *Defense Analysis*, 17:3 (2001), pp. 289-306.

<sup>5</sup> Press Conference by the Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck on January 13, 2004, The Further Development of the Bundeswehr: Waypoints for the New Course, at: [http://eng.bmvg.de/sicherheit/print/040204\\_wegpunkte\\_fuer\\_neuer\\_kurs.php](http://eng.bmvg.de/sicherheit/print/040204_wegpunkte_fuer_neuer_kurs.php) (23 August 2004).

# **Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation after the Cold War**

Peter Viggo JAKOBSEN  
*Danish Institute for International Studies*

Peace operations have been the single most important driver of defence transformation in Denmark since the end of the Cold War. While this may also be true for other European countries, Denmark nevertheless stands out in a number of respects. The transformation from invasion defence towards an expeditionary force structure began as early as 1992, the process has been underpinned by a remarkably strong domestic consensus, and the officer corps has not resisted the move away from invasion defence. The distinct features of the Danish case can be explained by the fact that Danish decision makers buried the threat from the East very quickly, that Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Defence Minister Hans Hækkerup succeeded in pushing the armed forces to the forefront of Danish foreign and security policy at an early stage, and that the policy paid off. This locked Danish defence transformation on a course of internationalisation that it shows no signs of departing from.

The Danish Armed Forces have been engaged in a process of transformation since the end of the Cold War. The same can be said for all European countries, but the dominant role played by peace operations in this process does make Denmark special. The Danish experience even stands out in comparison to the other Nordic countries that are most similar to Denmark in terms of force size and structure, defence spending, traditional (Cold War) peacekeeping experience and number of troops deployed abroad on international operations.<sup>1</sup> Compared to the other Nordic countries, Denmark was the first to engage in fundamental defence reforms, it had less qualms about going beyond traditional peacekeeping, the process of internationalisation has gone much further in Denmark than in the other Nordic countries and it has been far less contested domestically. The process of transformation in Denmark started as early as November 1992 when the decision to establish the 4,500-strong Danish Reaction Brigade (DRB) was taken. In Norway and Sweden the reform processes did not start in earnest until 2000, and it still has not started in Finland, which continues to rely on general conscription and give priority to invasion defence.<sup>2</sup>

The chapter will show that peace operations has been the single most important driver of defence transformation in Denmark after the end of the Cold War, and explain why. The dominant role played by peace operations in this process is demonstrated in the first part of the chapter by means of four indicators: the importance attributed to peace operations in both defence and foreign policy, its actual size in terms of personnel and deployment costs, its influence on the force structure, and its influence on procurement. The second part of the chapter explains the rise of peace operations. The disappearance of the Soviet threat, the outbreak of war in the Balkans, pressures from the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the rise of democracy and human rights are identified as the principal explanatory factors at the international level. They apply to all

European countries and explain why Denmark has moved in the same direction as everybody else. To explain the peculiarities of the Danish case three factors at the national level must be invoked: threat perceptions, the pivotal roles played by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (1982-93) and Defence Minister Hans Hækkerup (1993-2000), and luck. The chapter ends with a conclusion that sums up the main points and discusses the future of Danish defence transformation.

### **The Rise of Peace Operations after the End of the Cold War**

Participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping played an important role in the Danish foreign policy during the Cold War. Denmark participated in nine of the 13 peacekeeping and observer missions that were conducted by the UN during the Cold War (1948-87), and peacekeeping figured prominently in foreign policy documents and statements. Peace operations played a marginal role in Danish defence and security policy, however. Decisions to commit troops to UN operations were only made when they were deemed not to have a negative impact on national defence, and alliance/neutralty considerations were an important determinant. Effective national defence was seen as a prerequisite for peacekeeping participation, and the latter invariably lost out if it was perceived to have a detrimental effect on the former.

The influence of peace operations on the Danish defence structure and procurement was consequently almost non-existent. Peace operations remained an ad-hoc activity organised outside the defence forces. UN contingents were equipped with basic military equipment and made up by volunteers who were raised outside of the defence forces. The vast majority of the personnel serving were conscripts who had completed their basic military training. Only 8-10 per cent of the personnel were drawn from the officer corps and career officers looked upon the UN service with disdain. It was not considered real soldiering and it never became a trump in the promotion game. Even demanding UN service was dismissed as ‘holidaying’ as one Danish officer learned when he asked his commanding officer why his UN experience from the Congo had not been taken into account in the decision to promote him.<sup>3</sup>

All this has now changed. Peace operations has become the single most important driver of Danish defence reform. This is evident in the prominent position that peace operations have been given Danish defence and foreign policy, the dramatic increase in the number of troops deployed abroad, the political willingness to break the defence budget to pay the costs of the international deployments, and their determining influence on the force structure and on procurement. Taken together these indicators demonstrate the pervasive influence that peace operations have had on Danish defence transformation after the Cold War.

#### *The Prominence of Peace operations in Danish Defence and Foreign Policy*

Peace operations have become the flagship in the new post-Cold War foreign policy doctrine known as ‘active internationalism’,<sup>4</sup> which holds that Denmark must play an active role and make a difference on the international scene. The crucial importance attributed to peace operations in the new doctrine not just evident from the way in which it is singled out for praise time and again by Danish Defence, Foreign and Prime Ministers. It is also demonstrated by the strong concern voiced by former and current Defence and Foreign Ministers that the defence opt-out preventing Danish participation in peace operations led by the European Union (EU) are destroying the prestige and influence generated by Denmark’s active involvement in peace operations since the end of the Cold War.<sup>5</sup> Niels Helveg Petersen even claimed that it played a role in his decision to resign as Foreign Minister in December 2000.<sup>6</sup>

The role of peace operations has become equally dominant in Danish defence policy. Peace operations were defined as a main task of the armed forces when the *Law on the objectives, tasks and organisation of the armed forces* was revised in 1993, and their importance was further underlined in the latest revision in 2001.<sup>7</sup> In the course of the 1990s, the Cold War distinction between peace operations and national defence simply disappeared as Danish decision makers successfully portrayed the former as an integral part of national defence. The argument that peace operations equal national defence has become an axiom of Danish defence and security that is rarely questioned. Nobody consequently raised an eyebrow in October 2004 when the Defence Minister stated that the defence of Denmark now took place in caves in Afghanistan and in the Iraqi desert.<sup>8</sup> The shift from invasion defence to a more expeditionary posture triggered very little debate, a fact that sets Denmark apart from many other European countries and certainly its Nordic neighbours. Large majorities in Parliament have supported all international deployments since the end of the Cold War. The only exception to this rule was the participation in the American-led war against Iraq in 2003 that split the Danish parliament down the middle. This deployment was based on a slim 11-vote majority (61 in favour versus 50 against). The political consensus was quickly re-established, however. Only two months later a large majority supported the deployment of a 500-strong Army contingent to take part in the post-war stabilisation of Iraq.

*Table 1 Public support for participation in UN operations in general*

Questions	Do you support Danish military participation in UN operations in the Balkans?		Do you Danish military participation in UN operations outside of Europe?		Will Danish participation in UN operations help secure the peace in Denmark and in Europe in the longer term?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
April 1994	69,5%	30,5%	55,1%	44,9%	72,3%	27,8%
October 1996	74,8%	25,3%	52,5%	47,4%	76,7%	23,2%
October 1998	85,7%	14,3%	61,2%	38,9%	82,8%	17,2%
October 2000	85,1%	14,8%	59,4%	40,6%	79,5%	20,5%
October 2002	82,2%	7,8%	73,6%	26,4%	81,4%	18,6%

Source: The Danish Armed Forces Faculty of Leadership and Psychology. The polls were conducted by Statistics Denmark and based on representative samples of 939-1472 persons.<sup>9</sup>

Table 2 Public support for Danish participation in specific military operations since 1990

Operation	Polling dates	For	Against
Naval embargo against Iraq	August 1990	73%	11%
Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait	January-February 1991	44-47%	44-47% <sup>1</sup>
Possible operation to end the civil war in Bosnia expected to involve a risk of high Danish losses	July-August 1992	54%	37%
Operation Alba in Albania	April 1997	45%	39%
Possible attack on Iraq	February 1998	61%	31%
Possible attack on Serbia	June 1998	66%	15%
Operation Allied Force in Serbia	March-May 1999	63-74%	20-25% <sup>2</sup>
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan	December 2001	63%	24%
Operation Iraqi Freedom	March-April 2003	35-46%	42-56% <sup>3</sup>
Peace operation in Iraq	October 2003	77%	21%

The polls were conducted for various Danish newspapers and *Eurobarometer* by professional polling institutes using representative samples of 500-1343 persons.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Based on two polls; <sup>2</sup> Based on four polls; <sup>3</sup> Based on four polls.

Public support has been equally strong as Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate. It is notable that more than over 70 per cent share the view that participation in peace operations strengthens national security as this link is generally regarded as difficult to establish.

### *Personnel Deployments and Costs*

Denmark's annual average contribution of military personnel to peace operations has more than doubled since the end of the Cold War, jumping from 831 during the Cold War to 2,129 in the period between 1990 and 2002.<sup>11</sup> Since Danish military personnel generally serve six-month tours, it follows that Denmark has sustained an average of approximately 1,000 personnel deployed abroad on peace operations on a continuous basis in the post-Cold War era. Although this level has been established as the maximum that the armed forces should be able to sustain abroad, this ceiling has been exceeded each year since 1997. A record total deployment of 2,323 troops at the same time was set when the Danish Kosovo battalion deployed in August 1999.<sup>12</sup>

Qualitatively the changes are equally dramatic. The Navy and the Air Force, which did not take part in peace operations during the Cold War, have become involved on a continuous basis, and Danish participation is no longer restricted to traditional peacekeeping. Denmark was one of the few nations that volunteered to deploy troops to defend the 'safe areas' in Bosnia in 1993, and the tank squadron deployed in Tuzla in 1994 became involved in direct combat with the Bosnian Serbs on a number of occasions. In one of them, which made international headlines, the Danish tanks fired 72 shells successfully taking out all the Serb positions that had opened fire on them.<sup>13</sup> The Danish Army subsequently participated in NATO's enforcement operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Danish F-16s took part in bombing missions during Operation Allied Force in 1999, and Danish Special Forces were involved in combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in the spring of 2002. Denmark also contributed a submarine and a corvette to the US-led war against Iraq in 2003 and sent troops to take part in the occupation after Baghdad had fallen.

Table 3 Ministry of Defence Budgets and Expenditures on Peace Operations (current prices - million DKK)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003 <sup>2</sup>	2004 <sup>2</sup>
UN, OSCE + NATO operations <sup>1</sup>	700.5	622.2	594.3	979.8	1,134.7	912.5	1,037.4	1,187.0	702.5
EU and OSCE-observers	13.9	15.8	15.1	18.3	11.2	6.7	7.8	5.7	5.7
Total expenditures	714.4	638	609.4	998.1	1,145.9	919.2	1,045.2	1,192.7	708.2
Budgets <sup>3</sup>	581	545	557	572	586	600	616	631	643

1 EUR = 7.5 DDK

1) Gross amounts incl. storage figures

2) Estimates

3) Net amounts meaning that the figures are not directly comparable with the costs. Still the differences are so large that the expenditures clearly exceed the budget figures.

Source: Danish MoD

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) expenditures on international operations have grown significantly since 1988 when they amounted to 91 million DDK.<sup>14</sup> As is clear from Table 3 below, the expenditures have exceeded the amounts allocated in the defence agreements for international operations in every single year since 1996, when a separate account for this item was created in the defence budget. Until then military participation in peace operations had been financed on an ad hoc basis outside of the defence budget.<sup>15</sup> Special reserves totalling 750 million DDK (2002 prices) were established for 2002 and 2003 to cover expenditures in excess of the amounts appropriated for international operations in the defence budget,<sup>16</sup> but they were quickly exhausted. In August 2002, Defence Minister Svend Aage Jensby thus estimated the total deficit for the 2000-04 period covered in the current defence agreement to at least 800 million DDK.<sup>17</sup>

Even though the expenses have continued to exceed the sums set aside in the defence agreements, the deficits have, surprisingly perhaps, not become a serious political issue or resulted in calls for reducing the military involvement from the parties behind the defence consensus. The willingness of the defence parties to continue to break the budget to enable Danish forces to participate in new missions provides yet another indication of the importance that they attribute to the Danish involvement in peace operations.

### *Force Restructuring*

The impact on the force structure has been equally profound. The process of transforming the structure of the armed forces from invasion defence to expeditionary operations began with the decision to establish the DRB in November 1992. Enhancing the capacity for international operations has been the principal feature of all subsequent defence agreements. The latest defence agreement passed by Parliament in 2004 covering 2005-09 continued this process. The remaining elements of the Cold War mobilisation structure were scrapped, conscription was reduced to four months, and a new rapid reaction brigade staffed entirely by professional soldiers was established. The new reaction brigade is intended to double the number of troops that the armed forces to sustain abroad on international operations on a continuous basis to 2,000.<sup>18</sup> The decision to retain conscription should not be interpreted as unwillingness to adopt a more expeditionary posture, as one might incline to do. On the contrary, the decision to retain a four-month conscription period reflects the belief that this is the best way to recruit high-quality personnel in sufficient numbers for international missions.

In contrast to the situation in other European countries, such as Norway and Sweden, the Danish officer corps has not resisted the process of internationalisation. The decision to make international service mandatory by law in 1994 was generally welcomed. Only five per cent said no when all serving officers were given the opportunity to say to no international service before the new law entered into force.<sup>19</sup> International service is now seen as a natural and prestigious activity and it has become a prerequisite for promotion for young officers. Peace operations are, in other words, no longer dismissed as holidaying.

### *Procurement*

Procurement has been driven by the increased involvement in peace operations since the deployments began in the Balkans in 1992. By the end of 1993 the Danish contingents in Croatia and Bosnia had been provided with 1 billion DDK worth of new equipment.<sup>20</sup> The soldiers in the Army were provided with new personal equipment to enhance their security and effectiveness, the tanks were upgraded, new armoured vehicles and a modern field hospital were procured, a new system for the evacuation of wounded personnel was developed, and a new organisation has been set up to support the units deployed abroad. The Navy has been equipped with new patrol boats and flexible support ships to enable it to take part in operations far from home, and a transport ship has been leased to enhance its sealift capacity. The Air Force has been provided with additional transport planes to enhance its strategic lift capacity and Denmark supporting the efforts to establish collective air-to-air refuelling assets in NATO. Usability on international deployments has, in short, become the single most important criterion for justifying the procurement of new weapons systems as well as the preservation of the existing ones.<sup>21</sup>

### **Why Peace Operations ended up in the Driver's Seat**

The permissive factor explaining the rise of peace operations is obviously the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat to Danish security. Strategically, the end of the Cold War moved Denmark from the frontline to the backwater. In NATO's collective defence structure Denmark is no longer a receiver of reinforcements, but a provider of them. By the turn of the century, two-thirds of the Danish Army was tasked to take up positions outside of the country in a crisis.<sup>22</sup> The military threat from the East was officially buried in 1992,<sup>23</sup> and this paved the way for the establishment of the DRB in November of that year.

That the end of the Cold War gave Denmark unparalleled freedom of action does not explain why the opportunity to conduct an activist policy on the international scene was seized. Activism and the involvement of the armed forces in peace operations going beyond self-defence was not a 'natural' choice. It was unexpected and generally seen as a clear break with the past by politicians, foreign policy officials and commentators alike in the early 1990s, and many doubted that it would last.<sup>24</sup> A combination of international and national factors explains why it did.

### *International Factors*

Four international factors determined the form and contents of the activism and the increased involvement in peace operations. First, the outbreak of war close to home in the Balkans gave Denmark a security interest in preventing the conflict from spreading and stemming the flow of refugees. Second, the nature of the Balkan operations creating the need for a more robust

approach forced Danish decision makers to go beyond traditional peacekeeping. Third, the memberships of the EU and NATO generated external pressures as well as internal desires in the foreign policy establishment for increased Danish participation. It was seen as necessary in order to maintain and enhance Danish influence in the two organisations, and as an obligation that a responsible member of these organisations had to fulfil. The Danish restructuring process was directly influenced by changes in NATO's force structure. It was the establishment of rapid reaction forces in NATO that led to the establishment of the DRB, and the establishment of a new rapid reaction brigade configured for war fighting and manned entirely by professionals in the new Defence Agreement passed in 2004 was triggered by the establishment of the NATO Response Force.

Finally, the growing involvement was facilitated by the strong role democracy and human rights played in the justification of military intervention after the Cold War. This made it easy to legitimise the growing involvement in peace operations as a continuation of the support for UN peacekeeping operations that had been one of the four "cornerstones" in the foreign policy pursued during the Cold War.<sup>25</sup>

While these factors can explain why Denmark and most other European countries became increasingly involved in peace operations in the Balkans, they cannot explain the differences between Denmark and the other Nordic states which resemble Denmark the most. Denmark was quicker to embrace operations going beyond traditional peacekeeping, it was quicker to give real priority to international operations in its restructuring process and in procurement, and it was the only one to give its military forces pride of place in its foreign policy. To understand these differences we need to move from the international to the national level.

### *The Dynamic Duo*

The necessary conditions for the military activism at the domestic level, the political consensus and the strong public support, did not exist in 1990 when the corvette, *Olfert Fischer*, was sent to the Persian Gulf to take part in the naval embargo imposed against Iraq by the UN. Nor did they exist in 1992 when troops were sent to Bosnia to take part in a peace operation that involved a real risk of combat. They were created by an active effort spearheaded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and the Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, who, ashamed of the role Denmark had played in NATO as "footnote country" in the 1980s, strongly believed that Denmark should play a more active role in the management of international peace and security.<sup>26</sup>

It has become commonplace within the discipline of International Relations to dismiss the importance of individuals in foreign policy,<sup>27</sup> but without the pivotal roles played by Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup, then defence spokesman for the Social Democrats, *Olfert Fischer* was unlikely to have been sent to the Gulf. Together they played a key role in persuading the sceptics within the government and the Social Democratic Party, the largest opposition party, to accept the deployment of a naval vessel instead of limiting the Danish contribution to humanitarian and medical support.

Similarly, it is also hard to imagine that Denmark would have sent tanks to Bosnia in 1993 had Hækkerup not been the Minister of Defence. A weaker and less confident minister is unlikely to have stood his ground and backed the proposal from General Jørgen Lyng, his Chief of Defence, in the face of scepticism from the Danish Foreign Minister and strong opposition from the UN secretariat in New York, the UN force commander in Bosnia and close friends such as Thorvald Stoltenberg, who at the time was the UN-appointed mediator in Yugoslavia. Unlike his Dutch counterpart, who bowed to the pressure from the UN and deployed troops in the safe area of Srebrenica without heavy weapons (a decision that paved

the way for the 1995 massacre), Hækkerup did not yield. Instead, he aligned himself with Anders Björck, his Swedish colleague, to make the tank deployment a precondition for the deployment of the Danish and Swedish contingents in Tuzla.<sup>28</sup>

The deployment of Olfert Fischer to the Gulf got the snowball rolling and the subsequent (from a Danish perspective) successful deployments in Croatia and Bosnia created an avalanche that changed the Danes' understanding of their appropriate role in the world. The result was the political consensus and the strong political support that have underpinned the activist foreign policy and the high profile in peace operations since then. At the turn of the century this profile was no longer a topic of debate, it was an axiom that hardly anyone questioned.

This is not to say that Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup did it alone; only that they were instrumental in pushing the armed forces to the forefront of Danish foreign and security policy at a very early stage when it was considered controversial to do so, and other options more in line with past policies seemed more "natural." They were supported by other politicians, officials in the Defence and Foreign Ministries and opinion leaders who shared the view that Denmark should pursue an activist foreign policy.<sup>29</sup> And they were lucky. The Danish involvement has thus far resulted in very few casualties. If the early deployments to the Gulf or the Balkans had resulted in significant casualties before the consensus and the strong public support had been consolidated, the whole enterprise would probably have been called off in favour of the traditional low-key approach emphasising the virtues of traditional peacekeeping, civilian crisis management and humanitarian assistance. This was the approach initially chosen by the other Nordic countries.

## **Conclusion**

Peace operations have been the single most important driver of defence transformation in Denmark since the end of the Cold War. Peace operations became the flagship in the new activist foreign policy doctrine known as 'active internationalism', they are now presented as forward defence in official documents and statements on Danish defence policy, the size and cost of international deployments have significantly increased, and defence restructuring and procurement are now driven by the need to enhance the expeditionary capacity of the Danish Armed Forces. This development is similar to the one taking place in most, if not all, European countries, but Denmark stands out in a number of respects. The transformation from invasion defence towards expeditionary forces began as early as 1992, the process has been underpinned by a remarkably strong domestic consensus, the officer corps has not resisted the move away from national defence and international service has become a prerequisite for promotion for younger officers. These differences must be explained by the fact that Danish decision makers buried the threat from the East in 1992, that Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup pushed the armed forces to the forefront of Danish foreign and security policy, and that the policy paid off. It did not only enhance Denmark's international standing, but it also persuaded the Danish elite and the population at large that Denmark could and should make a difference on the international scene.

Looking towards the future, the process of internationalisation shows no sign of weakening. The political and public support underpinning it remains strong, and the military leadership and the officer corps also want the process to continue. The direction of the transformation process is therefore not in doubt, it will continue to enhance the Danish capacity to participate in the full spectrum of peace operations as well as war fighting away from home. The pace of the process is harder to predict as it is conditioned by the unwillingness to spend more than 1.6 per cent of GDP on defence and by recruitment problems. It remains an open question whether the Armed Forces will be able to find the

regulars and conscript volunteers required to sustain 2,000 personnel abroad on a continuous basis as the defence agreement passed by Parliament in 2004 demands.

## Appendix one

### *The Nordic Countries Compared*

	<b>Sweden</b>	<b>Finland</b>	<b>Denmark</b>	<b>Norway</b>
Population, mill. (2002)	8.9	5.2	5.4	4.5
Armed forces personnel; conscripts (2002)	27,600; 12,300	27,000; 18,500	22,800; 5,700	26,600; 15,200
Total defence budget, mill. Euro (2002)	4,500	1,900	2,900	4,000
Costs of international activities, mill. EUR	115	80	145	180
Share of total costs for international activities, per cent	2.6	4.1	5.0	4.5
Share of total costs (excluding materiel etc.) for international activities, per cent	4.9	4.8	5.7	6.5
Military personnel stationed abroad (2004)	1,000 (1 July)	997 (September)	1,010 (30 June)	600 (1 July)

Sources: *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004* (Prime Minister's Office, Government report 6, 2004), p. 96; *Försvarsberedningen, Försvar för en ny tid* (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, Ds 2004:30), pp. 306-307.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix one for a comparison of the Nordic countries.

<sup>2</sup>For an overview of the reform processes in the four Nordic countries see Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?* (London, Routledge, forthcoming 2005).

<sup>3</sup>Poul E. Gustafsson, *Afrika-missionen. FN-soldater i stammekrig* (København: Forlaget Europa 1988) p. 194. See also Per Skov-Christensen, 'Tager Europa fredsbevarende operationer alvorligt', *Militært Tidsskrift*, 121: 6 (1992), pp.175-184.

<sup>4</sup>The doctrine was born in a speech by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen on 17 April 1989 given to the first meeting of the Foreign Policy Commission which had been tasked to outline the requirements for an effective Danish foreign policy in emerging the post-Cold War era. See Udenrigsministeriet: *Udenrigstjenesten mod år 2000. Bd. I, Betænkning 1209* (København: Udenrigsministeriet 1990), p. 40.

<sup>5</sup>Søren Gade, 'EU tager ansvar - Danmark tager forbehold', *Folk & Forsvar*, 5:2 (juni 2004), p.1; Udenrigsminister Per Stig Møllers tale ved DIIS-seminar i Eigtveds Pakhus, torsdag den 16. september, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, at: <http://www.um.dk/da/menu/OmOs/Udenrigsministeren/Taler/UdenrigsministerPerStigMøllersTaleVedDIISSeminarIEigtvedsPakhusTorsdagDen16SeptemberK115.htm> (14 October 2004); Niels Helveg Petersen 'Fredsbevaring anno 2003', *Jyllands-Posten*, (8 October 2000), p. 8; Kristian Klarskov, and Jens Holsøe 'Dansk forsvarsprofil udhules', *Politiken*, (12 December 2000), p. 1. This assessment is shared by some analysts. See for instance Hans Henrik Holm, 'Danish Foreign Policy Activism: The Rise and Decline', in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.) *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2002* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs 2002), pp.19-45.

<sup>6</sup>Martin Krasnik, 'Magelig magt', *Weekendavisen*, (22 December 2000), p.6.

<sup>7</sup>*The MOD Objectives, Tasks, and Organisation etc. Act No. 909 of 8 December 1993*; and *The MOD Objectives, Tasks, and Organisation etc. Act, No. 122 of 27 February 2001*.

<sup>8</sup>*Dansk forsvar som sikkerhedspolitisk instrument. Forsvarsminister Søren Gades tale ved Udenrigspolitik Selskab i Kunstindustrimuseets festsal mandag den 4. oktober 2004*, Danish Ministry of Defence Website at: <http://forsvaret.dk/NR/rdonlyres/E17B86AC-8B4B-466A-8984-0654385E7E8E/0/ups041004.pdf> (14 October 2004), p.3.

<sup>9</sup>Erik Kousgaard, *Befolkningens forsvarsvilje maj 1975 – oktober 1998*, FCLPUB, No. 147 (København: Forsvarets Center for Lederskab, 1998), p.7; Erik Kousgaard, *Befolkningens forsvarsvilje maj 1975 – oktober 2000*, FCLPUB, No. 151 (København: Forsvarets Center for Lederskab, 2000), p. 8; Erik Kousgaard, *Befolkningens forsvarsvilje maj 1975 – oktober 2002*, FCLPUB, No. 153 (København: Forsvarsakademiet, 2003), p.7.

<sup>10</sup>Sten Arnum, 'Dansk støtte til landkrig er faldende', *Jyllands-Posten* online at: [www.jp.dk](http://www.jp.dk) (5 May 1999); Christine Cordsen, Kristian Klarskov and Jakob Nielsen, 'Danskerne imod krig i Irak', *Politiken*, 19 March 2003, p. 1; Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen (eds.), *Dansk Udenrigspolitik Årbog 1992* (København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1993), p.510; Eurobarometer, 'Iraq and Peace in the World', *Flash Eurobarometer*, No. 151, 8-16 October 2003; Gallup, 'NATOs bombing af Serbien', *Berlingske Tidende*, 28 March 1999, p.6; Eva Rymann Hansen, 'MEGAFON: Danskerne mere positive over for krigen', TV 2 Nyhederne, 5 May 2003, at <http://nyhederne.tv2.dk> (5 May 2003); Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1998* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Affairs, 1998), p.155; Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 1999), pp.220-221, 223; Peter Møller and Eva Rymann Hansen, 'MEGAFON: Folkelig krigsmodstand, men støtte til Fogh', TV 2 Nyhederne, 27 March 2003 at <http://nyhederne.tv2.dk> (27 March 2003); Sonar, 'Danskeres holdning til NATO's aktion', *Jyllands-Posten*, 9. April 1999, Sektion 2, p.4; Vilstrup-instituttet, 'Danskeres reaktion på NATO-aktionen', *Politiken*, 31 March 1999, p.8; Jakob Weiss, 'Gallup: Dansk ja til krig', *Berlingske Tidende*, 26 March 2003, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>Forsvarskommandoen, *Dansk deltagelse i internationale operationer 1948-2002* (Vedbæk: Forsvarskommandoens Presse- og Informationsafdeling, 2003).

<sup>12</sup>'2,323 danske soldater i fredsstøttende indsats', *FOV Nyhedsbrev*, 13: 26 (12 August 1999), p.1; Forsvarskommandoen, *Virksomhedsregnskab 2001* (Vedbæk: Forsvarskommandoen 2002), p.34.

<sup>13</sup>Rod Nordland, 'The Mouse Ate the Cat', *Newsweek*, 123: 20 (16 May 1994), p.18; John Pomfret, 'In Bosnia. U.N. Troops Finally Go to War', *The Washington Post*, (5 May 1994), p.A1. Since then the incident has frequently been hailed as proof that force, properly used, may be key to success in contemporary peace operations. See for instance Edward N. Luttwak, 'Give War a Chance', *Foreign Affairs*, 78: 4 (July/August 1999), p.40.

<sup>14</sup>*Danmarks internationale indsats: rapport fra et tverministerielt udvalg* (København: Finansministeriet, 1993), p.120.

<sup>15</sup>*Danmarks internationale indsats...*, pp.119-124.

<sup>16</sup>*Finanslov for finansåret 2002* (København: Finansministeriet), account no. 35.11.05.

<sup>17</sup>Jesper Kongstad, 'Jensby: Forsvaret mangler penge', *Jyllands-Posten*, (5 August 2002), p.5.

<sup>18</sup>The agreement is available in Danish from the Danish Ministry of Defence Website at: <http://forsvaret.dk/FMN/Temaer/Forsvarsforlig+2005+2009/> (14 October 2004).

<sup>19</sup>Forsvarsministeren, *Årlig Redegørelse 1994* (København: Forsvarsministeriet 1995), p.45.

<sup>20</sup>Forsvarsministeren, *Årlig Redegørelse 1993* (København: Forsvarsministeriet, 1994) p.44.

<sup>21</sup>On procurement see Bjørn Ingemann Bisserup, 'New asymmetric and unpredictable threats', *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, 49:4 (2004), p.97; H.H. Ekmann, 'The Danish Army Materiel Command', *NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special Issue*, 42:4 (1997), pp. 65-69; Lt-Gen Ove Høegh-Guldberg Hoff, 'Lessons Learned from the IFOR Deployment. Danish Engagement in the Former Yugoslavia', *NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special Issue*, 42:4 (1997), p. 84; V.D. Nielsen, 'The Danish Air Materiel Command', *NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special Issue*, 42:4 (1997), pp.72-75.

<sup>22</sup>Hans Hækkerup, *På skansen* (København: Lindhardt & Ringhof 2002), p.218.

<sup>23</sup>*Rapport om Forsvarets fremtidige struktur og størrelse* (Rapport fra det af Forsvarsministeren den 11. april 1991 nedsatte Udvalg vedrørende forswarets udvikling mv., 2 March 1992); *Mulighederne for at opstille en dansk hærhed af brigade størrelse til indsættelse i internationale operationer* (Forsvarsministerens Rådgivnings- og Analysegruppe, October 1992).

<sup>24</sup>Michael H. Clemmesen, 'Efterkoldskrigstidens danske forsvarspolitik', in Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (eds.) *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1992* (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundet 1993), pp.41-55; Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 'Et historisk gennembrud i dansk udenrigspolitik', in Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (eds.) *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1990* (København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 1990), p. 185; Jacob Schönstadt (pseudonym of Ib Faurby) 'Verdenshavet og Frederiksholms Kanal', *Udenrigs*, 46: 2 (1991), pp.12-13.

<sup>25</sup>These factors are discussed in greater detail in chapter three in Jakobsen, *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?*

<sup>26</sup>In 1983-87 the deployment of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe led to a breakdown in the traditional consensus on defence policy in Denmark. The opposition consequently forced the minority government to insert a series of footnotes in NATO communiqués in which Denmark distanced itself from decisions related to deployment. For both Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup getting rid of the footnote image and the traditional pacifist, low profile foreign policy and improving the Danish standing in NATO, and especially in Washington, became ends in themselves. See Hækkerup, *På skansen*, pp. 9-10, 30, 40, 97-98, 167; Thomas Larsen, *Erobreren* (København: Børsen 1997), pp.230-235.

<sup>27</sup>For a recent call to bring statesmen back in see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, 'Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In', *International Security*, 25: 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-146.

<sup>28</sup>Simon Andersen and Jesper Larsen, 'Høj cigarføring', *Jyllands-Posten*, (2 March 1997); Hækkerup, *På skansen*, pp. 58, 112; Jørgen Lyng (ed.), *Ved forenede kræfter: forswarets øverste militære ledelse: forsvarschefsejdembedet og forswarets udvikling 1950-2000* (Vedbæk: Forsvarskommandoen 2000), p. 213. Stoltenberg, whom Hækkerup in his book refers to as his mentor (p. 147), described his opposition and admitted he had been wrong in his address to the seminar celebrating the 50<sup>th</sup> birthday of UN peacekeeping held at the UN Information Office for the Nordic Countries in Copenhagen on 20 October 1998.

<sup>29</sup>Foreign ministry officials lost no time making the case that Denmark should exploit the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to pursue an activist foreign policy. See for instance Ulrik Federspiel, 'Den internationale situation og Danmarks udenrigspolitik', in Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (eds.), *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1991* (København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundet 1991), pp. 12-26; and Christian Hoppe, 'Danmarks østpolitik', in Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (eds.), *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1993* (København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundet 1994), pp.67-97.

This page intentionally left blank

# Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance: the Contribution of Hungary

Pál DUNAY

*The Geneva Centre for Security Policy*

The chapter argues that Hungary has contributed to peace operations in a number of different capacities: it has provided host country support, helped the transit of forces through its territory and contributed troops. However, as peace operations move further away from the country's borders Hungary faces a series of challenges in this area. This has led the government to limit the number of Hungarian troops engaged in peace operations, with a number of potentially negative implications for the armed forces as a whole.

Hungary, like most former socialist countries of East-central Europe, is a relative newcomer to peace operations. It did not get involved in such activities prior to the system change of 1989-90. During its Warsaw Treaty membership its involvement had to remain limited and until the last moments of the regime had been confined to one operation. This occurred in Vietnam where Hungary participated between 1973-75 in the International Commission of Control and Supervision (a non-UN operation). The next, strictly limited, participation began after the end of the Iraq-Iran war, where a few Hungarian observers contributed to the UNIMOG mission. In sum, when democracy was introduced in Hungary at the beginning of the 1990s the country had no viable experience in international peace operations. Since the end of the Cold War Hungary has contributed to several operations within UN as well as NATO frameworks. It has also provided a limited (and largely unnoticed) contribution to one ESDP based operation, before has joined EUFOR, launched in December 2004.

It has become a problem for Hungary, as for many other countries, that the term 'peace operation' has increasingly become an elusive category. It has encompassed activities ranging from low intensity monitoring of some provisional peace arrangements (e.g. truce) to high intensity expeditionary warfare. The euphemistic use of 'peace operation' for every type of contingency emptied the term of its noble content and reduced it to an all-embracing, largely content-free, category. It is extremely doubtful whether an operation, like the one conducted against the former Yugoslavia in 1999 or against Iraq in 2003, has anything to do with 'peace'. Consequently, the concept that should underline this analysis, generally as well as concretely in the case of Hungary, is stretched beyond the limit of sense and cohesion. In order to avoid endless discussion about the 'end' of peace operations and the 'beginning' of international operations of other kinds, this paper will extend its analysis to every type of international military operation in which Hungary has been engaged.

The paper addresses the following topics: 1. The contribution of Hungary to international peace operations since the system change. 2. The process to approve the participation of Hungarian troops in international operations. 3. Conclusions: The mounting problems concerning the contribution of Hungary in the future.

## **The Hungarian Contribution to International Peace Operations**

Hungary has been facing a frustrating experience, as far as the assessment of the performance of its armed forces by the world at large, during the last half a decade and more. Hungary has traditionally been a country that has not attributed particular importance to defence matters since the system change.<sup>1</sup> In this respect its attitude is nearest to that of the Czech Republic. This is a reflection of the maturity of the population, which has rightly perceived the declining threat level and has found no particular reason to allocate huge resources to defence. It also reflects the attitude of the political establishment that knows fully-well: allocating resources to defence contributes far less to the country's prosperity and stability than if the same resources are allocated to internal security or other areas, like health care, education, social services, pensions, or the development of infrastructure. The recognition of this situation does not mean, however, that Hungary has not been wasting resources irreversibly over the last fifteen years or so and did not make severe mistakes in developing the armed forces.

The fact that Hungary has been in a largely threat-free environment for at least half a decade and that it was already sufficiently difficult to identify large-scale traditional military threats against Hungary throughout the 1990s, has to have some bearing upon the functions of the Hungarian armed forces.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the accession of the country into NATO and its integration into the EU as well as the accession of three neighbours of Hungary to the former (Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and the membership of three (soon four) of the latter (Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia and, as of 2007 Romania) also has to have repercussions upon the security perception of the country. As have the more subtle changes not codified in formal institutional alignment, like the informal alignment reflected in the aspirations of Croatia, Ukraine and to some extent Serbia. Overall, the entire security environment of Hungary has changed.

Consequently, there is no need for individual self-defence against an adversary. Moreover, there is no need for collective self-defence either, except for addressing the non-traditional threat of terrorism directed primarily against foreign interests in Hungary. With the full professionalisation of the Hungarian armed forces it is also doubtful whether they have retained a residual function to address natural catastrophes and man-made disasters, a function they used to fulfil regularly. If the conclusion is drawn that not even that function has been retained by the military then it can be stated that the Hungarian armed forces have no function to carry out on the country's territory. More precisely put, whatever the Hungarian armed forces do in Hungary should be related to some international activity to be carried out either inside or outside the country. Everything the Hungarian armed forces do should be part of international activity, i.e. of the country's external relations. In contemplating the performance of the Hungarian defence sector, it is essential to examine how it contributes to international operations and how it cooperates inside Hungary to protect foreign interests.

There are many issues of Hungarian politics where the difference between government and opposition, left and right, Socialists and Liberals on the one hand, and Conservatives on the other, is functional. The position of the political elite depends upon whether they exercise governmental responsibility or not. The functions of the Hungarian armed forces and their contribution to international commitments do not belong to this category, however. Conservatives are of the view that defence of the national territory still has some residual relevance as unpredictability prevails in the international environment, whereas socialists and liberals are more relaxed about changes that may make such classical genuine defence efforts largely unnecessary. However, it would be wrong to assume that the latter group has a clear view that would focus the efforts of the armed forces towards

international commitments. The difference is far less clear-cut. When the conservatives recently governed the country between 1998 and 2002 they were far more in favour of retaining a mass army, including compulsory military service and of preparing for highly unlikely eventualities than those on the other side of the political spectrum. The Socialists and Liberals have been of the view that there is no need to prepare for the national self-defence of the country's territory, and thus argued that the full professionalisation and major downscaling of the size of the armed forces would not jeopardise security. This concept has been implemented as far as full professionalisation in 2005. Implementation will continue by further reducing the armed forces' personnel, maybe to fifteen thousand by 2013.<sup>3</sup> They are rightly of the view that if any significant threat emerges there would be sufficient collective defence forces to address it and time to allocate resources in order to cope with it. It means that resources could be liberated to move away from a largely static capability to establish an operational (or at least more operational) one. This does not mean that there is only good news about the efforts of the current Socialist-Liberal government. Downscaling does not mean automatically that there would be a full concentration of efforts. Moreover, there can be serious doubts whether the defence sector remains a rock-bed of waste and corruption.<sup>4</sup> In the end one has to live with the reality and hope Hungary will be able to contribute to international operations partly for its own sake and partly in order to partake in efforts to guarantee international security. There is reason to assume Hungary will continue its participation in international operations, as it is well aware 'the soldiers make an exemplary service in foreign missions, thus increasing the recognition of our country in the Alliance'.<sup>5</sup>

The basic documents on the national security of Hungary have always emphasised the contribution of the country, and its armed forces, to maintain international peace and security. The national security strategy of Hungary presents a long list about the national security interests of the country. It mentions as a national security interest 'to maintain international peace and security, to prevent, or resolve regional, interstate and internal conflicts in accordance with the Charter of the UN and norms of international law'. Activity related to international peace and security is extensively presented in the context of the country's NATO contribution. There it is emphasised that 'Hungary seeks to contribute substantially to the full spectrum of allied missions, including participation in expeditionary operations outside of the Euro-Atlantic area and guarantees that the Hungarian armed forces could contribute in due time with adequately trained and prepared forces to coalition operations, which are led by NATO or where its allies participate'. In relation to the UN it is mentioned that Hungary 'participates actively in UN-led peacekeeping missions'. In case of the OSCE: 'Hungarian diplomacy participates in OSCE missions ... according to its possibilities'.<sup>6</sup>

Hungary has carried out three types of activities in relation to international peace operations: 1. Host country support. 2. Transit. 3. Troop contribution abroad. During the 1990s each of the three activities were necessary as Hungary has actively contributed to provide host country support to forces involved in operations in the former Yugoslavia, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and during the so-called Kosovo war as well as for KFOR. During the war on Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 it hosted U.S. refuelling aircraft at Budapest (Ferihegy) international airport. After the 1990s Hungary kept the Taszar airbase at the disposal of the U.S. It has also contributed to the training of CIMIC personnel to deploy in Iraq as 'host country support'. This activity came to an end in 2004 when the Taszar airbase was returned to the Hungarian armed forces. Due to its strategic location Hungary was also actively involved in transit for international operations. It has put its airspace at the disposal of forces carrying out activities in the former Yugoslavia and also during the Iraq conflict. Recently the contribution of Hungary to international operations

has been increasingly confined to providing troops as other activities, due to geo-strategic changes, have gradually lost their relevance.

The Hungarian armed forces have increased their activity gradually internationally. First, their participation in international operations remained strictly limited and then increased as challenges Hungary felt able to address emerged. The major boost has come with the peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton peace agreement (IFOR, SFOR and recently EUFOR) and in Kosovo (KFOR) some years later. Although debates surrounded the decision as to whether Hungary should participate in the former, in the end there was enough political determination to engage in the operation.<sup>7</sup> For a number of reasons the participation of Hungary in multinational operations has remained the most controversial activity of the armed forces. Most probably for the reason that the international engagement of the armed forces is the only activity that can be contemplated and measured.<sup>8</sup> During the last few years the personnel of the armed forces engaged in international operations has varied.<sup>9</sup> In November 2003 1,060 troops participated in international operations, by April 2004 the number declined to 964 and remained on this level also in June 2004. By November 2004 it increased to 1,103. By late February 2005 it fell to 775.<sup>10</sup> Recently the troops on NATO assignment have exceeded the number of troops in other missions (UN, OSCE, EU). This is due primarily to the participation of Hungary in KFOR in Kosovo and in ISAF in Afghanistan.

Currently, the largest contingent of Hungarian personnel is present in Kosovo (256), followed by Afghanistan (181), Bosnia and Herzegovina (120), Cyprus (80), Macedonia (53) and the Sinai (42). Furthermore, 43 people serve at ten other headquarters and operations, mainly in observer missions. The personnel on international assignment in NATO operations significantly exceed those on other international assignments. As of February 2005 there were 513 people on NATO assignments and 262 on other assignments, including UN, OSCE and EU missions.

According to a decision of the government passed in 2004, the number of troops on foreign assignment shall not exceed one thousand after 1 January 2005. Troops in preparation for such assignment do not count against this limit, of course. This is a step back from the objective put forward by the recent defence review that counted with the availability of two battalions, approximately 1,600 troops by 2013. Bearing in mind the regular revisions of defence concepts, reviews and doctrines it is certain that further versions will contain a variety of options. Still, with the projection of such a limited level of engagement, the Socialist-Liberal government might have contributed to opening a 'downward spiral'. Conservative political forces have traditionally been less actively committed to international peace operations than the left. Consequently, when they return to power they may regard the number put forward by their predecessors as the maximum and move further down from there. This could be counter-balanced by international pressure, however.

It has to be taken into account that a number of changes have occurred that has disadvantageous effect on Hungary's contribution to international operations.

First, and most importantly, some operations take place in recent war zones where the situation is often unsettled if not outright dangerous. This has not resulted in fewer members of the armed forces volunteering to participate in international operations. However, it may influence the political atmosphere that surrounds this activity if Hungary suffers casualties. One should be aware that Hungary politically is a deeply divided country that often gives ground to political populism. The international relations of the country are not exempted from such a division of domestic politics. This fact certainly limits the freedom of action of the government to engage more actively in risky international military operations.

Second, Hungary, partly due to some wrong decisions, has strictly limited capacity to deploy and sustain troops at large distances. A contraction is noticeable in operations near the country's borders, as there is less demand to deploy troops in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>11</sup> Then the country is dependent upon the logistical support of the forces of other countries. This is partly understandable in light of the size of the country and its armed forces. Not fully, though. The fact that Hungary did not opt for acquiring aerial transportation capacity and has decided to lease fancy multipurpose (Gripen) aircraft expands the time-span of such logistical dependence.

Third, in some cases it presents a further problem that the operations are associated with contingencies not supported either by the majority of the population, or the full political spectrum. This results in some volatility and unpredictability as Hungary's participation in the Iraqi operation has demonstrated. Although more attention has been paid to the termination of the presence of Hungarian troops in Iraq certain problems were noticeable already at the time when Hungary took the commitment to join the operation. Then it was caused by the slow and complicated decision-making structure of Hungary. It resulted in a situation that Hungary was among the latecomers to the operation. When it joined there were not many tasks left to choose from. Consequently, Hungary had to accept the task to carry out transportation.<sup>12</sup> This has partly involved higher risks than some other activities, and partly represented a challenge to establish a unit, a transportation battalion that did not exist in the armed forces of the country. In order to gain the approval of the opposition, indispensable for such an international assignment, the argument was put forward that the contribution to the delivery of humanitarian aid is based on a resolution of the UN Security Council. Such international 'backing' of the mission was the precondition of gaining the support of the opposition without whose approval it would have been impossible to send troops to Iraq.<sup>13</sup> It has also meant that the opposition gave its approval to the transportation of humanitarian deliveries. When it turned out that the Hungarian contingent carries out deliveries for purposes other than humanitarian ones the opposition claimed the government has violated the accord. It was interesting to note, however, that the resolution of Parliament did not include clear reference to such a constraint.<sup>14</sup>

Fourth, although the Hungarian troops in Iraq suffered less casualties than many other nations, the fact that the continuation of the Iraqi presence was dependent upon its approval in Parliament by a two-third majority meant that it was only a question of time before it would be terminated. The decision was taken in November 2004 and the actual withdrawal took place in December. This could happen as it was not a NATO operation and thus the decision has not been in the hands of the government. It was a masterly move of the government that under the decision of the Istanbul NATO summit of June 2004 Hungary – in compensation for its withdrawal from Iraq before the elections – committed itself to contribute to training Iraqi security forces and thus live up to a NATO commitment. As such it did not require the approval of Parliament.<sup>15</sup> This was a masterly move: Internationally, as the country is thus contributing to an activity not much in demand in NATO and thus appropriate to demonstrate the country's commitment to the Alliance. Domestically, as it has demonstrated that under appropriate legal conditions the government will be ready to act irrespective the problems presented by the opposition.

### **Legal Approval of Hungarian Participation in International Operations**

Hungary, as one of the more reform-minded so-called Socialist countries has been going through an evolution in its constitutional development. No new constitution has been drafted since the system change and will apparently not be drafted in the near future either. Any modification of the Constitution as well as the passing of a new one would require

two-third majority in the Parliament. It is unlikely that either side will have such a majority in the foreseeable future. The largest revision took place in 1989 by the consensus of the main (emerging and declining) political forces. This fact has some bearing upon defence matters, including the hosting of troops on the territory of the country and their deployment beyond the borders of the country. 'The 1989 modification of the Constitution delegated the approval of such activities to the exclusive competence of the National Assembly. This regulation amongst the conditions of the system change provided guarantee against the one party government and the party-state'.<sup>16</sup> The emphasis continued to be on the side of guarantees also when Hungary joined the Atlantic Alliance. The modification of the Constitution failed in December 1998 for reasons entirely unrelated to the subject matter of the country's forthcoming NATO membership. That's why the constitutional rules of Hungary gave no room for flexibility in terms of sending Hungarian military personnel abroad on NATO assignments.

Although there has been pressure to revise the respective rules, the Hungarian political class did not feel an urgent need to attempt revision. It required the direct intervention of the then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson<sup>17</sup> to foster the process. This has led to a long awaited modification of the constitution. It was emphasised that it has been carried out 'in order to guarantee the carrying into effect of allied commitments' and accordingly the 'government approves the employment of Hungarian or foreign armed forces ... on the basis of the decision of the North Atlantic Council and ... other troop movements on the basis of the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation'.<sup>18</sup> This has eliminated an important obstacle in the way of the more effective contribution of the Hungarian armed forces to the alliance. In case of such decision the government reports to the Parliament forthwith and informs the President of the Republic simultaneously. With respect to non-NATO operations, the approval of sending troops abroad would remain in the hands of the Parliament. Bearing in mind the pace of UN decision-making this may not cause any particular problem. It would have been more forward looking, however, had the Constitution been modified so that it would make the foreign assignment of Hungarian troops for EU missions conditional on the approval of the government as well. The modification of the Constitution, primarily in order that Hungarian troops could be employed more flexibly in international operations, is a welcome change. It has to be emphasised however that it does not solve the underlying problem. It does not eliminate the political division of the political establishment also extending to the international relations of the country. If this deep division could be overcome Hungary could become a more reliable and predictable cooperative member of NATO and contributor to EU's ESDP.

## **Conclusions**

Hungary has contributed to international operations during the last fifteen years since the system change. It has done so in spite of the fact that the defence sector has constantly been a 'loser' of the transformation process. This is understandable as there were many far more urgent tasks in the transition process than the reform of the defence sector. Particularly in light of that Hungary has not perceived any major identifiable threat during most of this period. Consequently, Hungary made attempts to engage in international peace operations and also to demonstrate loyalty towards its main western supporters, later allies through its engagement. This went in parallel with the very significant downsizing of the armed forces.

Although Hungary has gradually upgraded its participation in international operations and was particularly committed to actions related to the former Yugoslavia, the shortcomings of the Hungarian military had to keep its participation overall limited. As the strategic priority of the West, be it in NATO, the EU or a coalition of states, will – at least

in the sense of international military commitment – decline in the western Balkans, Hungary will face a new situation that it will have to address innovatively. Namely, international (peace) operations will take place further away from Hungary's borders, they will be more frequently carried out in dangerous environments, and will be more demanding as far as logistics are concerned. All this should discourage Hungary from participating in international peace operations extensively. However, it would be regrettable if the country reacted to this by reducing its international engagement. The country would then further discredit itself among its allies and in the world at large. Moreover, the armed forces would deprive themselves of invaluable professional experience that can be gained through international engagement.

An eventual reduction of the participation of the Hungarian armed forces in international operations would also have a highly negative impact upon the ability of the armed forces to attract qualified personnel and retain them. Currently, participation in international operations and the income that can be gained from such participation is a major force of attraction of the armed forces.<sup>19</sup> This, at a time when the Hungarian labour market is increasingly competitive, should not be underestimated.<sup>20</sup> Taken together the contribution of the Hungarian armed forces to international peace operations may face rough times. It is possible that the right decisions will be taken this time and the armed forces will acquire the role it deserves. Sceptics could argue, however: Why this time?

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> This can be regarded a continuation of a longer trend. Hungary was a somewhat reluctant member of the Warsaw Treaty as well. Memorably, Hungary did not follow the Soviet instruction presented at a Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Commission meeting in 1978 to increase its defence spending to 3 per cent of GNP. It did not rebel, it sabotaged with reference to maintaining social consensus that required increasing consumption level.

<sup>2</sup> In Hungary's threat perception, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia played a far more significant role than turbulence in the former Soviet Union. This makes the Hungarian perception significantly different from that of other countries of the Visegrad group. It has also meant that with the departure of President Milosevic from power and continuing stabilisation of the western Balkans, Hungary has been left without any viable threat perception.

<sup>3</sup> The personnel of the Hungarian Defence Forces are somewhat less than 30,000 as of the beginning of 2005. The newly appointed chief of staff, Lt. Gen. András Havril, did not go beyond this in most cases. In one television interview on 13 February 2005 he said that an armed force of 15,000 troops would be sufficient for the country in the long run. It was broadcasted on Duna television. The press summary of the MoD of the next week nowhere made any reference to that interview. As if General Havril had said something very much on the mind of many, though entirely inappropriate to say at this juncture.

<sup>4</sup> Although there has been extensive speculation about some leaders of the MoD and the armed forces significantly enriching themselves it is more likely that a far larger part of the money has disappeared to finance political processes legal means do not allow. Whether this has anything to do with the fact that the defence portfolio could be held for the entire duration of the office term of each and every government since 1990 is a relevant question.

<sup>5</sup> 'Éves értékelés és feladat szabás' [Annual assessment and task assignment] The address of [then] Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy to the leadership of the Hungarian defence forces. <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=15486>.

<sup>6</sup> *A Magyar Köztársaság nemzeti biztonsági stratégiája* [The national security strategy of the Republic of Hungary], chapters I. and III.1.1, III.1.4. and III.1.5. Available (in Hungarian) on the website of the Hungarian MoD. <http://www.honvedelem.hu/>.

<sup>7</sup> The debates focussed upon two issues: 1. Should Hungary participate in an operation that takes place in such an unsettled environment? 2. Should Hungarian troops return to an area where it had been present as an occupying force during World War 2?

<sup>8</sup> The other activity that has caused controversy has been the acquisition policy of the armed forces.

<sup>9</sup> The Ministry of Defence regularly publishes the number of troops engaged under the heading 'Magyar katonák szerepvállalása a világ békéjének és biztonságának megteremtésében' [The contribution of Hungarian soldiers to the making of world peace and security], and updates it regularly. See [http://www.honvedelem.hu/Missziok\\_index.php](http://www.honvedelem.hu/Missziok_index.php).

<sup>10</sup> This major drop was due to the fact Hungary had to withdraw its transport battalion from Iraq that consisted of nearly 300 troops and its participation in UNFICYP (Cyprus) was reduced by one third from 122 to 80.

<sup>11</sup> This is due to the welcome change of the expansion of the zone of peace and stability in Europe.

<sup>12</sup> The argument has been put forward that the protection of military facilities would have been less dangerous than transportation, an assumption not necessarily easy to sustain. Not to mention that when Hungary had to accept the role of carrying out transportation this assessment had to be forgotten rapidly. See 'Juhász: Irakban biztonságosabb az őrzés-védelmi feladat, mint a szállítás' [Juhász: In Iraq the task to protect facilities is safer than transportation], *MTI* (Hungarian News Agency), 9 December 2004.

<sup>13</sup> 'Békefenntartók: az ellenzék nemzetközi felhatalmazásra vár' [Peacekeepers: The opposition waits for international mandate], *Népszabadság*, 2 May 2003.

<sup>14</sup> The resolution of the Parliament spoke about a contingent to be established 'for the carrying out of transport and humanitarian tasks, and for deployment to the Iraqi zone of operation'. See 65/2003 (VI. 3.) *OGY határozat az iraki válság rendezése érdekében tett erőfeszítésekhez történő magyar katonai hozzájárulásról* [Resolution of the National Assembly No. 65/2003 (3 June) on the military contribution of Hungary to the efforts to solve the Iraq crisis] available at <http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o03h0065.htm/o03h0065.htm>. See section 2 of this article for more details.

<sup>15</sup> NATO, at the Istanbul summit of June 2004 said: 'we have decided today to offer NATO's assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces. We therefore also encourage nations to contribute to the training of the Iraqi armed forces.' *Statement on Iraq*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-098e.htm>.

<sup>16</sup> 'Dávid Ibolya előadói beszéde az Országgyűlés 1998. december 2-i ülésén' [Introductory statement of Ibolya Dávid at the 2 December 1998 session of the Parliament], [http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy\\_naplo\\_fadat?p\\_ckl=36&p\\_ult=38&p\\_fe](http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo_fadat?p_ckl=36&p_ult=38&p_fe).

---

<sup>17</sup> Lord Robertson in September 2003 named Hungary as a country whose constitutional rules do not make possible the employment of its armed forces for NATO missions. The somewhat unusually specific reference to one NATO member-state has urged reconsideration in the Hungarian political elite. (As the critical comment was made at an informal defence ministerial meeting in Colorado Springs there is no written record of the statement.) For reactions in the Hungarian press see 'Hogyan vélekedik a NATO-bírálatáról? Válaszol Simicskó István, a honvédelmi miniszter fideszes alelnöke' [How do you evaluate the criticism of NATO? The (fidesz) vice-chairman of the defence committee, István Simicskó responds]. *Mai Lap*, 16 Oct. 2003, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> 2003. évi CIX. törvény a Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmányáról szóló 1949. évi XX. törvény módosításáról [Act CIX of 2003 on the modification of Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary], <http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/t0300109.htm/t0300109.htm>.

<sup>19</sup> It is to be noted that in the case of contract soldiers, there is a tendency to participate in an international assignment and then leave the armed forces with the accumulated income. This tendency is far less noticeable, if at all, in case of officers. In their case the income earned at international assignments contributes to their readiness to continue their service in the military and take a long-term perspective.

<sup>20</sup> 'Túljelentkezés van békefenntartókból' [There is over-application for peacekeeping jobs], *Korridor*, 16 May 2003, <http://www.korridor.hu/static/popup.php?type=nyomtat&cikk=1000000059631>.

This page intentionally left blank

# Defence Diplomacy: the Bulgarian Experience

Valeri RATCHEV<sup>1</sup>

*G. S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College, Sofia*

The aim of this article is to present and analyse the experience accumulated by Bulgaria in performing activities within the *defence diplomacy concept* framework. The focus is on the process of establishing a systematic vision and approach towards practicing different 'defence diplomacy' activities during the last decade of both crisis management on the Balkans and preparation of Bulgaria for NATO membership. Despite the lack of a coherent concept, there are significant achievements in the list of the Bulgarian defence diplomacy practice, like the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Process, the establishment of the SEEBRIG, the Common Assessment Paper, the consolidation of a regional consensus on breaking the wars on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia, etc. Membership of NATO opens new opportunities for a more active and resultant performance especially in such areas as the Western Balkans, Black Sea area, and the Caucasus. The country's capacity to help with the creation of new national defence capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan should also be taken into account.

Bulgaria has a long and in many respects successful record in terms of activities that could be placed under the name of defence diplomacy. The peacetime military diplomacy has been recognised as an instrument of state security and defence policy by the first National Defence Doctrine as of 1993. This document introduced military co-operation as an integral part of the national defence strategy and opened the door for Bulgaria to join the Partnership for Peace Programme. The commitment to new types of military activities as outlined in Chapter 1 of this political-military document was the starting point in building the strategic culture of Bulgarian civilian and uniformed authorities, aiming to dispel the hostility accumulated throughout the region, building and maintaining trust, and promoting efforts for diminishing the direct military contradistinction.

During the last decade Bulgarian activities have been extensive and ambitious and in many cases it could be argued that the country has been one of the basic engines for the regional defence partnership. In the shadow of the war in Yugoslavia, efforts were concentrated on building common positions against the regime of Milosevic and upgrading defence ties at political and direct military levels in order to demonstrate his isolation and decline all possible efforts to provide local support.

A remarkable shift towards comprehensive understanding of defence diplomacy has been accomplished during the NATO campaign against Serbia in 1999 and the subsequent period of building security throughout the Western Balkans. For the first time the entire generation of politicians, diplomats and the military have grasped the meaning of the old saying that diplomacy is the first line of defence and defence is the last. Diplomacy and forces were not regarded as counter-poles of the national policy spectrum where one is used when the other fails. It could be acknowledged without any conventionality that Bulgarian defence diplomacy (together with that of Romania and Hungary) in its classical meaning helped to avert further escalation of the conflict. I could argue that for the first time after obtaining sovereignty from the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian government pursued a foreign

policy based on national interest priorities and military diplomacy was an essential component in its implementation.

During the period of extensive defence reforms and preparation for membership in NATO that started in 2000, Bulgaria benefited from Western assistance in force planning, resources management, language training, NGO development, and in other areas. A positive element in this period is the fact that those activities took place in a spirit of co-operation and mutual interest, rather than as a one-way donor/recipient relationship. The accumulated experience in defence reorganisation and force development is now probably one of the highest values that Bulgaria can share and in the future will contribute to the *transfer of capabilities* aspect of defence diplomacy.

With the rise of globalised terrorism as a main common security threat, as well as the accession to NATO and the EU of most of the Central and East European countries, Bulgarian defence diplomacy needs reassessment, conceptualisation and further institutionalisation in order to be adapted to both the new security priorities and the new status of the country. Only in this way can the Bulgarian military meet the expectations of society, NATO allies and neighbours. The principal necessary developments could be summarised as follows:

In the framework of the nation the components of defence diplomacy represent this set of new expectations for the role of Bulgarian defence and militaries that people would like to see now: a policy, forces and professionals that are oriented not so much towards defending national integrity but to contributing in a collective manner to conflict prevention and crisis response. Bulgaria, probably earlier than the other South East European countries has identified the end of the era of territorial defence as the primary role of the military and through defence reform has started to build forces with a more expeditionary than in-place character. Exactly this process should be recognised as the core of defence co-operation, especially with the strategic allies within NATO.

In terms of the regional aspect, it is essential that defence diplomacy should be oriented towards helping to promote a constructive 'peace dialogue' among the nascent 'new military professionals' in the South East European states, and to encourage the generation of locally-agreed – rather than externally-imposed – prescriptions for regional security (broadly defined) and the role of the military in the new environment. This is a matter of working together with neighbours to overcome old animosities and develop communication among defence policy-makers, military leadership and the ordinary military in a co-operative spirit, and to focus energy in these exchanges on options for extending concrete co-operation, either through the existing or new institutional arrangements.

The present period is particularly propitious for such an effort because, for the first time in years, *all* states in the area can be engaged. Defence co-operation in a region with six NATO members, two candidate states, one soon-to-be candidate and two prospective PFP members definitely provides an opportunity for homogeneity of security and strategic culture that have no precedents in Balkan history. Any future defence co-operation in the region of South East Europe must utilise this unique opportunity for the peninsula to modernise itself and improve the life of its people by establishing a stable and peaceful environment and by contributing to the formation of a similar pattern in other problematic areas of the globe to the extent NATO and other institutional affiliations would require.

In the context of the Alliance, NATO membership is a guarantee of the implementation of values, which Bulgarian society has laid in the foundations of transformation and adopted to follow in its way ahead: freedom, peace, security, democracy, private property, free market initiative, rule of law, respect of human rights and individual freedoms, development of an open society with reliable mechanisms of civil democratic control, participation in the civil democratic space and the security area, called the Euro-Atlantic community.

The actual preservation of the national interest viability in NATO membership has a great challenge with inherent international characteristics: how will Bulgaria meet the expectations of being a loyal and efficient ally in an environment both of internal contradictory processes in the transforming Alliance and of still developing economic, political and social structures, and how will it turn the membership into a powerful tool for achieving its national objectives, interests and priorities? The main solutions of this problem are to be found in the answers to such questions as: what kind of member of NATO will Bulgaria be, how will we realise the effect of membership for further stabilisation of the Western Balkans, what is the country's role in the Black Sea-Caspian region, how shall we participate in the struggle against terrorism and organized crime?

Bulgaria, in a sense, manages to also deal with the not-so-easy job of participating directly with its own peacekeeping units in the solution of difficult tasks of post-conflict reconstruction under UN aegis or within the framework of a coalition of states. The Bulgarian soldiers deserve greater public attention and consideration both during their difficult overall preparation and in all the details of their missions' abroad. The country has proven that it can be a reliable ally in the making of hard political decisions on security issues in international organisations. Bulgaria fulfilled a remarkable mandate as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and took later the no less responsible mission to chair the OSCE. The Alliance would expect its policy to be put into practice through the reasonable Bulgarian presidency.

Exceptional tact and good balancing of different factors are required to find the right track in the on-going contradictions between NATO and the EU, as well as between the US and some European countries. Each specific situation, including some with military content, will require a special analysis and arrangements, but Bulgaria should in principle insist that today's world must be looked upon as a field of co-operation between EU and the US and not as a field of competition between them and a balancing of 'the dominant US' by 'the EU caring for a multi-polar world'. Only in this context would it be possible to preserve the national interest in NATO membership in all its dimensions.

Bulgaria's accession to NATO has solved to a great extent the national security dilemma. The unpredictability and dynamics of the processes around the fight against global terrorism has turned the ability of the country to counteract and contribute to countering terrorism into one of the key elements of the policy for membership in the Alliance. Whatever the format of missions – UN, regional organisation or a *coalition of the willing* – those military operations will be the essence of future defence diplomacy. Accumulated experience during the preparation of both missions in Afghanistan and Iraq has identified a package of defence diplomatic capabilities that has to be set up within the political and military establishment dealing with military preparation and performance.

Based on its own expertise, the Bulgarian defence policy and military establishment should realise its accumulated experience in defence reforms in order to help the would-be members to cut short the way to interoperability and the establishing of effective democratic control and force management. This track should be developed as one of the top priorities within the new defence diplomacy concept. The creation of centres of excellence will establish opportunities for both the country's contribution to the NATO transformation and common efforts to accelerate the interoperability and overall security sector reforms.

From an operational point of view Bulgarian peacetime military diplomacy needs better institutionalisation and should be conducted in a co-ordinated and sustained manner. The establishment of military diplomacy as a defence mission instead of entire *military co-operation* will provide better coherence and renewed impetus to peacetime activities by its armed forces. Peacetime defence diplomacy should continue to help in creating the foundation for regional co-operation, which is based on mutual trust and confidence. Upgrading military ties by looking at various alternatives of peacetime military diplomacy

in a sustained manner can reduce the hangover security concerns in the region and assist in the fulfillment of foreign policy objectives. The Bulgarian contribution to the international military crisis response operations should be supplemented by co-operation in education and training as an essential component of enhanced defence diplomacy. There is enough evidence that in future this approach will dominate and can prove vital in furthering Bulgaria's strategic interests in both an enhanced regional context and coalition format.

### Definition

Military diplomacy has long been one of the essential constituents of international diplomacy and an effective methodology for fostering bilateral and regional relationships. The role of military diplomacy manifests itself in its two basic components: preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy. Within the framework of preventive diplomacy, the military component is aimed at achieving the climate of confidence, necessary for the improvement of relations between two nations. This could be called peacetime defence diplomacy. The painful Balkan experience shows that the best approach to prevention of confrontation between two countries is to identify common interests and to widen co-operation between them in diverse fields, particularly in 'military' areas. Developments in South East Europe during the last decade illustrate the dynamics in inter-state relations and the modification of their interests, including in a defence context. Because of this, the peacetime defence diplomacy has to find the best rhythm for the development of military relations.

Despite the fact that Bulgaria still has no coherent and comprehensive unified concept of defence diplomacy, the country has a significant record of extensive activities, especially during the bloody wars in Yugoslavia and as part of the efforts to join NATO. Within the national defence planning documents 'defence diplomacy' does not exist as a directly defined mission. The 2003/04 Strategic Defence Review provided a reassessment of military missions and tasks in order to adjust them to the realities and requirements of the entire security situation. The SDR concluded that the focus should be shifted towards building crisis response capabilities and conflict prevention activities. A significant component of such activities is defence diplomacy in its modern understanding. Following the internationally used definition of the term, some of its components could be found in Mission 2: *Contribution to international peace and security*. Its core content was defined as follows:

'The mission in support of international peace and security is in implementation of international and coalition commitments to fight terrorism, prevent and manage crises and conflicts abroad, participate in multinational peace forces, activities in support of the evolving European Security and Defence Policy, arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, international military co-operation, humanitarian assistance, strengthening of confidence and co-operation.'

Two specific Military Tasks underpin and contribute most directly to defence diplomacy aims:

- MT 2.3. International military co-operation and participation in multinational and bilateral military formations.
- MT 2.4. Participation in arms control, non-proliferation, and confidence and security building measures.

## Concept Development and Implementation

The term *diplomacy* was introduced into the Bulgarian military vocabulary in 1903 with the establishment of the 'Information Office' within the J3 'Operations' of the General Staff in order to manage the military diplomatic activities order, including those of the defence secretaries in the embassies (the prototype of today's defence attaché). The military intelligence service was developed as a *classical type* until the mid 70's when the global process of political warming started and measures for building confidence and diminishing tensions had been taken. Within the so called Helsinki Process a specific branch of defence diplomacy, engaging for the first time both civil and military experts, has been gradually established. In Bulgaria it is believed that the Vienna Document on confidence and security building measures (signed in Paris in 1990) is one of the two most significant performances of defence diplomacy in the entire understanding of this function. The second one is making use of defence diplomacy during the preparation of the Paris Charter on arms reduction and control. Signed in 1990, the 'Conventional Forces Europe Treaty' (CFET) has no precedent in world history. After extremely difficult negotiations, at the end of the final meeting in Budapest, the foreign ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staffs have reached an agreement on the ceiling level of conventional arms for each country. Later, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria, preparing itself for an *all-azimuths-defence*, has fought for more battle tanks and other heavy arms compared to Hungary, which decided that it does not need the prescribed quota. This way in 1994 the country obtained 1474 main battle tanks, which later became a very heavy burden for the defence budget not only for maintenance but also for the reduction in accordance with CFET requirements.

From an organisational point of view the process of development that enhanced defence diplomacy was institutionalised back in 1986 when a 'Confidence and Security, and Disarmament Group' was established within the General Staff. Later it was enlarged as the 'Disarmament' department. It has performed a leading role in building the capacity of specially trained personnel, provided expertise on issues related to confidence and security building measures and arms control, and supported the units for preparation of hosting inspections for verification. Within this process of establishing a new type of defence diplomacy, Bulgarian experts also participated in the preparation of the 'Open sky' Treaty regime, 'Treaty for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Comprehensive Nuclear Tests Ban Treaty', 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction', 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons', the so called 'Convention on Certain Non-Humane Weapons and Convention on the Anti-Personnel Land Mines', and others.<sup>2</sup>

In a political context the framework of the international military co-operation is defined by the priorities of the Governmental Programme 'Bulgaria 2001'. It aims to strengthen regional stability through the use of military co-operation as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, and to broaden the regional confidence and security building measures, including the decrease of the military presence in round-the-border regions.

From an implementation point of view, a qualitatively new stage of the development of military co-operation was marked by the introduction in 2001 of a programme approach to military contacts. By means of the 'Security Through Co-Operation And Integration' Programme clear priorities were introduced in the existing inefficient approach to international military activities. The activities are already directed towards assisting the processes of modernisation and democratisation of the armed forces, broadening the zones of confidence and increasing the capacity for participation in peace support operations. More than 110 framework agreements for military technical co-operation were signed, as

well as agreements for personnel training, preservation of the military secret etc. The programme is being implemented in five basic areas:

‘Strategic partnership’ is aimed at the development of effective military and military-technical co-operation and at broadening of the military contacts with the NATO member countries and the partner-countries through the following:

- Joint projects developed with partner-countries (22 projects with the US, UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark);
- Six political military working groups (jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs): the US, the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain;
- Holding annual talks for the coordination of military co-operation and defining of annual programs for bilateral military contacts within the framework of the ‘Security through Partnership’ Program (approximately 15 annual talks);
- Increasing the number of officers and civilians trained abroad and the modernisation of the personnel management policy;
- Participation in exercises and exchange of military units on Partnership for Peace Program - 85.

The ‘foreign consultancy’ approach was designed to support defence reform and the National programme for the implementation of the Membership Action Plan. There were seven consulting teams in the sphere of defence planning, language training, budget and finance, logistics, training of non-commissioned officers, C4 systems, organisational building of the armed forces: three from Great Britain, two from the US, one from Germany, one from France. The beginning was laid for a new form of consulting services with the Netherlands - through development and implementation of joint projects; 9 projects are being implemented, related to the following spheres: preparation of an engineering platoon, system of crisis management centers, tactical office - command center of ‘Cooperative Key’ exercise etc. At present consulting activities are being negotiated with Italy.

‘Southeastern Defence Ministerial’ (SEDM) was initiated by Bulgaria with the support of the US in 1997 in order to consolidate and stimulate regional co-operation through the active and multiple engagement of the political and senior defence establishment in a set of institutionalised ministerial meetings.<sup>3</sup> The original aim of the initiative was to arrive at subordination of the goals of entire bilateral co-operation to the goals of enhanced and strengthened regional co-operation. Initially it has to be supportive to an effective isolation of the Milosevic regime and in mid-term perspective, to good neighborly relations, transparency, interoperability, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Initiatives which have been realised in the framework of SEDM process are the Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe; establishment of an engineering-construction unit; establishment of an information network for actions under crises on a regional scale; establishment of a Civil-Military Planning Council for actions under natural disasters; and the building of an information exchange system in the sphere of military reforms between the countries in Southeastern Europe.

‘Multinational military formations’ is the area of the ‘Security through co-operation and integration’ Programme where most of the practical results have been achieved. With the successful establishment of the ‘Multinational Peace Force - Southeastern Europe’ (called SEEBRIG) an important precedent was made for the generation of security in Southeastern Europe by regional sources. From a military point of view the work within and around the SEEBRIG contributed significantly to the creation of initial interoperability capacity throughout the participating forces and the accumulation of initial but practical experience in combined exercises planning and implementation and operational planning in accordance with the NATO standards and CJTF concept.

'Military diplomacy' is directed towards increasing transparency and confidence in the military sphere. At this moment this is the only official text that includes the term 'military diplomacy'. It is addressed to the entire apparatus of defence attachés in order to explain that they do not have any more solely intelligence functions, but are 'diplomats in uniforms'. In accordance with the explanations of the chief of the Military intelligence agency, all defence attachés are oriented to provide two-sided information, enhance transparency on military activities, and facilitate the military-to-military contacts and official visits.

### **Significant activities and achievements**

#### *Military Task 2.3. International military co-operation and participation in multinational and bi-lateral military formations.*

The post-1989 regional context in South-East Europe (SEE) is one of diversity and complexity. We have seen the emergence of new states and the return of successor states in the Western parts of the region as a consequence of the prolonged dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These new political entities have had to manage two immensely difficult tasks at once. They struggle simultaneously with the fundamentally important processes of state and constitution-building and consolidating the transition to democracy, as well as the politically risky, but equally important process of introducing market economies in environments that are unready to accept these changes. Countries in the Southern and Southeastern parts of the region have continued to fulfil the obligations of EU and NATO members, thus performing a stabilising role in a region seeking a new configuration of political and economic relations. At the same time, countries in the Central and Northern parts of the region embarked on radical transformations of their political and economic systems in a less-perilous setting, devoid of any challenges to state and territory. Bulgaria's security policy approach towards regional co-operation has two perceptions that need to be emphasized. Firstly, cooperation and new security arrangements can only be achieved through multilateralism. Secondly, the period since 1989 provides a unique opportunity to consolidate democracies in South-East Europe and enhance long-term stability and prosperity through active membership in the EU and NATO.

The Dayton Agreements and the ensuing political processes provided an appropriate context to launch a new framework for intensive, multilateral cooperation. With the support of Greece, Turkey and Romania, Bulgarian policy-makers initiated a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the states of SEE. A conference was held on July 5-6, 1996, in Sofia. The meeting launched a process of comprehensive and intensive multilateral cooperation. Many analysts have described this process as 'the South-East European Cooperation Process' or the 'Sofia Process.' The Sofia Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in the SEE, signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the heads of delegations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania and Turkey, was a founding document of the efforts to improve multilateral cooperation for enhancing stability and security. The Helsinki principles of international relations, confidence and security building measures, the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and support for regular meetings of the Defense Ministers of the SEE states were among the key points adopted at the meeting. The Ministers also agreed to develop multilateral regional economic cooperation, especially in the areas of cross-border cooperation; transport, telecommunications, and energy infrastructures; trade and investment promotion; and protection of the environment. They also agreed to cooperate in the fields of humanitarian, social, and cultural affairs and to

fight illicit drug and arms trafficking, organised crime and terrorism. The US, EU, UN, the Council of Europe, Russia, France and the Central European Initiative countries, declared their support for this new process. A follow-up meeting of the Foreign Ministers was held on June 9-10, 1997, in Thessaloniki, Greece, and paved the way for the first meeting of the Heads of State, which took place on November 3-4, 1997, in Heracleion, Crete, Greece. The seven leaders of South-East European states, along with a non-voting observer representing the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, issued a joint statement that outlined a framework for economic growth and political cooperation. The declaration noted the determination of participating states to work together to create conditions of prosperity for the nations in the region within a framework of peace, security, good-neighbourliness and stability.

### *The 'South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) Process'*

The dividing lines between Balkan countries brought massive militarisation both in terms of military hardware, and doctrine. This led to a region-wide, deeply rooted, public expectation that military means are unavoidable for achieving political objectives. In other European regions political and economic co-operation were natural first steps, but due to the unique situation in South East Europe, military co-operation has played a larger role. The efforts of Bulgaria to kick-start co-operation in these areas date back to 1995 when a series of meetings of the Defence Ministers of the states of the region was proposed. Further exploration of this idea was possible during the March 1996 meeting of the Defence Ministers of the region, the US, Italy and Russia, which took place in Tirana, Albania. The ministers agreed that the fundamental principle of co-operation in security and defence would be its inclusiveness and 'equal proximity,' ensuring symmetry in treatment and perception. The start of the *Sofia Process* provided the necessary spur.

Though not originally envisioned as part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) process and at the initiative of Bulgaria, co-operation in defence and security assumed a clear PfP/EAPC format. On October 3, 1997, the first meeting of the Ministers of Defence of PfP countries of South-East Europe took place in Sofia. The participants included all states of the region aspiring to join NATO, representatives of the US, Greece, Turkey and Italy as well as representatives from NATO Headquarters, OSCE and the WEU. The remaining NATO member states and the three already successful NATO applicants from Central Europe participated as observers. Political and policy statements of intent represented the main thrust of the agenda. A further meeting, this time at the level of deputy Defence ministers, took place on the May 22, 1998 in Tirana, Albania. The representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, FYROM, Romania and Turkey signed a letter of intent to create a multinational peace-keeping force in SEE. Formal agreement on the matter was reached on September 26, 1998 at a meeting in Skopje, FYROM. By September 1999, three NATO countries (Greece, Italy and Turkey) and four PfP countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania) were to form the rapid reaction force, which represented a major confidence-building step in the region as well as a significant contribution to NATO's cooperative defence arrangements in a volatile region. All willing NATO and PfP countries from the region were free to join this rapid reaction unit of 2,000 soldiers. It was designed to provide a contribution to NATO- or EU-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations under the mandate of the UN or the OSCE. Enhanced contacts, co-operation and efforts to increase the interoperability of the armed forces of these six countries within NATO standards and requirements have made a contribution to collective peace- and confidence-building. The driving idea behind the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE) was and remains not the formation of a 'regional club' or 'regionalized

security,' but rather the consolidation of democracy and stability in the SEE as well as the formation of a broad coalition of states willing to act together in addressing specific security threats. Bulgaria was chosen to be the host country of the rapid reaction force for the first four years, and was responsible for providing logistics, infrastructure and other facilities for the force in the city of Plovdiv, Southern Bulgaria.

Some of the basic regional defence diplomacy projects are as follows:

*The Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE)*. The Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe signed by the Ministers of Defence of seven countries on September 26, 1998, in Skopje was an historic event for the region. Albania, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Italy, Romania, and Turkey (individually referred to as Nations 1 through 7) came together to demonstrate their commitment to regional security and stability, forge closer ties between their military forces, and foster good neighborly relations among their countries. Slovenia and the US opted for observer status but expressed full support for this initiative. Croatia became the third observer nation to the MPFSEE at the fifth annual South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) meeting in Thessaloniki on October 9, 2000 - when it also was accepted as the tenth full member of SEDM. Consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter, the MPFSEE:

- Is neither directed against any third nation nor intended to form a military alliance (of any form) against any country or group of countries.
- Is transparent and open to any NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations of the region, which are 'able and willing' to contribute constructively at any later stage.
- Is in line with, and supportive of, PfP programs aimed at improving regional cooperation within PfP, and promotes cooperation with UN, NATO, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and EU activities.
- Will conduct political and military consultations and make decisions at regular meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of Defence Staffs, and of its Politico-Military Steering Committee (PMSC).
- Requires consensus among the Parties for all decisions.

In accordance with the MPFSEE Agreement, the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) was activated in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, on August 31, 1999. Its activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. SEEBRIG will be available for possible employment in UN- or OSCE-mandated, NATO- or EU-led peace support operations, including peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. It could also participate in a 'coalition of the willing' type international initiative, but will NOT join any peace enforcement operation. The Brigade will also function 'in the spirit' of the Partnership for Peace. It was agreed to rotate command of SEEBRIG every two years. Turkish MG Zorlu was the first Commander, and was followed on August 31, 2001, by Greek BG Kouzelis. Command will pass to Italy in 2003. National units allocated to SEEBRIG will remain at their permanent home base locations until committed for exercises and operations. SEEBRIG HQ was located in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, and will rotate every four years. It has been moved to Constanta and Eforie-Sud, Romania, in 2003; and will be moved to Istanbul, Turkey, in 2007; and Kilkis, Greece, in 2011.

*BLACKSEAFOR* was established as a naval task group to take part in joint search-and-rescue, humanitarian aid and sea-mine clearing operations, as well as in Black Sea environmental protection operations. The six Black Sea littoral countries signed the establishment agreement in Istanbul on 2 April 2001. The task group's mandate includes co-operation with international organisations like the UN and the OSCE, but it does not have a mandate for military operations. Depending on their capacity and areas of expertise, the participating countries are to commit their available resources to BLACKSEAFOR to respond to emergency situations as required. This initiative aims to promote cooperation

between the Black Sea countries and to contribute to peace and stability in the region. Under the agreement, decisions are to be taken by consensus and the presidency is to rotate among the member countries in alphabetical order. The group does not have permanent headquarters. Instead, its headquarters are to move to the country holding the presidency. The group's plans are to hold at least one routine maneuver in the Black Sea every year.

In October 2000, the 10 Defence Ministers of the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process endorsed a US proposal for a *South-Eastern Europe Simulation (SEESIM) Network*. Through a series of simulation-based exercises, SEESIM is designed to serve as a foundation for integrating several initiatives functioning within the SEDM framework.<sup>4</sup> SEESIM is also intended to be a prelude to regional live exercises and real world emergency response operations.

*Satellite Interconnection of Military Hospitals (SIMIHO) Project.* A Greek proposal to connect Military Hospitals in South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) countries by satellite in order to practice telemedicine and exchange medical information was endorsed by Ministers at their annual October 2000 meeting in Thessaloniki. The initial Greek concept was intended to improve health services in military hospitals, and to provide them with a relatively low cost connection to specialized medical research units and hospitals elsewhere in Europe - including any hospital that might serve SEEBRIG if and when deployed.<sup>5</sup>

*Defence-Military Support for WMD Counter-proliferation, Border Security, and Counterterrorism Initiative.* A possible role for Ministries of Defence in border security and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was first raised in a South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) forum in Skopje in September 1998. A long-scheduled US-Slovenian co-sponsored SEDM Seminar on this issue was held in Bled, September 24-28, 2001 - on the heels of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Participants at the Seminar added counterterrorism to the agenda. A SEDM Experts' Group was later formed to address this triad of inter-related issues. The main objectives of this SEDM initiative are to:

- Build on the relevant sections of the NATO-sponsored South Eastern Europe Common Assessment Paper (SEECAP) on emerging threats and challenges.
- Update assessments of these threats by SEDM countries.
- Promote increased cooperation among Ministries of Defence in SEDM nations in addressing and responding to these threats.
- Increase awareness within Ministries of Defence and other relevant Agencies regarding these threats by improving regional Defence intelligence and information sharing among SEDM nations.
- Ensure synergy of effort by close cooperation and coordination with other international organisations and regional initiatives developing related projects and action plans.

*Regional Crisis Management Initiatives.* The development of cooperative crisis management capacity will build substantially on the existing military cooperation and the cooperation in emergency management - the South Eastern Defence Ministerial and the Multinational Peace Force South East Europe. The cooperation in emergency management evolves within two main initiatives. The Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative (DPPI) in the Stability Pact already produced a framework document, known as the 'Gorizia Document' that served to provide a strategy for common action in seven areas: Information sharing and networking; Standardisation and harmonisation, Preparedness and planning exercises, Cooperative development, conduct and evaluation of disaster management training events; Public awareness and media relations; Strengthening local structures; and Border crossing procedures. Furthermore, the initiative already resulted in a joint military-civil fire fighting exercise 'Taming the Dragon - Dalmatia 2002' in Croatia, 22-24 May 2002.

The second major initiative led to the establishment of a Civil-Military Emergency Planning (CMEP) Council for South East Europe. The Council is intended to coordinate efforts in all phases of the disaster management cycle: mitigation, prevention, planning, response and reconstruction. The areas of cooperation include: development of processes and means for practical regional cooperation in disaster management; development of improved coordination methods for all phases of the disaster management cycle; development of regional risk assessment; development of recommended response plans for the greatest risks; development of standard operating procedures and promotion of interoperability; planning, organisation and conduct of exercises and training.

*NATO's South East Europe Initiative (SEEI)*<sup>6</sup> NATO's long-term effort to partner with militaries in the region is also a vital part of regional stability. Efforts to help shape smaller, more professional and civilian controlled militaries throughout SEE has been of great utility, and the efforts should continue in order to rid the region of the paramilitary forces that have been a source of so much destruction and violence over the past eleven years or so. Through Partnership for Peace and the enlargement process, NATO continues to guide the integration of SEE countries into the Euro-Atlantic space and through co-operative schemes such as the EAPC Regional Open Ended Ad Hoc Group on South East Europe and NATO's South East Europe Initiative further promotes the principle of regional ownership in ensuring regional stability. SEEI was launched at the 1999 Washington Summit in order to promote regional co-operation and long-term security and stability in the region. A particular focus has been given to the involvement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in regional co-operation. A prime contribution of the initiative to help bring about lasting peace, stability, freedom and prosperity in SEE, is the 'South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities' (SEECAP).

SEECAP was endorsed on the margins of the EAPC Ministerial in Budapest on 29 May 2001. With the aim to evaluate security challenges in SEE and to identify some opportunities for international co-operation, SEECAP is designed as a general, flexible index for the regional priorities, promoting the principle of regional ownership. Its significance resides in the fact that SEECAP is the first comprehensive common document on perceptions and priorities of the countries of the region in order to bring peace and stability in SEE. SEECAP is based on the idea that common perceptions of the security challenges facing the region would promote common action to address these challenges and ultimately lead to security strategies and defence planning based on these agreed upon common perceptions. Confirming the essential contribution of and requirement for international engagement in the area, SEECAP is conceived to support and complement the objectives of the Stability Pact for South East Europe and other regional co-operation processes, such as the South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECOP) and Southeast Europe Defence Ministers Process, as a concrete contribution to building a secure, stable and indivisible Euro-Atlantic area.

The 'South East Europe Security Co-operation Group' (SEEGROUP) is the second major contribution of SEEI to the stability of the region. The South East Europe Security Co-operation Group is an advisory forum on security issues developed in the SEEI framework, which benefits from the NATO International Secretariat expertise. Comprised of representatives of Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Greece, the UK, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro, and Switzerland, SEEGROUP aims to contribute to the support of the NATO mechanism of clearing house type, to identify the existing shortcomings within the assistance in the field of regional security, to promote expert co-operation and to harmonize and co-ordinate the relevant regional projects. This is done by SEEGROUP's functioning on three complementary levels: biannual meetings of the national representatives; contacts between chiefs of the NATO missions in Brussels; and

ad-hoc groups constituted on projects on progress. SEEGROUP's setting up has appended an extra added value to the initiative as it had improved the connectivity between SEEI and other regional co-operative arrangements, among which the SEDM should be mentioned in particular.

Certain preconditions for such co-operation are already in place. Psychologically, the formation of a common brigade consisting of military units of most nations in SEE, as well as the common assessment of the security challenges, already made a breakthrough. Politically, there is a will to cooperate not only in crisis management, but also in broader security initiatives. Financially, regional resources are limited; however, adding outside assistance, they would allow sizable cooperative development of crisis management capacity.

The main obstacle is in the lack of in-region organisational capacity to deal with a problem of such complexity. Furthermore, there is no common understanding of 'crisis management,' and the procedures for procurement differ widely among SEE countries. We assume, that there is no instance when countries in the region themselves have managed common funds to acquire equipment under market conditions.

Fortunately, none of these obstacles is insurmountable. Following clear objectives, the implementation of the proposal herein will provide the necessary organisational capacity to guarantee efficient use of resources in SEE, including outside assistance. Thus, it will also increase the credibility of regional initiatives to provide for secure and prosperous future of South East Europe – part of the unified European continent. The present discussion of regional defence co-operation is by no means an exhaustive list of activities. Nevertheless, it points towards the creation and functioning of a framework of interaction that has already produced tangible results. Most importantly, the efforts made up to the present time have bred an unprecedented degree of confidence and trust in a region where both are sorely needed.

#### *MT 2.4. Participation in arms control, non-proliferation, and confidence and security building measures*

The perennial debate of intentions vs. capabilities has come to be a starting point in most foreign policy analyses. However, the post-Cold War predominance of low-intensity conflicts and the harsh realities of September 11 made non-proliferation the order of the day. This urged policy-makers to revisit the long-standing policy of denial, so that potential terrorists and certain 'risk states' are refused the capabilities to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means for delivery.

*Security Risk Reduction: Bulgaria's Contributions to Arms Control and Disarmament.* Bulgaria has an impressive record of supporting the international efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD. Bulgaria does not possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The country has signed all multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament and WMD non-proliferation and, except for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), has joined the existing international export control regimes (the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement on export control for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies).

Given the prospects to return to the European mainstream, since 1989 Bulgaria has been increasingly involved in multiple risk reduction endeavours. We are fully aware that meeting the imperatives of non-proliferation is an essential prerequisite for our European and Euroatlantic future. Bulgaria's responsible conduct in the realm of arms control and disarmament is a vital ingredient of the country's overall strategy for EU and NATO

membership. In wider terms, this policy is geared towards strengthening international security and stability, promoting predictability in interstate relations and countering terrorism on a global scale.

Those positive trade-offs are reached along two major avenues: namely, (1) involvement in the multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD, small arms and certain inhumane conventional weapons such as anti-personnel landmines; and (2) membership in international export control regimes and stringent national policy to control foreign trade activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies, including respect for internationally imposed arms embargoes and sanctions. By no means exhaustive, these cooperative dimensions of Bulgaria's risk reduction capability focus on supply-side initiatives only. On the demand-side of the equation Bulgaria has an impressive record too. Though beyond the scope of this article, it is worth reiterating that our predictable, credible and reliable foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis the conflicts in the Balkans, is geared to build confidence and trust in intra-state relations, address the root causes of conflicts and offer political solutions.

Bulgaria is among the 66 member states of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which to this day remains the sole negotiating forum for multilateral disarmament. In a similar vein, Bulgaria is a signatory to all major multilateral instruments in the area of arms control and disarmament. The latter form the cornerstone of today's non-proliferation regime in the field of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons. At the same time, however, we are favouring the comprehensive and integrated approach to applying all non-proliferation measures at global, regional and sub-regional levels. Bulgaria's practical approach towards WMD non-proliferation is also warranted by the country's stance on anti-terrorism.. Thus WMD non-proliferation has been recognised as a major underpinning of the global efforts to fight terrorism by reducing the risk of terrorist entities gaining access to WMD and their means of delivery.

In the field of nuclear non-proliferation Bulgaria has a long-standing record. The country has become a part of the international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in outer space by acceding to all relevant multilateral treaties (the 1967 'Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies'; the 1972 'Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects'; and the 1974 'Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space'). In July 1969 Bulgaria ratified the 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty' (NPT), thus becoming one of the first countries to endorse this pillar of global nuclear disarmament. Bulgaria supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Extension and Review Conference. Aiming to further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Bulgaria ushered the entry into force of the 'Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT) as it was among the first countries the sign (September 1996) and ratify (September 1999) this important treaty.

As a corollary, since 1970 Bulgaria has been applying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which aim to warrant the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes only and prevent its diversion into military usage. Elected as a member of the IAEA Governing Board in 2001 Bulgaria is an advocate for a greater viability of the IAEA safeguards regime in the post-September 11 environment. We believe that the IAEA safeguards system, including its 2000 Additional Protocol, is an essential instrument for preventive action against terrorism. Bulgaria supports the international efforts to limit the scope of the terrorist threat by strengthening the nuclear safety norms and preventing the acquisition and use of radionuclide materials by potential terrorists. In that sense the IAEA has an important role to play. The Agency has a panoply of tools to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism. The spectrum of further measures should include improved border control and

reinforced detection capabilities. These measures should be implemented on a priority basis by each state, bilaterally or in the IAEA framework.

Effective 29 April, 1997, Bulgaria applies 'the Chemical Weapons Convention' (CWC), as the Bulgarian legislation is fine-tuned to incorporate the CWC provisions. For example, in January 2000 Bulgaria adopted a 'Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Control on Toxic Chemicals and Their Precursors' to improve its control on foreign trade activities in dual-use toxic chemicals. In its current capacity as an Executive Council member in the 'Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (OPCW), Bulgaria is actively involved in international efforts to universalize the Convention by having on board as many countries as possible. For example, Bulgaria was among the co-sponsors of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the co-operation between the UN and OPCW at the 2001 56<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly.

Bulgaria has a long-standing record in preventing the use of biological weapons. That policy dates back to 1932 when Bulgaria ratified the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925. Along the same lines in 1972 Bulgaria acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). On an annual basis Bulgaria submits reports on its compliance with the CWC provisions. In similar vein, we are strongly supportive of the process to strengthen the BWC through the adoption of reliable verification mechanism.

Bulgaria has made a similar record in the realm of preventing the spread of conventional weapons too. Aiming to destroy the surplus of certain Warsaw Pact-era conventional inventories, Bulgaria is a party to the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty (CFE) and its subsequent Adaptation Agreement of November 1999. In 1998 Bulgaria ratified the 'Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and on their Destruction'. It is worth emphasising that by the end of 2000 Bulgaria destroyed completely its APLs stockpiles, thus complying with the Treaty's timeframe two years in advance. On a regional scale, Bulgaria and Turkey agreed in March 1999 on the non-use of APLs and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to their common border. This bilateral agreement, effective May 1, 2002, is an important contribution to the objectives of the Ottawa Treaty and all international efforts to destroy those inhumane weapons. Along those lines, it is an important indicator of the growing confidence and trust among the countries in South East Europe (SEE).

The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) poses another set of security challenges. Considering that SALW have been the most frequently used weapons in the recent armed conflicts in the Western Balkans, Bulgaria is particularly concerned with the security risks associated with their destabilising accumulation and – in the context of postconflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DD&R) programmes – their destruction. One illuminating example of Bulgaria's commitment to counter SALW proliferation is the speedy implementation of the Bulgarian-US agreement on the destruction of surplus SALW (about 80 000 units), signed on 19 July 2001. Furthermore, in its capacity as a EU applicant and negotiating country, Bulgaria has formally aligned itself to the criteria and principles stated in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and ever since consistently adheres to all relevant guidelines, decisions and statements of the European Council. In November 2000 Bulgaria also associated itself with the OSCE Document on SALW that provides for information exchange on the national marking and register systems, as well as export practices and destruction methods.

Along those lines, as a co-chair of Working Table 3 (security issues) of the Stability Pact for SEE, in October 2000 Bulgaria hosted a Stability Pact Seminar on SALW Collection and Destruction. In parallel to this event Sofia also hosted an informal meeting of the Group of UN Governmental Experts, which discussed the feasibility of restricting the

manufacture and trade in SALW to state-authorized only manufacturers and dealers. We deem it of paramount importance to design a strong legal base to regulate the overall process of production, trading, brokering and possession of small arms. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects, held in July 2001, set an auspicious beginning to check the proliferation of those deadly weapons. There Bulgaria argued that the complex nature of SALW proliferation should be addressed from the perspective of both supply and demand, thus making intra-institutional interaction a must. We are pleased that Bulgaria's role in addressing the SALW proliferation threats was duly recognised as our country was invited to join the UN Group of Experts on SALW Marking and Tracing. This group, hopefully, will reinforce the efforts to design a well co-ordinated approach to address SALW proliferation.

### *Bulgaria's Export Control Policy: Bridging Intentions with Capabilities*

Amidst the triumph of economic liberalism supply-side international export control regimes have come to be identified as reliable instruments to balance the competing priorities of free trade and non-proliferation. Sharing these common values of the Euroatlantic space, Bulgaria participates in regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee on controlling nuclear materials and technology, and the Australia Group on controlling chemical and biological weapons material and technology. Bulgaria has applied for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) but already applies the MTCR Guidelines.

#### *(a) Multilateral Export Control Regimes*

The controlling mechanisms enforced in Bulgaria strictly follow the requirements and restrictions imposed by UN Security Council resolutions, by decisions of the European Union, the OSCE, the Wassenaar Arrangement and other multilateral and regional instruments. Control lists applied by Bulgaria effectively implement the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List in the field of arms trade and the unified and annually updated EU List of dual-use goods and technologies as well as the lists and the guidelines of the Australia Group. In 2001 Bulgaria was officially admitted to the Australia Group, which we consider to be yet another indication of our increasingly efficient export control system. Bulgaria is strongly committed to further cooperate actively and effectively for the prevention of the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

Bulgaria has repeatedly indicated its willingness to adhere to MTCR as soon as any decisions of enlargement are taken. Despite not being a member of MTCR, Bulgaria strictly abides by the MTCR Guidelines as part of its export control policy. As a corollary, Bulgaria is a strongly committed member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which lists cover, *inter alia*, the armaments and technologies controlled by MTCR. Furthermore, in November 2001 the Bulgarian government officially committed itself to the decommissioning and destruction by October 2002 of the Bulgarian stockpile of SS-23 missiles. Determined to act in consistency with the MTCR principles and purposes, Bulgaria does not intend to purchase and/or commission missile systems under Category I of MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in the future.

Further to these steps, Bulgaria has been working to promote responsible arms transfers and to prevent illicit arms trafficking in South East Europe. In December 1999, Bulgaria and the US held a Regional Conference on Export Control. This conference, held

under the aegis of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, adopted two documents of particular importance: (1) Joint Declaration on Responsible Arms Transfers; and (2) Statement on Harmonization of End-Use/End User Certificates. A follow-up conference is scheduled to take place aiming to ensure compliance with the commitments undertaken.

*(b) National Export Control System*

The current Bulgarian export control system is designed to meet the most advanced European and international standards in monitoring foreign trade activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Relevant legislation and other normative arrangements were adopted in 1995 and 1996 to align the Bulgarian legislation with the provisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is worth emphasising that the current Bulgarian legislation includes a 'catch-all' clause, which provides under particular circumstances for control on non-listed goods and technologies.

Under the current Law on Control of Foreign Trade Activities in Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Regulations on its implementation, Bulgaria's export control regime includes a two-tier licensing and control mechanism consisting of two inter-agency bodies: (1) The Interministerial Council at the Council of Ministers is the only body authorized to execute licensing of Bulgarian companies wishing to perform foreign trade activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies; (2) The applications submitted by licensed companies for permits are considered on a case-by-case basis by the Commission for Control and Permission of the Foreign Trade Deals in Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies. That system offers important advantages, namely general or partial licensing of companies which meet criteria for foreign trade in arms and/or dual-use goods and technologies for a period of up to 12 months; consideration on a case-by-case basis and issuing, where appropriate, of a permit for each individual transaction; and post-shipment verification.

Furthermore, in line with its consistent policy and in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Government introduced additional measures aimed at enhancing the existing export controls, so that any illicit deals via third countries or brokers are ruled out. On January 17, 2002, a draft amendment to the Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activities in Arms and in Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was adopted by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Parliament for its approval. The following improvements to the national legislation are being put forward as part of this bill:

- Measures aimed at improving enforcement on national level. Compulsory lists of States that are placed under UN or EU embargoes and other international restrictions will be introduced as part of the implementing Regulation of the amended Law on Trade with Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. These 'commitment' lists will be subject to approval by the Council of Ministers and will be updated at regular intervals. Dealers and companies obtaining a general license for trade with arms and dual use goods and technologies will be obliged to comply with such lists;
- Precise definition of the prerogatives of state authorities that execute control over transactions, as well as of obligations and responsibilities of companies and dealers;
- Inclusion of additional provisions, requiring submission of all relevant documents certifying the legitimate end-use/end-user and mandatory post-shipment verification;
- Enhanced sanctions against possible violators, including amendments to the Penal Code;
- Improved control over brokering activities. Any such activities carried out in and of the territory of Bulgaria shall be treated as trade activities falling under relevant legislative provisions. This would also imply the introduction of a licensing regime for brokering

activities and the establishment of a register of companies and persons performing brokering activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies.

Bulgaria is particularly committed to one form of security risk reduction, namely compliance with internationally-imposed coercive measures such as arms embargoes, sanctions, restrictions or prohibitions to conduct arms transfers to particular 'sensitive countries'. Mentioned in relation to past transfers to UNITA in Angola, it is worth reiterating that Bulgaria actively and closely cooperated with the UN Panel of Experts for investigation of violations of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against UNITA in Angola. The collaboration and assistance extended by Bulgaria were highly appreciated and well taken. The UN Final Report explicitly mentions that in executing those transfers the Bulgarian export control authorities and the Bulgarian supplying companies had acted on the basis of end-user certificates they considered authentic (Cf. *Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions*, UN S/2000/1225, Dec. 21, 2000).

Respect for the UN-imposed sanctions has proven to be a reliable credential of each country's readiness to balance security concerns with commercial gains. Those competing priorities pose difficult dilemmas for all states, especially for those - like Bulgaria - that experience a transition to market realities. However, hoping for a speedy 'return to Europe', that we were deprived of more than 50 years ago in Yalta, the Bulgarian policy-makers no longer face such dilemmas that might risk our European and Euroatlantic future. The Bulgarian Government is committed to maintaining effective enforcement of export controls and maximum restraint as a matter of national policy when considering licensing for the export of arms and sensitive dual-use items to all destinations where risks are judged greatest, in particular to regions where conflict is occurring or is threatening (criteria of the EU Code of Conduct, the Wassenaar Arrangement, etc.). The Government has established the regular practice of adopting special normative acts (decrees) to implement Bulgaria's obligations under the UNSC Resolutions and the decisions of the EU and OSCE.

One telling example is the Decree No 91 adopted by the Government on 9 April 2001, establishing a consolidated List of countries and organisations towards which the Republic of Bulgaria applies prohibitions or restrictions (depending on each case) on the sale and supply of arms and related equipment in accordance with UNSC resolutions and decisions of the EU and the OSCE. The adoption of this normative act, which in fact reproduces the respective List prepared by the Secretariat of the EU, consolidates the practice of systematic application of international sanctions and the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct. This list is to be updated regularly and in correspondence to the EU list. The harmonization of the Bulgarian export control system with the practice applied by the countries that are leading in this field represents an important political signal to our partners in the EU and NATO that the Bulgarian policy on this issue is both responsible and transparent.

Thus, apart from ensuring compliance with the UN sanctions against Angola (UNITA), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, that list names other 'risky' countries where conflict is occurring or threatening (criteria of the EU Code of Conduct, the Wassenaar Arrangement, etc.). Hopefully, those self-restraints, alongside our participation in international export control regimes, highlights Bulgaria's resolve to be a reliable and trustworthy European and Euroatlantic partner.

Though focused exclusively on supply-side efforts, this article has tried to outline the panoply of risk reduction endeavours undertaken by Bulgaria since 1989. Aspiring to join NATO and the EU, Bulgaria is strongly committed to ensuring the conduct of a responsible national policy with regard to transfers to particular 'sensitive' states and regions. Last but not least, compliance with internationally imposed embargoes is a benchmark of Bulgaria's commitment to be a net contributor of security. In parallel, our country is a strong proponent of the integrated approach to addressing proliferation risks. Thus, whilst

avoiding duplication, multilateral instruments are applied at global, regional and sub-regional levels in a well-coordinated fashion. This, hopefully, would charge intra-state relations with an even greater degree of transparency and predictability, so that security and stability are warranted.

### *International Military Education and Training*

During the last decade Bulgaria was one of the major beneficiaries from the international support for officers' education and training, provided by the Western countries:

Country	1992-2000	2001	2002	2003	Total
USA	228	54	76	63	421
Germany	101	35	39	55	230
France	93	21	25	19	158
The Netherlands	88	13	23	28	152
England	78	12	28	34	152
Canada	41	39	64	41	185
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies	47	7	30	54	138
Turkey	26	10	8	5	49
Greece	26	1	7	3	37
Others	70	43	89	116	318
<b>Total</b>	798	235	389	418	1840

Today, opportunities for foreign officers to receive education in Bulgarian military colleges are provided on a bi-lateral basis as form of exchange. During the entire academic year there are 19 foreign officers – 17 of them at *G. S. Rakovski* Defence and Staff College and 2 at the National Military University, all of them from NATO countries.

### **Defence Diplomacy in the New Security and Defence Agenda**

So far as topics for defence diplomacy are concerned, regional military co-operation is regarded as a subject of particular promise. In this connection most of the governments of South East Europe *have* shown initiative and have set up various forums and a few concrete defence arrangements. The mentioned above best examples are the South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process and the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE)/South-East European Brigade (SEEBRIG). Others are under consideration. At the same time, not all the declaratory policy statements about co-operation that have been heard lately have actually led to substantive action: a number of collaborative ventures have been announced, but have not materialised. They would seem destined to appear only as exhibits in Europe's 'Museum of Initiatives'.<sup>7</sup>

One reason for such disappointments may be that the best ideas tend to be those for which there is broadly-based US, NATO and EU support. With the change of the entire priorities of these sponsors many of the regionally oriented activities, including those that have been quoted as extremely successful, have been marginalised. The launch of the *war on terror* and the NATO and EU enlargements shifted the focus from what has been developed during the last decade as defence diplomacy *environment* (in terms of aims, set of principals, support, procedures) towards what should be created in immediate

perspective. Without being very strong one could argue that the new security situation redefines probably not all the defence diplomacy definitions and basic aims but introduces a set of new driving factors that reflect the entire security and defence agenda.

Significant change in the atmosphere of formulating and performing defence diplomacy, especially in its *transfer of know-how* aspect, has been introduced by the powerful engagement of the NGO – both international and national – within the security sector reform framework. The fact that there are emerging civil societies throughout the region should be taken into account by defence diplomacy executives. This is an argument for policy debate and policy formulation, which engages international, and national security communities as envisaged in the present proposal, linking NGOs active in this field, academics and journalists as well as security-sector professionals and elected representatives. In practice some of the NGOs have more financial and expertise capacities than some of the regional ministries of defence. The other mutually recognised fact is that the non-governmental representatives are better transporters of know-how and lessons learned than the official representatives, they are better in generating discussions and are much more flexible in establishing multilateral contacts. The engagement of NGOs in the countries' defence diplomacy efforts (which is a normal practice in most of the Western countries) will help to overcome the fact that some initiatives have undoubtedly foundered because of a lack of real political will. Some governments lack the confidence to commit themselves wholeheartedly to regional or sub-regional security and defence co-operation. There is not enough mutual trust yet. The engagement of the NGOs and academicians in defence diplomacy will help to overcome such still existing resistance through engagement of the *social factor*, which in many cases is and could be more constructive and radical than the entire administrations, which wrongly believe that developing sub-regional affiliations may have been regarded as a distraction from, maybe even an obstacle to success in, their high-priority integration in NATO and EU quest.<sup>8</sup>

In addition there is mutual understanding on the necessary change of the geographic terrain of defence diplomacy that was in some degree officialised by the NATO Summit in Istanbul (2004). For Bulgaria the shift of the Alliance's focus from the Balkans towards a broader regional projection that connects the Western Balkans with the Caucasus and Central Asia represents both challenge and new opportunities. Today the military co-operation in South East Europe, in addition to completing the job of stabilising the region and integrating it into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream, has the opportunity to enlarge its motivation, objectives and outreach. The broad area, stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea and further eastwards to the Caspian Sea has been a clashing zone of the bipolar divide during the Cold War period. The structural shifts in the international system of the last decade have resulted in changes in the Balkan-Black Sea-Caspian Sea area that can be defined in geo-political and geo-strategic terms in the following way:

In geo-political terms three geopolitical zones have been formed within this same broad area: South-Eastern Europe (or the Balkans), the Caucasian region and the Caspian Sea region. They are evolving fast into a single geopolitical zone in the context of the global counter-terrorist fight.

In geo-strategic terms the broad area constitutes already a single zone, confirmed in a decisive way during the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia; by the membership of Turkey, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria in the Alliance, and expected later accession of other countries of South East Europe, the special relations between the Alliance and Russia, the active links of NATO with Ukraine and by the co-operation of the Atlantic Alliance with countries of the Black Sea-Caucasian-Caspian Sea region in the Partnership for Peace Programme. The fight against terrorism confirmed the legitimate functioning of this zone.

Though, most probably, the requirements of shaping such a functioning region are many and diverse, the military co-operation of the countries from South East Europe is indispensable and with a promising end-result: integration in the European Union and NATO and receiving a fair share of profits from the stable and secure business environment. The model of South East European defence and military co-operation bears the potential of being exported with dignity to other neighbouring regions of Europe.

By receiving full NATO membership, as well as its future accession to the European Union, Bulgaria will solve the classical issues of national security in their dual dimension – obtaining capabilities to deter various direct and indirect threats and building conditions for an accelerated economic, social and cultural development. These developments however will not mark ‘the end of the story’ of redefining national security as they will open an opportunity for a ‘new beginning’ in an environment with a huge potential. This new beginning includes an enhanced policy of defence diplomacy based on the accumulated experience, its new conceptualization and further institutionalisation. The aim of expected policy should be accelerating the transformation of the country from mainly a recipient towards a new sponsor of defence co-operation and provider of opportunities for *capacity transfer* through education, training and expert support.

As stated above, one central purpose of the defence diplomacy is to facilitate, guide and drive a formal and informal peace dialogue (the process). Another is to derive from this not only an improved understanding of what partnering countries can and cannot agree about, but also innovative ideas for enhanced security co-operation and for experience-sharing on a regional basis (the output). Building mutual trust and understanding, exploring shared perspectives and examining options for arms control agreements, demobilisation steps, confidence- and security-building measures and suchlike – these are, of course, actions to be valued in their own right. No less important, though, are the likely pay-offs that can be expected in the longer run, in terms of conflict prevention and capacity-building for conflict mediation. This traditional defence diplomacy driving considerations continue to have meaning and value. At the same time in the case of Bulgaria (and not only) there is a set of essential new factors that influence defence diplomacy perspectives like: the Strategic Defence Review and the resulting missions/tasks based defence planning; NATO membership and the orientation from *defence reform* towards *transformation*; the engagement in the *war on terror*; enhanced vision for a region of activities that includes *Balkans - Black sea – Caucasus – Caspian sea* political, economic and security areas; raised significance of effective arms control and disarmament; the need for continued and enhanced transfer of *know-how* in implementing security sector reforms.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is based on the presumption that the new security situation (September 11, new global security relationship, NATO’s internal development and enlargement etc.) forces a new security paradigm. It cannot be explained with the simple ‘all for one in the war against terrorism’. The new decisive strategy towards a new world order to be established, which is most of all a *security order*, reflects the construction of the entire national security sector even in countries like Bulgaria. The list of the new qualities consists of fundamental issues such as the redefinition of roles and a new division of labour between the components of the security sector in both internal and external aspects; a new constitutional and judicial basis for engagement, management, command and control; new forms and procedures for parliamentary and civil control together with a new content of transparency, etc. There is no doubt that the potential of the existing national ‘policy of copying’ is dismantled forever, especially because most of the countries with effective liberal democratic models of security sectors are currently undergoing a process of redefinition of these models. NATO and EU as organisations unavoidably did the same. Following this trend, Bulgaria together with most of the East European countries respectively enrolled into a conceptual vacuum on how to continue with

both further security sector reform and the next generation democratisation measures. That is why in security sector reform policy these countries face again the basic problem to define the competencies of the various security actors, the rules of their political subordination and horizontal integration, and at the same time, the fulfillment of the conditions ensuring operational autonomy of the security services professionals.

It is clear that among all security sector institutions the Bulgarian military are less prepared for immediate involvement in anti- and counter-terrorist operations. During the last two years the debate on how to adapt the forces hangover from the Warsaw Pact time to the entire and near future national, regional and Euro-Atlantic realities was complicated with discussions on their role in 'the new war' against terrorism. The campaign against Saddam Hussein fostered the political/expert consensus that the specific units, equipment and infrastructure should as a matter of priority be adapted to react both independently and in multinational format to this new challenge. This deep engagement reflected the defence reform orientation simultaneously with expected transformations in the other organisations of the national security sector. In accordance with the Bulgarian political and military authorities, the role of the military in preventing and combating terrorism should be enhanced because (1) there is no longer a clear border between external (military) and internal (police) security, (2) there is no longer a fixed line between terrorism (political, criminal, civilisation) and war (armed conflicts with different intensity), and because the armed forces maintain offensive capacities that could be employed on a multinational basis to prevent bloody terrorist actions and even human catastrophes.

Implementation of this vision was performed through the Strategic Defence Review. The political frame of this review is the Armed Forces to build a capacity to reflect the new security challenges in internal and international format together with NATO and member-countries forces. Using the Armed Forces as an additional instrument in the efforts to stabilise the situation and minimise the risks of multifaceted threats is not based on abstract 'big wars' any more but on concrete conditions, common sense and rapid reaction capabilities. The time to react is short. Hence, the internationalisation of efforts in the military sector and the supporting areas of intelligence, communications, logistics and infrastructure are inevitable. The existing security environment, the new national interests and goals and the resulting defence missions and tasks demand a *transformation of armed forces* that should comprise:

- Optimal (sensible, resource matching) introduction of the achievements of military science (new military technologies in arms, equipment, communication and information systems for command and control (*C4IR*), management of powers and resources);
- Auspicious operative concepts with regard to the different scenarios of using the armed forces in allied, coalition, international and national formats;
- Efficient organisation and system of command that ensures superiority over a potential enemy and performs the tasks of collective defence of the country and its allies in a way that corresponds to the real security situation.

However, in accordance with the political leadership and military experts that presented the SDR outcomes, serious support, consultancy, and training with the partner countries forces and experts should be provided in order that Bulgarian militaries are able to obtain capacities for effective contribution to both national and international efforts to counter the global terrorism in all of its forms.

Membership of NATO is the crucial determining factor for defence diplomacy. Bulgaria has the capacity for a successful policy within NATO. Its potential includes scores of manifestations of strengthening relations in times of crises, persistent trust in the political adequacy and the recognised efforts to bring the reform of the military to a successful end. The major challenge for Bulgaria's policy as a NATO member stems out of the fact that the country has to make its own way through a large group of new members, to establish a new

image and clear this image of some awkward associations (some of them connected to defence diplomacy issues such as uncontrolled arms export), to strike the balance between the national and collective interests, and to utilize the capacity of the Alliance for projecting those interests through out the enhanced region.

The membership itself presents a specific challenge to Bulgarian defence diplomatic capacity. Bulgaria must develop a position on the major processes of transformation of the Alliance in order to emerge as an active and constructive member. NATO transformation is vitally important for the future of the Alliance – and hence for Bulgaria as well. For this reason, the position of this country must be consistently created with the participation of the political forces, the professionals and the representatives of the non-government sector. A possible system of positions on the Alliance transformation may include issues like:

- Bulgaria must contribute to the common approach to the perception of threats, their intensity and the possible risks for the Alliance and its member states;
- The consolidated perception of threat must be used as the basis for NATO military and auxiliary planning;
- Bulgaria and the other new members, aided by NATO and by the present members must be prepared both politically and militarily with about a 10-year perspective. For that purpose, NATO must develop its policy in support of the modernisation of the armed forces of the new members, to establish funds for operations outside the scope of responsibilities, and to expand the spectrum of joint exercises.

The membership will also require Bulgaria to participate in a collective manner in the efforts to enhance the impact of defence diplomacy towards unstable regions, partner countries and concrete security and defence problems. The sharing of both positive experience and lessons learnt should be made within the collective approach towards those countries that apply the Membership Action Plan and others that would like to reach higher interoperability in order to join the combined military operations against sources of threat. The engagement of Bulgarian experts (together with other new members) in consulting decision makers and training of experts will make the transfer of know-how in the integration policy and defence reforms much more acceptable.

For this purpose and in the context of the implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment, Bulgaria has to develop Centres of Excellence based on the existing *know-how*, intellectual and infrastructure capacities. There are several proposals in this direction: *SEE Co-operative Crisis Management Capacity, Centre of Excellence in C4I, Training Centre on Security Sector Reform*, and others.

Supporting future NATO members from the region is also an important new defence diplomacy mission for Bulgaria. The Alliance position is that Albania, Macedonia and Croatia *will* join NATO. Consequently, relations with them need to consider this future membership. Bulgarian efforts, such as joint training of officers and civilians, exercises of staff and units, mission participation, infrastructure development, logistical solutions etc., are definitely not sufficient. The potential for conducting any type of international training is minimal: Bulgaria does not possess a single international training centre while the number of officers from the region trained in our military schools and the Academy remains lower than ten per year.

The intelligence services, as they still in large degree are related to ‘defence diplomacy’ should contribute to promoting Bulgaria within NATO and the EU. There are four factors that cause special concern in NATO’s respective circles in connection with Bulgaria’s (and other new members’) intelligence services reform:

The first factor depends on the degree to which democratic control over the intelligence services and their operations is achieved. In this connection, it is important to motivate citizens to educate themselves on the issues of intelligence in order to be able to control it better. This makes it necessary to demystify intelligence while preserving and

increasing its efficiency in the service of the country's defence and the exerted civic democratic control. It is also necessary to assist the formation of a political culture that supports the legitimate role of intelligence under conditions of democracy and does not permit the leakage of intelligence information for private or political goals. At the same time, this culture should not allow intelligence to roam free by drawing social and political dividends from its concentrated informational might. Finally, there is the issue of selection, training and overall preparation of professional agents – those who specialise as professional servants of the state.

The second factor depends on the degree to which the intelligence services reform has been harmonised and synchronised with the standard procedures of Western intelligence services. A question of key importance in this context is that of the early retirement of *high-ranking officers* remaining from the times of totalitarian communism, as well as the recruitment of officers that have a pro-western orientation and have not been discredited. One may say that this is a matter of simple party political analysis that should not provoke dramatic responses from any direction.

The third factor is dependent on the degree to which the link between national and Russian intelligence and counter-intelligence services has been severed. The problem is that the US and NATO possess evidence of conducted disinformation campaigns and of Russian intelligence gathering intelligence information from the new countries, members and aspiring members of the Alliance. These facts tie in logically with the continuing declarations of top-level Russian officials that NATO enlargement is a mistake and Russia perceives it as a hostile act. It is naïve to expect that our future NATO allies will become 'less alert' in this area, even if they act as friends or even allies with Russia on a number of issues or because we do not go far enough in our analyses and activities in this area. Our sovereign conduct following 1989 means, above all, an independent, comprehensive and in-depth strategic analysis and assessment of the security situation and an adequate response to it. It turns out that one important component of this situation includes the opinions, perceptions and assessments of our allies, which we should also study carefully. In addition, we need to formulate independently our positions according to the demands of the new situation without necessarily expecting the corrective power of allied opinion. The positive content of our links with Russia will apparently have to be promoted by other ways and channels: e.g. in the context of multilateral shared efforts against terrorism instead of free use of our national sovereignty by skilful intelligence quarters.

The fourth factor depends on the degree to which intelligence and counter-intelligence have been granted sufficient budgets and other resources in order to function efficiently. In the case of Bulgaria, there was some additional concern recently that the trafficking in arms towards the Middle East and dictatorial or terrorist bound states may have something to do with an insufficiency of the reform and adequate control of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services.

The engagement of Bulgaria in the war on terror requires a new and different approach towards defence planning and mission's performance that have strong and direct links to a larger definition of defence diplomacy. Although there have been a notable number of exceptions, the forces taking part in contemporary operations have been multinational in nature, usually 'coalitions of the willing'. Coalitions must be built and maintained, capitals consulted, policy influenced, governments and heads of state in the theatre of operations assuaged and cajoled. This brings special challenges for defence diplomacy today and in the future.

Developments in communications now allow open video links between capitals and theatre HQs; ministers, senior officers and officials will want to use them, and to speak to commanders, not to their senior staffs. A key challenge for commanders of multi-national forces is that of forging a common purpose across the breadth of outlook, training and

capability found in the coalition. Commanders must mesh different national doctrines, weapon systems, logistics and degrees of military expertise together, ensuring equality of risk and suffering across the coalition, playing to the strengths of the national contingents to make best use of expertise, capabilities and command states. In addition, there will be a wide range of other organisations, groups and bodies in the theatre of operations (such as NGOs, local authorities and different factions) with whom commanders must deal, and all under the 24-hour glare of the world's media. This means that the training of forces and especially the commanders and staff should take adequate account of the international context and not just the national context.

The NATO focus today is very much on developing deployable forces – professional forces that are well trained, well equipped, held at graduated readiness, with strategic lift assets to get them into theatre and tactical lift assets to move them around the theatre of operations, and with the array of logistic support to sustain operations over time. These capabilities do not come cheaply. Yet in most countries, there is still a significant mindset that wants to spend limited defence budgets on maintaining and replacing major non-deployable platforms that are surplus to meeting the threats of today or the near future. Above this level of national integration there needs to be an effective international integration – because international terrorists not only disregard national boundaries, they exploit them. Timely exchange of intelligence, secure communication links, robust and responsive information systems, rapid decision-making, common procedures and well-trained, well-equipped personnel are required for this approach to succeed.

## **Conclusion**

History reveals that wars have been fought amongst states that have closed all communication channels, with no military-to-military contacts. It is important to develop close ties with the military forces of the region, to build confidence and enhance security. The mindset that ‘the pursuit of foreign policy/diplomacy is the exclusive preserve of the diplomats and the use of force is the preserve of the military’ is no longer valid. There cannot be a foreign policy without military content. Therefore, within the overall framework of the Constitution and civilian control, the Bulgarian armed forces will continue to contribute to the evolution and formulation of the country's foreign policy. Defence diplomacy needs to be developed as one of the main and continuous peacetime activities in support of foreign and security policy objectives aimed at maintaining peace, establishing mutual trust, developing co-operation and enhancing stability and security in the region.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> The paper presents the personal view of the author and does not reflect any official or institutional position.

<sup>2</sup> The Republic of Bulgaria is a Party to the following international treaties and Conventions in the sphere of armament control: Protocol on prohibition of the use in wartime of suffocating, poisonous and of other gases and of bacteriological warfare methods (Geneva protocol from 1925); Treaty on the Antarctic from 1959 - the Treaty stipulates that the Antarctic will be used for peaceful objectives only; Treaty on the prohibition of atomic tests in the atmosphere in the cosmic space and under water from 1963; The treaty on the prohibition to deploy atomic and other mass destruction weapons on the sea floor, on the ocean floor and under the soil from 1971; Convention on the prohibition of military or other hostile use of technologies for changing the environment from 1977; Agreement guiding the activities of the states on the Moon and on other celestial bodies from 1979.

<sup>3</sup> Meetings have been conducted as follows: four meetings of the Ministers of defence, three meetings of the deputy ministers of defence, two meetings of the Chiefs of the General Staffs / deputy Chiefs of General Staffs of the countries from the region, and 23 expert meetings.

<sup>4</sup> These include the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) and its Engineer Task Force (ETF); civil-military emergency planning (CMEP) workshops; and the US-sponsored Partnership for Peace Information Management System (PIMS).

<sup>5</sup> Of the 10 SEDM members, Croatia and Albania withdrew from the Experts' Group in June and October 2001 respectively – the former because its armed forces do not receive medical care in military hospitals.

<sup>6</sup> Based on presentation *Evaluating South East European Security Cooperation* made by Adrian Pop within the CEES Project ESCADA.

<sup>7</sup> Term introduced by Professor Jan Zielonka at the 'Stability Pact Conference' for Bulgarian and Romanian parliamentarians, organised by the Centre for European Security Studies in Co-operation with ISPS and the European University Institute, and held in Florence, Italy, November 1999.

<sup>8</sup> Adina Stefan, *Romania's Engagement in Subregional Co-operation and the National Strategy for NATO Accession*, Harmonie Papers, nr. 10 (Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies, December 1999) pp.22-23.

This page intentionally left blank

# Domestic Military Assistance: The Case of Slovenia

Ljubica JELUŠIČ  
*University of Ljubljana*

The Domestic Military Assistance Task is a matter of complex relations among Slovenian public opinion, Slovenian Army, defence actors in rescue and protection, and official state policy. The participation of Slovenian military in rescue and protection operations at home is one of its most important sources of social legitimacy and public support for this task is longstanding. Operational problems regarding the more effective use of the military in such operations are caused by the exclusivist approach to such missions during the early years of the modern Slovenian Army, and by competition with other actors that participate in rescue and protection units and operations on more professional basis.

The newly independent state of Slovenia began to develop its post-Cold War national security system in 1991 with a military drawn mainly from reserve soldiers from the former Yugoslav Armed Forces.<sup>1</sup> These 'territorials' had made up the Territorial Defence Units of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Their military training had been received during one year of compulsory military service in the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and sustained through refresher courses never longer than one week per year. The reservists were in uniform only during these refresher courses and they did not represent the real high readiness armed force of SFRY's government. As reservists, they were mobilised for Slovenia's Ten-Day War of Independence in June-July 1991, and demobilised immediately after the end of hostilities and peace agreement in July 1991. Therefore, the main duty of the reservists in the defence system was to defend the country from the possible attack, and to help root the military establishment in society. All other activities, roles and missions were carried out by the YPA.

The newly born Republic of Slovenia preserved conscription as the main source of manning for its armed forces. In the years that followed independence, the number of military professionals (officers, NCOs and privates) slowly increased. They built up its standing army, while at the same time the number of conscripts who were willing to serve slowly decreased. After 1995, the rejection of military service by male conscripts was very widespread. In 2000, the number of conscripts asking for the official status of conscientious objector reached one fifth of the age cohort. On the basis of negative trends in the preparedness of young males to serve, the government of Republic of Slovenia in 2002 decided to abolish conscription within two years. This decision caused additional criticism from young men who were not ready to serve as the last victims of disliked system. Due to their massive resistance to the call up, the government was forced to implement this change early, and halted the drafting of conscripts in 2003. The last generation of conscripts in military service ended their term in October 2003, while the last conscientious objectors served the civil duty for two months longer, finishing their last term in December 2003.

The process of changing the manning system of the Slovenian armed forces has been very influential in restructuring the role and missions of the military. The official five tasks of the military have remained basically the same through the 15 years of its

development. Pursuant to the Defence Act<sup>2</sup> The Slovenian Army's (SA) fundamental tasks are as follows:

- Military education and training for combat and other military defence purposes;
- Providing an adequate and necessary level of combat readiness;
- Providing military defence in the event of an attack on the country;
- Complying with Slovenia's commitments to international organisations and agreements;
- Cooperation in rescue and protection in accordance with its organisation and equipment.

What has radically changed over time has been the prioritisation (in terms of human and financial resources committed) of these five tasks. Although the Defence Act pleads for the equal development of all tasks, the reform process shows that the military's international commitments have been the main driving force for structural change in the armed forces. Without its international obligations, the military would not have changed its manning system so quickly. Indeed, between 1997 and 2005 the military fielded 1700 soldiers in peace operations. Given a total military strength of around 7000 troops, this means that every fourth member of the SA has been deployed or is currently deployed outside the country.

In common with many other European armed forces in post Cold war era, the Slovenian military have experienced different reform processes, trends and transition. Haltiner and Klein (2002) identify three reform waves in armed forces in Europe: the decline of the armed forces between 1990-95; NATO-oriented internationalisation and professionalisation between 1996-2001; and modularisation after 2000/2001. They recognise a number of common trends across these waves, including the establishment of expert commissions on defence reform, the abolishing of conscription, constabularisation, feminisation, multinationality, amongst others.<sup>3</sup> Although born at the beginning of these European processes, the Slovenian Army has also been shared these reforms and trends.<sup>4</sup>

The attitude of the government, military, and public opinion towards the basic military tasks, including domestic military assistance, has been an inherent part of these trends. However it is noticeable that within all these changes, *the public perception of military as provider of domestic assistance in case of natural and other catastrophes has remained very stable and coherent for several decades, no matter of what kind and structure of armed forces were present in Slovenia.*

### **Domestic Assistance as a Source of Social Legitimacy for the Military**

Domestic assistance has been an important source of social legitimacy for the armed forces throughout Slovenian history. Their assistance was most appreciated during natural disasters. During the time of former Yugoslavia, people perceived disaster relief as a military task of comparable importance to the defence of the territory. As long as whatever military that ruled over the territory of Slovenia, understood and acted in accordance with this, then the citizens would be more willing to legitimate its presence and other activities.

In Slovenia, domestic military assistance is mostly defined as assistance in cases of natural and technical disasters: primarily in floods, avalanches, and earthquakes, forest fires – which are the most frequent catastrophes to affect Slovenia each year. The disaster relief task is mentioned by the State Constitution and more precisely described by Defence Act. However, disaster relief occurs in a whole system of national security in which the military is just one actor. There are for example a number of other organisations – more specialised in civil protection – that take lead in the crisis management of disaster events. These include rescue and protection units that are coordinated from the Ministry of Defence and

financed from the same budget as the military. Article 37 of the Defence Act states that that the government decides on use of the military in rescue and protection duties, while in emergency cases, this decision is made by the Minister of Defence on the proposal of the Commander of Civil Protection of Republic of Slovenia or the Chief of General Staff. The Commander of Civil Protection has priority in the evaluation of the state of emergency needs and in the decision on whether the military is needed or not. His or her proposal then serves as the basic recommendation to the government or to the Minister of Defence.

Today, the Slovenian Army is losing many of its territorial defence abilities, largely due to the decreasing number of personnel serving in the military and lower popular and elite threat perceptions. As a consequence, there are very few activities left for the military in which it would have the possibility of direct communication with the population. There are certain occasions in which it may show the inner life, equipment, and partly activities, including military parades, 'open door' days, historical and political celebrations and so on, but these are usually very timely limited performances, which present the military from its positive side. More realistic views of military performance tend to derive from its deployment in disasters. Here the military has first: a direct communication with affected civil population without political and media mediators, and second, with the wider public through media presentations of its work. The circumstances in disaster are very close to wartime deployment, involving a high level of emotional intensity, though of course posing fewer threats than in combat. As such, domestic military assistance activities give the military the opportunity to show all of its abilities and readiness – except combat ones – in a relatively friendly environment.

### **Social Distance between Soldiers and Civilians**

Another issue that complicates the domestic outlook of the military, is, at least in case of Slovenia, their very extensive employment in missions abroad. This contribution to international security may be seen as relevant and is highly appreciated by the international organisations, but much of the public still miss the results, which would show in a very clear way how these international, mainly peace support operations, contribute to the national security. The contradiction of this task is, that the SA has more direct contact and work with local population in areas of peace operations like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Middle East, than in Slovenia itself. Interestingly, soldiers report very good relations with local population, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina peace operations, although their work – including patrolling, searching for illegal arms, checking houses and so on – may disturb the everyday life of citizens. While operating in Slovenia – for example while on manoeuvres or training exercises – many soldiers report the opposite attitude from the Slovenian population who sometimes see them in a negative light. Such negative public attitudes towards the military are more visible and intensive in training areas, where locals argue about the noise and environmental damage caused by military training. The gap between being accepted and appreciated in the foreign 'unfriendly' environment of peace operations, and being criticised or even rejected by their own home population in an expected 'friendly' environment causes a disappointment and a low motivation to serve on behalf of the homeland by many soldiers. They have a specific feeling of being 'strangers at home'.<sup>5</sup>

From the training perspective, disaster relief is also a peripheral task, and soldiers are not obliged to prepare in long and specialised way for it. During the period of the conscript army for example, (1991-2003), conscripts were prevented from disaster relief work. This was because their term of compulsory military duty was only seven months barely enough time to train properly for any of their missions, let alone disaster relief. In

practice they had enough time to learn basic procedures on how to stop fire – mainly for self-protection purposes – and far less for purposes of help in a real catastrophe.

The governmental understanding of the soldiers' job has also been very narrowly limited to the defence of the country. The public statements of many politicians in the construction phase of Slovenian Army (1991-95) stressed the defence of national territory mission as the only professional task of the conscripts. All other duties in the security of the country would be performed by other, more professionalised or specialised actors. For example, conscripts were not supposed to go on missions abroad, they were not prepared enough to participate in disaster relief, and they were excluded from training if this took place beyond national borders. Indeed, officials usually rejected the use of conscripts in disaster relief, even in cases when the disaster would directly threaten the soldiers themselves.<sup>6</sup>

The reason for such a protected status for conscript soldiers was the pressure of public opinion – primarily from conscripts' families – who would react very vocally if their sons were put into dangerous situations that were not directly connected with the 'holy' goal of defence of the country. In order to keep parents supportive towards the military, and to stop them from calling media if they thought their sons would be abused for purposes not primarily seen as training for defence, the officers and especially defence officials from Ministry of Defence left the conscripts out of disaster relief efforts. These decisions seemed to be politically reasonable to escape possible media attacks, but in long term they affected the social legitimacy of the military. The conscripts felt that their training was of little value to the country how unlikely any threat (or potential threat) to Slovenian territory appeared to be. The unclear utility of conscripts' military skills added to common perception that military duty was not appropriate for Slovenian males anymore. The conscripts reported many times that their military activities were fully useless for society, and many conscientious objectors explained their motives to choose civil duty because they would feel more useful for people and for humankind doing this rather than joining the SA.

The exclusion of conscripts from any involvement into humanitarian work at home contributed to the growing social distance between Slovenian Army and the citizens of Slovenia. In 2003, when the Government stopped drafting conscripts and suspended military duty as a part of the compulsory military service, there was nearly no public debate at all. Public opinion accepted the abolition of conscription in an extremely relaxed way. There was no public sympathy for the military establishment, which was largely unprepared for this very fundamental and swift change in its recruitment system.

This growing social distance between military and society has caused specific fears in the military itself. In particular, after eight years of participation in peace operations the SA has suffered no casualties. However, given the ambiguity of public feeling on military issues, what would happen if somebody did die on a mission? What would the public reaction be? Supportive or ignorant again? Many soldiers are afraid that the second option is the more likely one.

### **Public Opinion on Domestic Military Assistance**

Public opinion in Slovenia is very supportive of the military's disaster relief tasks. Indeed, it potentially offers an important new base for the military's legitimacy in society, in the face of the declining legitimacy of traditional missions. There are a number of domestic military assistance jobs that the military can fulfil – including providing assistance to the police in the case of a breakdown in public order for example or their involvement in the political system. However, these are not so widely accepted by the public as disaster relief

tasks. For most Slovenes, the use of the military in these other domestic capacities is viewed as unacceptable.

Public attitudes regarding the main roles of the military have been surveyed for more than two decades in the Slovenian Public Opinion (SPO) poll. This is one of the first and most representative measurements of public trends in Slovenia, and dates back to the 1960s when polling was considered to be the most useful social-science activity in socialist political circles. The SPO is conducted by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, and for many years was the only Yugoslav public opinion survey. The public acceptance of military tasks is measured in a question that was originally formed and firstly used in the 1981/1982 survey. In subsequent measurements the original question was preserved, and new tasks, when developed, were just added to the original set of variables.<sup>7</sup>

**Table 1: Attitudes on the military tasks (percentage of answers ‘agree’)**

*The question is: ‘How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following tasks of the military?’*

The military should....	SPO 81/82	SPO 88	SPO 90	SPO 94/5	SPO 99/1	SPO 01/3	SPO 03/3
Defend the country from outside attack	92,1	96,2	95,5	93,7	95,2	88,2	85,3
Cooperate in building the roads, harvesting, public works	83,7	88,2	87,9	59,7	48	45	46,2
Educate young people in patriotism	74,7	68,1	62,8	64,9	68,7	58	56,8
Defend the political system and internal order	76,6	54,6	42,1	*	*	*	*
Help in cases of natural and other catastrophes	92,8	97,5	95,8	95,6	95,2	92,9	92,5
If needed, it should take the state power in its hands	41,9	24,7	18,6	10,6	11,9	12,6	13,8
Care for military preparedness and not interfere in political events	55,2	74	86,2	86,3	81,5	80,2	80
Cooperate in international peace and humanitarian operations	*	*	*	*	78,2	76,6	74,7
Work instead of workers on strike	*	*	*	*	10	9,4	11
Assist police in providing internal order and security	*	*	*	*	51	58,7	50,5
Assist police in protecting the border from illegal crosses of immigrants	*	*	*	*	*	72	67,2
Fight against terrorism	*	*	*	*	*	73,5	71,6

NB: The surveys are cited according to the year they were conducted. For example 81/82 means that the survey was on field with face to face interviews in December 1981 and January 1982. 01/3 means that the survey was the third public opinion survey in the year 2003.

SPO results since 1982/83 illustrate that the public's trust in the defence capacities of the military has been decreasing for the past 20 years. When the first three measurements took place (Winter 1981/82; 1988, and late 1990), Slovenia was a republic within former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and people had in mind the YPA when they were making their evaluation of the military's tasks. Defending the country from the outside attack was the second most desired task – after providing help in natural and other catastrophes. The priority given to these two tasks has remained the same in measurements made in independent Slovenia. In addition, the SPO shows that there is also a history of strong support for the provision of military assistance in tasks such as road building, harvesting and public works. During the SFRY period, this role was generally perceived as the third most important. However, since Slovenian independence, public support for military involvement in these activities has declined significantly.

Police assistance tasks were also viewed as unacceptable in the newly independent Slovenia. Politicians firmly opposed any kind of internal military role, largely because of their own negative memories of the YPA's intervention in Slovenia in 1991. The reaction against YPA was inserted into the new military of Slovenia by exclusion of internal police work from the list of military tasks. Public opinion was not so eager to oppose such role. In 2001, when the Slovenian Public Opinion Poll first asked if military should assist the police in securing Slovenia's borders against illegal immigrants, two thirds of the public supported this task. Moreover, while the public's readiness to support military in assisting police in the maintenance of law and order is very low in comparison to other tasks, half of the respondents still do support it.

In relation to public opinion therefore, it is clear that disaster relief is viewed as the most important task for the military, followed by the defence of the country in the event of an attack, military preparedness and cooperation in peace operations.

### **Is the Military Happy with the Domestic Assistance Role?**

Whilst the Slovenian Army was still conscript-based, military training plans did not foresee the need for special training in domestic assistance, although this task was one of the five mentioned in Defence Act. Conscripts had a few hours of training how to deal with fires, but this was intended to prepare them for help in case of possible fire within the military training camps or barracks. They were not trained systematically to cooperate in disaster relief for any kind of disaster. Now the Army is comprised of volunteers, there is more time to train soldiers specifically for this role. This is a popular mission amongst the soldiers themselves who have expressed their readiness to help people on many occasions because 'we must help the people who are paying for us'. Additionally, many soldiers have experienced domestic assistance tasks, not just in Slovenia, but during their time on international peace operations. Their feeling is that they are good enough to carry out police assistance and domestic assistance for Slovenian population, too. It is likely that public opinion would accept such a transformation.

The Slovenian Army is included in the special program of rescue and protection, called ZARE (*Zaščita in Reševanje* - rescue and protection), where they contribute primarily in the form of helicopter units. These units are assigned to ZARE duties through a request to the Minister of Defence and are very active, averaging over 100 rescue flights per year. This number increased to 264 in 2001 and 257 in 2002 as a consequence of the many forest fires which swept Slovenia in these years. The number of passengers rescued in these activities varied between 129 in 1998 and 366 in 2002. In addition, the fight against fire is among most important tasks of the helicopter crews. In year 2003, the amount of water delivered by military helicopter crews in fire fighting operations was 1,255,900

litres.<sup>8</sup> The reaction of the helicopter crews to this very demanding and intensive work in rescue and protection is two sided. From one side, they are aware of a humanitarian imperative and need to provide help in such situations, and they express their high commitment to this work. On the other, however, they are concerned with being overloaded and overstretched. They think that the national security system should find a solution to award crews with extra financial support, in addition to the basic amount allocated to them in the defence budget.

While operating in rescue and protection tasks, the Slovenian Army has to balance between its capacities to help, its readiness, equipment, and needs of the affected people. In all cases, it is also under direct control of the System of Rescue and Protection, the second main pillar of national defence system. Some soldiers, who have had the opportunity to participate in rescue operations, report on feeling marginalised in these operations. Usually, it is the media that ignores military's participation in such operations, because a few helicopters on duty does not represent a substantial contribution in terms of quantity. Soldiers argue that their help, which is very expensive and professional, can be perceived as unimportant.

## **Conclusion**

In summary, the Domestic Military Assistance Task is a matter of quadrangle between public opinion, military, defence actors in civil protection, and official state policy, as written in law, recommendations, and plans. Additionally, it is becoming one of the most important sources of social legitimacy of modern armies, because it brings the military in direct contact with the local population of the states that they belong to. Although Slovenian soldiers are increasingly operating in multinational circumstances – forming parts of multinational military formations or being deployed in multinational environments – they still regard patriotism as a core military value. They believe that the awards and recognition which they are earning in the international circumstances should be respected at home, too. In 15 years of Slovenian independency, the military passed different phases in its involvement into the domestic assistance. At the beginning, between 1991 and 1997, the military was excluded from such activities, primarily because of its conscript based force structure which was not trained for disaster relief tasks. In period after 1997, the military, which was heavily involved in international peace operations, learned a difficult lesson – that while these activities were known and appreciated in foreign circumstances, they were often ignored at home. Since the switch to an all volunteer army in 2003, the struggle to maintain the military's contact with society has become an urgent task – not least in order to ensure that the military can still find an adequate number of recruits. Additionally, those soldiers who contribute to the rescue operations, would like to see their work presented in the media in a more positive way.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> In the period between 1968 and 1991, the Yugoslav (SFRY) armed forces were organised as a standing federal army (the YPA) together with Territorial Defence units under the command of each of the republic's governments.

<sup>2</sup> Article 37, 'Zakon o obrambi' (Defence Act) (ZObr-UPB1), *Uradni list RS 103/2004* (Official Gazette of republic of Slovenia), 23 September 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Karl W. Haltiner and Paul Klein, (eds.), *Europas Armeen im Umbruch* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002).

<sup>4</sup> The trends were elaborated in: Ljubica Jelušič 'Slovenia: Reform in the Vicinity of Conflict', in: Wilhelm N.Germann, Andrzej Karkoszka (eds), *Security Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Difficult Paths Towards Success* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005) pp. 140-142.

<sup>5</sup> The origin of expression 'strangers at home' comes from the negative experiences of US Vietnam War veterans. See more in: Charles R.Figley and Seymour Leventman, *Strangers at home, Vietnam veterans since the War* (New York: Praeger, 1980). The use of expression in the Slovenian situation focuses more on the attitudes of public towards the soldiers in peace at home in comparison to their engagement in peace operations abroad. There is also no direct impact of deployment abroad on military acceptance at home, as was the case of Vietnam veterans in USA. On the contrary, the peace operations' task is highly appreciated by Slovenian public, but the military at home is largely ignored.

<sup>6</sup> The case of floods in early nineties in north eastern Slovenia was indicative regarding the soldiers exclusion from the participation in disaster relief. The river floods passed the garrison where soldiers lived. They have been watching through the windows of the buildings how civil protection units and citizens fought against the water, but they as conscripts were not allowed to participate in rescue activities.

<sup>7</sup> Table 1 is reproduced on the basis of data published in: Ljubica Jelušič and Vinko Vegič, 'Izzivi javnomnenjskega raziskovanja odnosa med državljani in nacionalnovarnostnim sistemom' ('The Challenges of Public Opinion Survey of Relations between the Citizens and National Security System'), in Brina Malnar, *S Slovenkami in Slovenci na štiri oči* (Ljubljana: Založba FDV, 2004) p. 344.

<sup>8</sup> Data on helicopter participation in rescue operations had been taken from the Analysis of engagement of the 15<sup>th</sup> Air Brigade of the Slovenian Army for purposes of rescue and protection, November 2004, quoted in: Rudolf Velnar, *Delo letalstva SV na civilnem področju* (*Work of Air Units of Slovenian Army in Civil Areas*). Seminar work at Senior Officers Training Course, 2005 (unpublished paper).

# **Defence Transformation and Internal Security: the Turkish Experience**

Bill PARK

*King's College, London / Joint Services Command and Staff College*

Turkey's troubled neighbourhood, incorporating the Middle East, the former Soviet south, the Balkans, and a fraught relationship with Greece, meant that Turkey's security perspectives remained relatively unaltered as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. This was accentuated both by the domestic political role traditionally played by the Turkish General Staff, and the intensification of the Kurdish problem. In fact, Turkey embarked on an expensive programme to modernise its large, infantry-heavy armed forces. However, the requirements of EU accession, economic problems, and the election of the Justice and Development Party, have served both to reduce spending on defence and prompt a reform of Turkey's civil-military relationships. Yet continued internal and external security threats, and domestic political uncertainties, could undermine the defence transformation process in Turkey.

Turkey's post-Cold War approach to defence and security sector transformation has been, in the European context, quite unique. This is chiefly explained both by Turkey's exceptional domestic political evolution, and also by its geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances. Unlike post-communist Europe, Turkey has not been obliged to transform its security sector along with its political and economic system in order to rid itself of any communist legacy and ready itself for inclusion into the western fold. Turkey's political system emerged intact from the Cold War, and the country's NATO membership dates back to 1952. Nor did the Cold War's demise presage a relaxation of Ankara's perception that its neighbourhood abounded with threats to national security. In this, Turkey's response to the changed international climate was at variance with that of its European NATO partners. Adjacent to Turkish territory could be found such 'states of concern' as Iraq, Iran and Syria, that between them entertained a worrying interest in developing weapons of mass destruction programmes; fomented terrorism in the region, whether of the anti-Israeli, Islamic fundamentalist, or Kurdish variety; demonstrated an inclination towards conflict with their neighbours, as demonstrated by the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Iraq's 1990 annexation of Kuwait, Iran's tension with (during the Taliban period) and inclination to interfere in Afghanistan, not to speak of Iraq; and Syria's persistent enmity with Israel. Furthermore, and for quite varying reasons, Turkey's southern and eastern neighbours exhibited hostility towards its alliances with the US and with Israel. These regional tensions inevitably attracted the attention of Washington, not least as a consequence of the policy of 'dual containment' of Iran and Iraq, and this too encouraged Ankara to maintain its traditionally 'hard' security outlook.

Additionally, although the collapse of the Soviet Union had the effect of removing Turkey's four-centuries old border with an often adversarial Russian empire, as well as substantially reducing Russia's useable military capacity, Ankara remained suspicious of Russian intentions. Moscow's unwanted military presence in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, an unstable state aspiring to friendship with Turkey and its western allies, and Russian support for the Armenian side in the conflict with Turkic Azerbaijan over Nagorno-

Karabakh, had helped turn the troubled Caucasus region into a source of Russo-Turkish mistrust. The Chechen conflict, Russo-Azerbaijani differences over the delineation of the Caspian Sea, the emergence of Turkey as a potential outlet for Caucasian, Caspian and Central Asian energy, and Ankara's aspirations to establish a foothold on Turkic Central Asia, served to augment this sense that the post-Soviet territories to Russia's south were a developing zone of conflict and competition into which Turkey could be catapulted.

Even during the Cold War, Turkey's military planners paid as much if not more attention to fellow NATO neighbour Greece as they did to the Soviet threat. The Turkish Fourth Army was equipped and deployed with a potential Aegean war with Greece in mind, and for that reason remained unassigned to NATO. Greek-Turkish tensions surrounding the status of the Aegean islands, the seas around them, and the airspace above them, and the unresolved problem of the division of Cyprus and the presence of a 30,000-strong Turkish force in the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), have persisted well after the removal of the Cold War threat as a focus for Turkey's military thinking. Elsewhere in the former Ottoman Balkans, Yugoslavia's violent break-up, and the plight of the Bosnian and Kosovan Muslims, served to engage Ankara's attention and even risk Turkey's direct involvement should the region implode. Ankara had also to contend with the flight of ethnically Turkish refugees from Bulgaria in the late 1980s.

In short, during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, as much of the rest of Europe appeared to be taking strides towards the inexorable creation of an expanded 'security community', Ankara remained mired in a zone of conflict and crisis. Furthermore, the Kurdish issue had domestic as well as external dimensions. Thus, beginning during the Iran-Iraq war and up to the present time, Turkish forces have maintained a more or less continuous, around 5000-strong, military presence in northern Iraq. Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)<sup>1</sup> fighters had opportunistically holed up there as a consequence both of Baghdad's uncertain writ in the region and of the need to avoid the intensified activity of Ankara's security forces in Turkey's own south-east. Punctuating this persisting low-level Turkish presence in northern Iraq were the occasional hot pursuit and even larger scale Turkish incursions, for example in 1991, 1995, and 1997. These involved substantial forces up to 40,000 strong, and incorporated heavy air strikes.

During the Iran-Iraq war, these incursions enjoyed the blessing of Baghdad and were in pursuit of Turkey's Kurdish separatists of the PKK. Later, they were conducted in the face of Baghdad's (and Teheran's) disapproval, and that of some of Turkey's NATO allies, and on occasion involved cooperation with one or other of Iraq's Kurdish factions against either the PKK, or opposing Iraqi Kurdish groups.<sup>2</sup> On the eve of the March 2003 US-led attack on Iraq, Ankara had built up 50,000-strong force on Iraq's borders and was again threatening to intervene unilaterally.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, shortly after the US invasion of Iraq, a group of non-uniformed Turkish special force troops was escorted back across the border into Turkey by US forces. Ankara's preparedness to confront its neighbours militarily was also demonstrated in 1998, when an estimated 30,000 strong Turkish force was poised to invade Syria unless the authorities in Damascus expelled the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from their soil, which they duly did. The year 1996 witnessed the rapid escalation of an air and sea confrontation with Greek forces over the disputed and uninhabited islet of Imea-Kardak, and in 1997-8 Turkey made very threatening noises concerning the planned purchase by Cyprus of Russian S-300 missiles.

### **Ankara's Approach To Security; Internal and External**

Turkey is located on a fault line between the Kantian, cooperative security community of western (and, increasingly, central) Europe on the one and, and the more Hobbesian conflict-

prone regions of the Middle East, the Balkans and the former Soviet space on the other.<sup>4</sup> It is thus unsurprising that its security behaviour and discourse should be somewhat at odds with the prevailing mood in much of the rest of Europe.<sup>5</sup> This strain of ‘geographical determinism’ in Turkey’s security thinking and behaviour has served to discourage any dramatic post-Cold War defence sector transformation in the country. Turkey remained committed to the maintenance of a large, modern, high intensity war fighting capability underpinned by a ‘hard’ security doctrine that embraced the centrality and indispensability of the potential use of force as a means to ensure the country’s regional security and territorial integrity. To that end, in 1996 Ankara embarked on a major 25-30 year military modernisation programme. Dubbed ‘Vision 20/20’, it envisaged the acquisition of a force of 1000 new main battle tanks, a large helicopter fleet to include 145 attack helicopters, the complete modernisation of its ground attack force, a shift in emphasis away from heavy towards modern light artillery, and improvements in surveillance capability, intelligence equipment, thermal imaging, and the like. The overall concept aimed to transform Turkey’s traditionally large, mainly infantry land army, geared primarily towards static territorial defence, into a more mobile, light, pre-emptive, rapid reaction forward defence and intervention force. A shift from a divisional to a more flexible brigade structure is planned, a much greater emphasis on special forces is envisaged, and it is hoped that conscription will be phased out in due course as newly-introduced technology proves increasingly able to function as a force multiplier.<sup>6</sup>

Yet, paradoxically, as the 1990s unfolded Ankara’s security elite, and most especially its politically powerful Turkish General Staff (TGS), increasingly appeared to focus their attention on internal rather than external security challenges. By the late 1990s the constantly revised and military-produced National Security Policy Document was identifying political Islam and Kurdish separatism as the chief threats to the country’s security. In some respects this preoccupation is neither new nor surprising. Since 1984 the vicious internal war against the PKK has resulted in over 30,000 fatalities, the displacement of millions of Kurds from the rural southeast, and the deliberate destruction of thousands of villages believed by the authorities to harbour pro-separatist sentiment or activists. Turkey’s forces in the southeast region, which lies outside the Conventional Forces in Europe zone, have increased five-fold during this period. At times up to half of Turkey’s land forces, including the 180,000 strong Gendarmerie and which incorporates its own special force units, have been deployed in the southeast and engaged in the fight against the PKK.<sup>7</sup>

The lull in the fighting that followed Ocalan’s arrest in 1999 (he was under Greek diplomatic escort at the time of his capture) has flared up again in recent months in the wake of the PKK’s lifting of its ceasefire in June 2004. This has added to the frustration Ankara has repeatedly and vehemently expressed concerning the lack of action against PKK remnants in northern Iraq by either US or Iraqi Kurdish forces. It has been noted that, ‘In Turkish security perceptions, there is no real separation between northern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey: they are the geographic and ethno-cultural extensions of each other’.<sup>8</sup> With the continuing uncertainty over the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, Ankara’s acute sensitivity to Kurdish separatism looks set to stretch into the future. This matters for the prospect of defence transformation in Turkey, because in the past the substantial economic cost of Turkey’s internal war has delayed the military’s modernisation programme. The associated requirement for a large army, notwithstanding the lifting of the state of emergency in the Kurdish provinces, has set back the phasing out of conscription.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the domination of policy towards the Kurds by the country’s security forces, and the human rights abuses and political restrictions associated with the conflict, have provided a major foundation for the military’s powerful domestic political role and for the country’s EU accession difficulties. In Turkey, defence transformation is inextricably linked to democratisation.

The identification of political Islam as a threat to the country’s domestic security is also unsurprising. The Republic’s founder, Kemal Atatürk, sought to create a secular state in

Turkey and to banish Islam to the private sphere. The Islamic faith, or at any rate its intrusion into political and economic life, was seen by Ataturk and by his successors as a major obstacle to modernisation and ‘westernisation’. The military, as self-appointed guardians of the Kemalist legacy generally and secularism specifically, have since been on their guard against it. Although the General Staff itself sanctioned a degree of religious education in the wake of the 1980 coup, in the hope of weaning Turkish youth from extremist political ideologies, Islamist-based political parties and activists have often found themselves subjected to political restrictions. Thus, the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was imprisoned and banned from political office as a result of his public recitation whilst mayor of Istanbul of an apparently Islamic-inspired poem. In the so-called ‘soft’ or ‘post-modern’ coup of 1997, the head of the Islamic Welfare Party and prime minister in the governing coalition, Necmettin Erbakan, was forced from office as a result of a campaign of demands, criticism and intimidation led and orchestrated by the General Staff. In the months following the November 2002 election victory of moderate political Islam’s latest Turkish incarnation, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the military issued repeated warnings of its determination to protect the Republic’s secular character.<sup>10</sup> Given the apparent rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and elsewhere, this perceived internal security threat can also acquire an external dimension in the eyes of the Turkish security establishment. There has long been suspicion in Turkey of Iranian sponsorship of domestic Islamic militants, and the November 2003 fundamentalist bomb attacks in Istanbul, apparently perpetrated by Turkish nationals linked to al-Qaeda, further accentuated the potential external dimension of the domestic struggle against fundamentalism and terrorism.

### **The Military in Turkish Politics**

The ‘securitisation’ of Turkey’s domestic politics manifest in all this – controversially identified in 2001 by the then deputy prime minister and head of the Motherland Party, Mesut Yilmaz, as the ‘national security syndrome’ – is strongly linked to the domestic political role traditionally played by the TGS.<sup>11</sup> This role has been expressed not simply through the political coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980<sup>12</sup> – as well as by the events of 1997 – but has also been reflected by the day-to-day institutional entrenchment of the Turkish military. For example, until recently military officers sat on the boards charged with regulating Turkey’s education sector and media, and military judges presided over State Security Courts enjoying the right to try civilians. Above all, until recently the military were able to dominate a National Security Council (NSC) that had the power to set the government’s agenda across a wide range of domestic and security issues.

Perhaps more tellingly still, the evolution of Turkish politics since the founding of the Republic, the Ottoman legacy, the weakness of the country’s civilian institutions and democratic safeguards, and the country’s authoritarian political culture, have all combined to create a widespread deference to the military in Turkish political life, a readiness to support or at least acquiesce in its involvement in domestic politics, and to permit the emergence of a military ‘state-within-a-state’. Turkey’s politicians have been loath to scrutinise or question either the scale of Turkey’s military budget (which until recently was around 5-6% of GNP) or its contents. They have also been prepared to leave the conduct of the internal war against the PKK to the security forces, and have allowed the military to conduct external relations of its own – notably with Washington and with Israel, but also in northern Iraq. In any case, criticising the military has been punishable by law. There has been widespread acceptance in Turkey of both the right and the competence of the military – rather than elected political representatives – to safeguard the Kemalist commitment to Turkey’s territorial integrity and secular nature.<sup>13</sup> The domestic political role of the military, and the statist, security conscious

Kemalist ideology in which it is embedded, has also served to obstruct defence transformation in Turkey.

### **The EU, the AKP, and Turkey's Transformation**

However, more recent years have seen the emergence of factors encouraging Turkish defence transformation. It is tempting to argue that the prospect of EU accession is the main driving force behind Ankara's recent reforms in this area. However, we should be reminded that Turkey had an Association Agreement with the then European Economic Community dating back to 1963, and a Customs Union with the EU that came into effect on 1 January 1996 – the only state to enjoy such a relationship.<sup>14</sup> Yet, as the entire non-Soviet Warsaw Pact area was given the green light to prepare for membership, along with Slovenia and the three former Soviet Baltic states, as recently as 1997 Brussels provoked an angry reaction from Ankara as a result of its decision not to recognise Turkey as an accession candidate. This status was not granted until December 1999 at the EU's Helsinki summit. At the time of writing, the majority of these states have since joined the EU, Romania and Bulgaria are on course to join in 2007, yet Turkey alone has yet to even embark on accession negotiations.

The reasons for this delay, formal and informal, are manifold, and include the country's relative economic backwardness, its size, its Islamic root, and a whole raft of political and other shortfalls as measured against the EU's Copenhagen criteria that all aspirant members are required to meet. Central to these shortfalls has been the political role played by the TGS in Turkey, and human rights and other political restrictions that stem both directly from this role and more indirectly from the Kemalist legacy that provides so much of its rationale. Paradoxically, the historical mission of Kemalism has been to modernise and 'Europeanise' Turkey, and the Kemalist elite, including the TGS, have long aspired to EU membership as an expression of this. Yet, in the race for EU accession, Turkey's Cold War membership of the western alliance, and decades of association with the EU, still left it lagging behind states that had been communist adversaries until very recently. Kemalism has simultaneously aspired to and helped obstruct Turkey's European destination.

The 1999 Helsinki decision to grant accession status was clearly a turning point, and offered the long-awaited incentive that Turkey's leaders needed before they were able to seriously address Turkey's shortcomings. The coalition government then in power in Turkey, led by the veteran Kemalist Bülent Ecevit, did indeed embark on a major reform programme. However, their efforts were disrupted both by what many have argued was Turkey's most serious ever economic crisis in February 2002, but also by the AKP election victory in November 2002. In any case, it seemed clear that Ecevit's coalition government was experiencing difficulties in adjusting its mind-set with respect to the role of the military, treatment of the Kurdish minority, the Cyprus question, and political constraints on Islamic parties. This was partly though by no means exclusively because the coalition incorporated the intensely nationalistic National Action Party (MHP).<sup>15</sup>

The AKP by contrast has been far more prepared to bite these various bullets in its determination to meet the criteria for EU accession negotiations. Although nationalistic and socially conservative, the AKP leadership is not reflective of traditional Kemalism, and appears to have concluded that good governance in Turkey combined with EU membership offers the best hope both for the country and for its own political fortunes. Perhaps to the surprise of many, the AKP government is a major explanatory factor behind defence, and the much wider, transformation currently taking place in Turkey.<sup>16</sup> An implication of this observation is that continued progress might considerably hinge on its future fortunes, as well as on the extent to which the reforms take root and are internalised by the Turkish political spectrum and political culture at large. This no doubt largely explains why the European

Commission, in its October 2004 report cautiously recommending that accession negotiations with Turkey should commence in 2005, carefully draws attention to the prospect that the talks could be suspended by the EU should Turkey's reform programme receive set-backs.

### **Transformation?**

At any rate, since 2001 seven so-called 'harmonisation packages' – chunks of legislation and constitutional amendments presented to Turkey's National Assembly to be voted on as a whole – have been passed.<sup>17</sup> In addition to legislation relating to matters such as Kurdish language rights, the abolition of the death penalty, political freedoms, the penal code, and economic management, the sixth and seventh packages in particular addressed issues relating to defence transformation. Thus, whereas the 1982 constitution obliged the government to give 'priority' to the 'decisions' of the NSC, new legislation relegates the body to an advisory role only. Furthermore, the number of civilians on the NSC, hitherto equally divided between military and civilian membership, has been increased to create a 9:5 ratio, and the post of head of the NSC's General Secretariat is no longer reserved exclusively for a military figure. Indeed, in August 2004 the body's first ever civilian head, former ambassador to Greece Mehmet Yigit Alpogun, took over the reins, appointed by the prime minister and approved by the president. The number of annual NSC meetings has been halved from twelve to six, and they can no longer be convened at the bequest of the Chief of the General Staff. Military representation on media and educational boards has been abolished, which should help reduce if not eliminate the military's input into issues relating to minority language education and broadcasting, among other things. State Security Courts, which contained military judges and had the right to try civilians, have also been abolished.

There has been progress too in Turkey's defence management. Hitherto, the Turkish defence budget process has been characterised by a lack of transparency far in excess of what might be expected in Western Europe. In essence, the service chiefs have presented their requirements to the Chief of the General Staff, who would then present the integrated proposals to the minister of defence, who has signed and forwarded it to the procurement departments in his ministry, or to the separate Undersecretariat for Defence Industries. In effect, the TGS has had complete freedom to determine how defence funds should be sent. Secrecy laws, ignorance, deference, and procedural arrangements have all combined to minimise the scope for and impact of parliamentary scrutiny of defence spending. Furthermore, the TGS has had access to supplementary sources of funds that have lain beyond even nominal parliamentary scrutiny. Under new legislation, the Court of Audits, acting on behalf of the National Assembly and its relevant committees, has enhanced powers to scrutinise the defence budget and any associated source of funds. Parliamentarians can call for more detailed information, and will be afforded more time to review and debate defence budgetary matters. The article of the constitution that pleaded secrecy as a basis for limiting parliamentary scrutiny has been deleted.<sup>18</sup>

Given the informal basis for much of the military's role and status in Turkish politics and society, the extent to which these reforms structurally alter civil-military relationships in Turkey must remain to be seen. The EU has repeatedly expressed reservations concerning the implementation of reforms in Turkey's case – as in the Commission's 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's accession progress, for example.<sup>19</sup> There are indications, though, that Turkey is undergoing genuine, deep and structural changes in its political relationships and culture, and in any case the passage of time should help the reforms take root. It is fortunate too that the present Chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Ozkok, has generally been prepared to acquiesce to these changes, and is on record as preferring to see a de-politicisation of the Turkish military – although his term of office has also witnessed what amount to ideological

spats with the AKP government too, notably over secularism. It is not guaranteed, however, that his subordinates and successors will necessarily follow his benign lead.

It is too early to have total confidence that key features of the eighty-year long story of the Republic's evolution have simply evaporated in a sudden rush of legislative activity. Furthermore, there are too many potential trap doors lying in wait. We have already noted the possibility that the AKP might be out on something of a limb in Turkish politics in its readiness to adjust so fully to the EU's requirements. Any future non-AKP government might exhibit more reluctance. Ankara's approach to the problems of Cyprus and Iraq retain the potential to disrupt Turkey-EU relations, as does an unsatisfactory EU decision on accession negotiations in December 2004, or over-fraught EU-Turkey accession negotiations that could follow in its wake. We should also remind ourselves that the TGS is a body quite distinct from the country's defence ministry, and that its Chief reports directly to the prime minister, not the defence minister. In the Turkish context in particular, this arrangement might be seen by some as offering ample scope for military pressure on the civilian authority. The TGS and the Ministry of Defence are even formally regarded as no more than equal. In reality, the MoD has long been the subordinate body. On the other hand, many of the traditional mechanisms facilitating the military's day-to-day interference in the political process have been removed by the recent reforms, and Turkey is making strides towards the 'alignment' with mainstream European practice that the EU called for in its 2001 Accession Partnership document and subsequently.

### **Economic pressures**

Turkey's economic woes, and the long-standing difficulties the country has faced in military procurement, also appear to be giving impetus to defence transformation in the country, although the outcomes produced by this combination of factors may not always be coherent. Thus, in its bid to shift to a smaller and more professional force, in July 2003 compulsory military service was reduced from eighteen to fifteen months, and in May 2004 four brigades were abolished. These measures should lead to a reduction in conscript personnel in excess of 100,000. However, high levels of unemployment, as well as the situation in the southeast, continue to delay the final abolition of conscription, now earmarked for 2006. Furthermore, the Gendarmerie, affiliated to the Interior Ministry but controlled by the TGS, and central to the internal war against Kurdish separatism, has increased in size since 1998. In total, Turkey still retains a total force of around 800,000-armed personnel, most of them conscripts. The equipment modernisation that was intended to go hand in hand with the reduction in the size of the armed forces received a setback when, in a sudden announcement in May 2004, the plans to locally produce 1000 main battle tanks, the co-production of fifty attack helicopters, and the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles, were all cancelled.<sup>20</sup> The absence of debate or even forewarning of the cancellations offered an acute insight into the continued opaqueness of defence issues and debates in Turkey, notwithstanding recent improvements.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, some Turkish press reports credited Prime Minister Erdogan with playing a critical role in bringing the cancellations about. If true, this too would suggest a shift in civil-military relationships.

This was just the latest in a litany of delays, cancellations, and reductions that have bedevilled Ankara's efforts to become more self-reliant in the procurement of military equipment, to technologically upgrade it via both national research and development efforts (R&D) and technology transfer, and to diversify foreign suppliers. For example, in early 2002 eighty-eight unspecified procurement projects were either cancelled or suspended. The aspiration to shift towards greater domestic production of military equipment in the longer term

remains intact, with off-the-shelf purchases and modest upgrades expected to fill gaps in the meantime. Ankara has often been frustrated by the restrictions on technology transfer, however, whilst national R&D remains weak. Furthermore, during the last few years Turkey's defence spending has been progressively reduced such that in 2004 it is expected to amount to no more than 3.4% of GNP, pushing it lower than state spending on education for the first time. General Ozkok has anticipated that it might reduce still further. For the foreseeable future, the Turkish armed forces are likely to remain large, mainly conscripted, patchily modernised but often quite poorly equipped, but with an increased emphasis on mobility and special forces. Changes to this overall picture will generally be incremental.

### **The Impact of Multilateralism**

Although it is usual to characterise Turkey's security outlook as 'hard' rather than 'soft', emphasising military preparedness, a militarised approach to security problems, and a strong attachment to national independence in military affairs, Turkey has in fact emerged as a major post-Cold War contributor to multilateral security initiatives and as a practitioner of 'defence diplomacy'. This reflects Ankara's long-standing determination to be an active NATO member, and to be a net security contributor. In part, it has also reflected Turkey's desire for involvement and a say in regional issues. However, if Turkey sustains its activities of this kind, it could emerge as an insidious basis for transformation of Turkey's armed forces and even its approach to security issues generally.

Combined with a possible decline in direct US military sponsorship of Turkey in the wake of regime change in Iraq, Turkey's possible future participation in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) initiatives, and the domestic political and economic developments outlined above, peace support operations could emerge as a major feature of Turkish security policy and as a significant determining factor in the shaping of its armed forces. Thus, in recent years Turkey has contributed to peace support operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ankara played a leading role in the formation of the Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force (SEEBRIG) and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation force (BLACKSEAFOR). Each of the three services established peacekeeping departments, and has introduced special training programmes. A Partnership for Peace training centre has been established in Ankara, and Turkey is a major contributor to its activities. There have been usually low level military and security sector dimensions to Turkey's cooperative relationships with Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan.<sup>22</sup>

### **Conclusion**

On balance, it is reasonable to conclude that Turkey is currently undergoing a process of defence transformation, both in its civil-military relationships and in the structure and mission of its armed forces, that is generating convergence with more than divergence from other European or developed states. There is no universal formula governing the armed forces of the west, but Turkey is increasingly aligning itself with what might be regarded as a 'norm'. However, the process in Turkey is a gradual one, is in its early stages, and remains subject to stagnation or even reversal. Turkey has a political culture and a historical evolution that has endowed the military with a unique and respected status in the perspective of many Turks. The country has yet to develop civilian institutions of sufficient vigour and depth to confidently safeguard the country's stability and democracy. Its courts, political parties, civil society organisations, media, and administration can be weak, corrupt, and sometimes less than unshakeable in their attachment to and defence of the rule of law and the norms and practices

of democracy. The armed forces in some senses reflect this culture, may bear some responsibility for its flaws, but might also be judged to have occasionally saved Turkey from even greater self-inflicted damage. Time is needed if Turkey is to manage substantial transformation, for its current practices and ideology are far too entrenched, and insufficiently discredited domestically, to evaporate overnight.

From Ankara's perspective, the country's security situation is far from encouraging. Unlike its European NATO partners, Turkey is not surrounded by friends and allies, but by unstable and sometimes aggressive and hostile neighbours. Again, Turkey's security approach can be accused both of reflecting that of its neighbourhood, and to some extent of creating that neighbourhood. However, states such as Syria, Iran and Iraq, are not likely to approximate in their external behaviour to that of, say, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Italy any time soon. Developments in Iraq, Iran, or even Cyprus, retain the capacity to knock Turkey's progress considerably off-course. Similarly, the approach adopted by Turkey's security forces to the PKK problem has probably made matters worse, but at the same time it might be considered whether the PKK itself ever held values such as tolerance and the negotiated settlement of disputes in high esteem. In any case, security forces everywhere can be inclined to adopt hard-nosed approaches to problems such as those posed by the PKK. Turkey undoubtedly needs a more open debate and greater civilian participation in the generation of the country's Kurdish policy. It might be usefully borne in mind, however, that greater democratisation did not ensure Yugoslavia's survival as a state, or quell the terrorist activities of Basque separatists in Spain or Irish Republicans in Northern Ireland.

If Turkey's defence and wider transformation is to progress, it will require the encouragement and patience of its allies. In the past, this has not invariably been forthcoming. Europeans have sometimes been content simply to condemn Turkey for its undoubted excesses towards its Kurdish minority, for its approach to Cyprus, or for the domestic political role of the TGS. Even where such condemnation has been warranted, it might have been fruitfully accompanied by greater constructive engagement with Ankara. EU accession negotiations should offer an unprecedented opportunity for such engagement, if both sides make use of it. Turkey's transformation, not least in the defence sphere, might also have been held back by its close security relationship with Washington. There has been an inclination to regard Turkey from an exclusively geostrategic perspective, as a prime location and local gendarme. US-Turkish relations have sometimes been essentially those between the Pentagon and the TGS. The 1 March 2003 Turkish National Assembly vote served to shake this relationship, and the removal of Saddam, the prospect of EU accession, Turkey's own democratisation, and Washington's Greater Middle East Initiative for regional democratisation, might all conspire to enrich and complicate, if loosen, US-Turkish ties. In short, there are internal and external, and positive and negative, factors, at play in Turkey's defence, and wider, transformation. Much depends on how each of these factors develops, and how they interact, and that is too complex to predict.

**Endnotes**

- 1 The PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in April 2002, and the Kurdistan People's Congress (KONGRA-GEL) in October 2003. As is common practice, I shall refer to the organisation as the PKK throughout.
- 2 For a useful and short account and analysis of Turkey's involvement in Northern Iraq, see Philip Robbins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, (London: Hurst and Co, 2003), pp.312-342.
- 3 For the background to this, see my 'Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq', *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, 7(2), (June 2003), pp.11-23.
- 4 See Kemal Kirisci, 'Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy', *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, 8(1), (March 2004), pp.1-2, for this characterisation.
- 5 H Tarik Oguzlu, 'An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union from a 'Security' Perspective', *Security Dialogue*, 34(3), (September 2003), pp. 285-299.
- 6 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'Arming for Peace', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 August 1998. The various publications by the Jane's Group are an excellent source of material. See also Ali L. Karaosmanoglu and Mustafa Kibaroglu, 'Defense Reform in Turkey', in Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (eds), *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc, 2002), pp.138-142.
- 7 For general overviews of Turkey's Kurdish war, see Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997; Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (Lanham, Maryland, and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Robert Olson (ed), *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996); Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London and Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 1997).
- 8 Cengiz Candar, 'Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq', in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass, and London, England: the MIT Press, 2004), p.53. See also Murat Somer, 'Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications', *Middle East Journal*, 58(2), (Spring 2004), pp.235-253.
- 9 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'Army Modernisation Hampered by PKK', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 August 1998.
- 10 For a brief and useful account of the relationship between Kemalist secularism and political Islam in Turkey, see Gareth Jenkins, 'Muslim Democrats in Turkey?', *Survival*, 45(1) (Spring 2003), pp.45-66.
- 11 For an account of this controversy, and a dissection of the concept, see Umit Cizre, 'Demythologising the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, 57(2), (Spring 2003), pp.213-229: see also Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, 'The Evolution of National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', *Journal of International Affairs* 54(1), (2000), pp.199-216.
- 12 A comparative study of these three events, and of their impact on the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, is offered by Ergun Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000). See also Nilufer Narli, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, 1(1) (Spring 2000), pp.107-127; and Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience', *Armed Forces and Society*, 26(4) (Summer 2000), pp.635-657.
- 13 The best study of the role of the military in Turkish political and social life more broadly is Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics: Adelphi Paper 337*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001).
- 14 For some background to Turkey-EU relations, see Avcı Gamze, 'Turkey's Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles, or Simple Euroscepticism?', *Turkish Studies* 4(1), (2003), pp.149-170; Ziya Onis, 'An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective', *Journal of European Integration History* 7(1) (2000), pp.105-119; Ziya Onis, 'Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations', *Government and Opposition* 35(4) (2000), pp.463-483; William Park, 'Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?', *Mediterranean Politics* 5(3) (Autumn 2000), pp.31-53.
- 15 See my 'Turkey and the European Union: Over the Horizon?', *World Today*, 57(6), (June 2001), pp.25-27.
- 16 R.Quinn Mecham, 'From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey', *Third World Quarterly*, 25(2), (2004), pp.339-358; Graham E. Fuller, 'Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities', *Washington Quarterly*, 27(3), (Summer 2004), pp.51-64; Mohammed Ayoob, 'Turkey's Multiple Paradoxes', *Orbis*, 48(3), (Summer 2004), pp.451-463.
- 17 Details can be found in 'Political Reforms in Turkey', published in February 2004 and accessible at [www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)
- 18 The author is indebted for much of this passage to a working paper produced by Nilufer Narli, of Kadir Has University, Istanbul, for a project sponsored by The Centre for European Security Studies, The Netherlands, on 'Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey'.

---

19 [www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2003/pdf/rr\\_tk\\_final.pdf](http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf)

20 See Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 'Turkey Cancels Attack Helicopter, Tank and Drone Projects', 19 May 2004, and 'EU Spur for Turkish Reform', 1 September 2004, both *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

21 Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Something is happening to military procurement', *Turkish Daily News*, 25 May 2004.

22 Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu, 'Defense Reform', pp.145-148.

This page intentionally left blank

# **Defence Transformation in Europe Today: Implications for the Armed Forces**

Anne ALDIS

*Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy*

Despite the plethora of recent reforms in the security sector, military forces may not be best suited or well equipped for today's defence tasks. Force structure and capability building should proceed on the basis of rigorous prioritisation. Special pleading on budgets and technology and ineffective or inappropriate use of both mass and specialist military forces undermine morale and public support. Defence specialists must learn to operate effectively in the real, public, world.

Transformation in the security sector has come a long way in the last 15 years, but it is unfortunately a process that can never be declared quite finished. Particularly in the UK, where review has followed initiative ad nauseam, one can be forgiven for groaning inwardly at any exhortation to revisit the subject of military restructuring. NATO's newer and aspiring members, too, have grounds for believing that having virtually created their armed forces from first principles in accordance with NATO's best practice, a period of consolidation is what is needed, not more changes.

Yet earlier debates have tended to be hijacked by special interest pleading, or in the case of new members, by a desire to join the winning team on whatever terms it cared to set, and by the need to deal with large and unbalanced legacy forces. And now, nearly three years after the bombings in the USA that led to the War on Terror, it has become clear right across Europe and beyond that the threats our armed forces were structured to meet are no longer at the top of the list of security problems which our countries face.

So what is to be done? Every country, rich or poor, is forced to place some limit on defence spending, and in democracies the process of arriving at an affordable figure is rather more realistic – and, one hopes, rather more transparent and credible - than it is in authoritarian states. Military forces are undoubtedly expensive, and we need to reassure ourselves that we are spending our money wisely. The need for this reassurance prompts me to pose once again the fundamental question: what are our armed forces for?

The obvious answer to the question is that armed forces are needed to defend a country's territory, its people and its interests. But a cursory examination of the match between threats and responses shows that this answer cannot be taken as self evident or complete. It is only a starting point for a discussion of how, how much, where, with what, for how long, against whom, and other such questions. Some countries, Denmark and Slovenia among them, have decided that they face little danger from invasion. Denmark has concluded that it can best defend itself by promoting peace elsewhere, and these efforts may if necessary entail contributing Danish soldiers to forces operating under United Nations' auspices. Even so, the Danes would acknowledge that the major threats of trafficking and terrorism cannot be dealt with by a UN peacekeeping contingent. They maintain other force structures to manage those problem areas.

Following the logic that the nature of the military threats defines force structures, and its corollary that military force structures may themselves encourage military threats,

Costa Rica and Iceland have no armed forces at all. Whilst few states have advanced this far along the peace continuum, every country in Europe faces the same dilemmas in working out just what it does need for its own protection. For some, territorial defence against a potential external enemy remains a priority, albeit not such an overriding one as in the Cold War or its immediate aftermath. Others may need to weigh the requirement to defend the country and its people from invasion against non-military threats such as excessive migration or economic subversion. All will have to achieve some balance between countering these threats and other demands upon government revenue, such as social security, health and education. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that in achieving this balance there are no right or wrong answers, only political choices. And yet too often governments are failing to justify their choices at the most fundamental level, both outside and within the security sector.

My analysis of how these choices should be argued through is rather like an algorithm, and I make no apologies in reducing it to a rather simplistic form. If at any stage the answer to a question is ‘It can’t succeed like that’, or ‘We can’t afford to do all those things properly’, then the whole process has to revert to a stage at which a different choice can be afforded or be more successful. After all, no government can argue that it does not need any security policy at all, and it needs to be able to justify its choices of appropriate instruments and force structures to its taxpayers. All too often recently, the stark choices have been cluttered up by the technical detail or our attention has been distracted by particular aspects of their implications. It’s time again to set out the big policy picture in broad sweeps.

### **Which Instrument First?**

Arguably the biggest challenge for the armed forces in today’s post-9/11 world is that dealing with terrorism and other security problems are more urgent priorities than defending territory against an external enemy, and for these the most appropriate instruments are not military ones at all, but rather border guards, reliable policing, accurate intelligence and so on. Evidence also suggests that because the military were the obvious security instrument in Cold War days, and because NATO was a valuable repository of expertise for members and aspirant members, it was the military that was the priority target for retasking and reform. It is no surprise that it continues to see itself as the primary, if not the sole, instrument of a country’s security, and therefore seeks or is encouraged to undertake work for which armed forces are not best suited. It is to be regretted that many of the transformations so painfully undertaken by the military have not yet penetrated as far into other sectors of the security establishment, but that is not a subject on which there is space to enlarge in this paper. That other force structures are inadequate is no excuse for relying on the armed forces to fill the gaps – military force may not be right for the task either.

One result of the ensuing competition between agencies is that in areas or instances where they could usefully cooperate, a great deal of effort is often channelled into jockeying for position. Recognition of achievements is a vital component of public validation for the work of all these agencies, and the stakes are therefore high. But achieving a sensible balance of spending between overlapping agencies engaged in turf wars is a difficult process.

## **Territorial Defence Design**

If a country does feel a need to maintain forces to defend its territory, then a strategy for how to mount that defence is a prerequisite for the force design. Today probably only the USA can consider itself able to mount for a long period, from its own resources alone, a credible defence by force of arms against a well-prepared and fully-equipped invasion. That does not preclude other countries attempting to prepare for this eventuality, against an enemy they have already identified and which is comparable in capability to their own: the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war is a fairly recent case in point. The result can be an expensive stalemate, escalating tensions fuelled by an arms build-up, and eventual economic collapse. In the event of an invasion, foreseen or unforeseen, virtually every country will have to rely on some kind of international assistance, either from partners in an alliance or under a United Nations mandate. That this defence can only be partial, or maintained for only a short period, should not be viewed as a shameful failure, or grounds for demanding more money or better weaponry. Rather, options need to be weighed about how long resistance might need to last until help arrives; against what kind of enemy using what kind of weapons; where in particular; and how that defence can best be achieved given budgetary constraints. Many countries in the last century – Switzerland is a good Cold War example - invested heavily in preparations for resistance by the population at large, directed by a very small permanent force. Partisan operations and guerrilla-style warfare are difficult and time-consuming to counter, so an emergency mobilisation plan based on volunteer reserves may be a very cost-effective deterrent, and an alternative to maintaining permanent mass forces, provided that training and other preparations are taken seriously.

Where the threat of a particular type of invasion is low, so should the budgetary priority of meeting it. Whilst it is vital to maintain an all-round awareness of imminent threats, troop concentrations on the borders are likely to be less effective than good air cover when an immediate threat is looming. Counter-terrorist and other internal security activities may rate higher than maintaining a large military force against a nugatory invasion threat. Conversely, a political decision may be in the military's favour if the case is a compelling one – but in order to succeed, the compelling case needs to be presented rationally and in a wider context.

'Deterrence' is often cited as a reason for higher levels of spending than this simplistic calculation suggests. Bear in mind, however, that at the high-tech end of the spectrum, deterrence is almost prohibitively expensive, especially deterring the use of more than one type of weaponry. More importantly, successful deterrence does not deter absolutely – it forces the potential attacker to think of other, less obvious ways to achieve his ends. The likelihood and effect of these must be assessed, and factored into the cost-benefit analysis alongside the deterrent. In particular, conventional military deterrence is ineffective against those who judge that the price it sets, however high, is worth paying, and against those not playing the game by conventional military rules.<sup>1</sup> Other types of deterrence, including alliance-building and economic leverage, must be evaluated. Incentives, too, might be worth paying for – the combination of carrots and sticks seems so far to have paid dividends in the case of Libya. So the calculations and policy choices are far from simple, even at this strategic level.

A further complication is that international alliances rarely, if ever, provide the reliable bulwark that a country needs to ensure its own defence. However committed members are to its stated goals at the time of its inception or their joining, events may render their calculations invalid in an instant. The most recent examples, those of NATO and the 'coalitions of the willing' in the US' Global War on Terror after 9/11, are so overused that it is almost an embarrassment to mention them. Nonetheless, memories can

be unreliably short when a special interest is involved, so forgive me for recording a few relevant, if unpalatable, lessons from the period 2001-04.

One, alliance members may not rush to one's aid as fast as one would wish, if at all. Although not formally a NATO member, Ukraine looked in vain for even the verbal support that it was entitled to expect in its contretemps with Russia over the Tuzla Strait in autumn 2003.<sup>2</sup> Two, allies may not bring with them exactly what is needed, and maybe not in sufficient quantity. The shortages, delays, and restrictions on the use of manpower and equipment for even the most basic humanitarian tasks in Afghanistan are a continuing embarrassment to the NATO effort there.<sup>3</sup> The prevarications and caveats that accompanied NATO's discussions at the Istanbul summit of possible assistance in reconstruction of the Iraqi defence forces show that the debate on the legality of the original intervention was not *sui generis*.<sup>4</sup> Three, even in an alliance where time and money for preparation have not been short, capabilities can be lacking, or dependent on one particular partner's willingness to engage. European weaknesses in strategic airlift and refuelling capacity had been highlighted in the Balkan wars of the 1990s and have been discussed fruitlessly ever since. Four, allies may outstay their welcome, and even welcome 'peacekeepers' may in fact end up perpetuating the problem. Although Georgia had agreed to the stationing of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia in 1992, there was evidence that by 2004 they were aiding and abetting the separatist agitators there.<sup>5</sup> Relying on allies is a risky business, especially when they are erstwhile opponents. The new world order that was ushered in by the collapse of the USSR is not immutable; nor is it in many respects benign. While one would dearly like to believe that there is real meaning in the vast repertoire of goodwill gestures and speeches that are the stuff of everyday diplomacy, it would be as well to have more substantial insurance available in case the hot air proves to be just that.

### **Force Tasking And Design**

For territorial defence a trained reservoir of manpower, small numbers of professional soldiers and/or a territorially based, possibly volunteer reserve, will probably be indispensable. The ideal mix depends on many factors. But that the force can then be used to help with civil emergencies or for guard or ceremonial duties is a bonus, not a rationale, unless the force is specifically designed to be dual-purpose. In that case, the relative priority of any territorial defence function to other missions will need to be scrutinised, and decisions made about numbers of people and suitable equipment. To be credible, and to deliver value for money, the force needs to be properly trained, equipped and manned for the tasks it is required to carry out. If this cannot be achieved, some rethinking of strategy or function will be required.

Because it will have to work with allies or international partners in defending the country, the force must also be designed, equipped and trained to be interoperable. A commitment to peace support operations abroad goes a long way towards achieving interoperability. That should be a major justification for undertaking such internationally useful work, alongside its undoubted contribution to international security. Security, like charity, begins at home.

As evidenced by the case of Denmark, creating peace abroad is a justifiable strategic choice for defending one's homeland. But consider also less comfortable scenarios, where interoperability creates vulnerability: should an ally's posture become threatening, it can profit from advantages gained by practising interoperability. Decision cycles, command processes and equipment capabilities will all be within their intelligence grasp, not to mention the personal relationships, language skills and local knowledge that can be useful in less obvious aspects of military operations.

Peace support operations abroad are the point in the algorithm at which those with territorial threat perceptions meet those who aim to defend their country by promoting peace and security elsewhere. But for both a utilitarian philosophy is appropriate – enough of the force must be interoperable across the whole spectrum of its tasks for the force as a whole to be fit for purpose. This is particularly worth emphasising if a civil emergency role is envisaged for the military. Earmarking a few specialists for international duties may rate high on the feel-good index, but if the rest of the force is unused to dealing with other types of soldiers, other uniformed security services, civilian aid workers and government officials in a confused situation, it is worse than useless. There are anecdotal examples of this kind of failing within every country in Europe, ‘old’ and ‘new’. It may actually be the case that in an international context interaction is more successful, since those involved have specifically practised the necessary skills and techniques. But that is little solace to those at home who find themselves on the receiving end of an ineffective disaster recovery effort.

Nor is it good publicity for the military, and the military establishments in some European countries are only now beginning to act on the realisation that public understanding of defence matters is a key factor in securing a reasonable budget. Good publicity – showing soldiers acting efficiently and responsibly in circumstances that the public regards as important – is money in the bank. Time and effort spent on cultivating the media, which then showcases the armed forces, is often worth more in the long run than, for example, the same amount of time spent on a detailed but secret justification for a new weapon system.

Public attitudes can also reveal a disparity between force structures and the tasks on which the armed forces are actually spending time. The range of duties the armed forces are permitted to undertake in accordance with national legislation is often huge. In practice, many of them are remote contingencies, which nevertheless require some professional preparation and planning for. Yet in conscript armies, the bulk of the forces’ time, effort and money is spent on routine training of conscripts for these contingencies, or on maintenance of a military infrastructure that would be unused were it not for these very conscripts. It is little wonder that popular perceptions are that military service is a complete waste of time and that young people could better secure the defence of their country by contributing to its economic rather than military muscle. The Slovene case is a particularly revealing one, but similar problems can be detected elsewhere. In Slovenia, the armed forces were at their most popular when employed in civil emergency work. They had been used in this role fairly regularly, but it occupied only a tiny proportion of their total man-hours. It was then decided on safety grounds that conscripts could not be used to help in emergencies, thus undermining at a stroke both a major rationale for conscript service and popular support for the military. Most of the conscripts’ time was spent on manual labour, not on serious military training.<sup>6</sup>

## **A Two Tier Force?**

It is natural for politicians and for military planners to wish to ensure that the armed forces have access to modern weaponry and other specialist equipment. The problem at its simplest is twofold: these things are extremely expensive, especially in useful quantities, and training specialists to use them to best advantage is also expensive in career time. Whether the military is conscript- or professional-based, training on specialist kit is a recurring, heavy, constraint on the available manpower. That budget and policy options are often presented as a simple necessity of choosing between various applications of sophisticated technology is profoundly misleading. The July 2004 British Defence Spending Review is a case in point. Equipment requires trained people to operate it and to

derive maximum benefit from its capabilities. And in the military sphere there are some jobs no equipment can do as well as 'boots on the ground' – compare the effectiveness of European and US peacekeepers in the Balkans, for example.

An aspiration towards high-tech symmetry with one's allies is likely to be unaffordable in all but a few instances. Certainly, across-the-board parity needs to be justified by much more than the desire to be seen to be 'doing one's bit'. Hard decisions on cost-effectiveness are made even harder by the desire to maintain international 'face', and by the opacity of technical argument to an untutored political class and an antipathetic public.

Given the growing divergence between the technologists required to operate today's sophisticated military equipment for high-end defence, deterrence and warfighting and the body of soldiers who are needed to implement other solutions, it is no surprise that people are talking of a two-tier military. But it is a surprise that they see this as a disadvantage. If one wants multi-purpose forces – and governments and military alike are loath to admit there are jobs their national armed forces cannot do - one must accept the need for specialist components within them. All armed forces have (and have had since earliest times and whatever their structure) a variety of specialist units and individuals. What should be paramount, though, is to design, train, resource and use those specialities properly, so that the force as a whole can perform to maximum effectiveness. Trying to train everybody to do a little bit of everything but not enough to do anything well, and its common corollary, using specialists for inappropriate duties, are an unforgivable waste of people and resources. They are also bad for morale, of which more below.

Some countries define the 'boots on the ground' group not as soldiers at all, but as a gendarmerie, albeit one which may maintain an expeditionary capability for international commitments. France, Italy and Spain offer European examples. For supplementing other uniformed services in border patrols, law and order duties, civil emergencies, and other popular uses of the armed forces, maybe a gendarmerie is more appropriate than either a high-tech professional military force or a larger force of conscripts, by definition not a specialised, highly trained instrument.

Whatever the name, the more one moves away from strictly warfighting tasks, the more such forces need to operate comfortably with other agencies, civilians included. This is true, for example, in the case of civil emergencies, but it is also true within defence ministries and in general interaction with the population. To take but two examples, a credible force needs, in addition to its military capability, specialists in communication who can make the case for the force and the equipment it requires, and accountants who can prove that the money has been well spent. These people do not need to be in uniform. But their functions are at least as important to the successful implementation of military policy as are those 'at the sharp end'. And for a good civil-military relationship, they are vital.

Some countries have decided to maintain a period of conscript service as a means of creating a reservoir of trained manpower. The German system, with its option for civilian service, is an example of how such a system might operate equitably in a country where territorial defence is a low priority. But as regards the military aspects of conscript service, it is important to focus on what role the manpower reservoir is to be trained for: is it for future mobilisation for territorial defence? In that case steps must also be taken to ensure that the reservoir is kept technically up to date and exercised regularly – expensive in the long run, so make sure this option is properly costed and that there is public support for it. Are they primarily for civil emergency work locally? Then they need not be trained as armed forces. Or are they simply being used as cheap labour on government projects? Considering both the costs of running such a structure and the loss to the civil economy, 'cheap' it certainly is not. Given the short time most conscripts serve, it will not be possible

to train them all for all these contingencies – a choice should be made about one or more options, the result properly resourced, and appropriate training given.

### **Morale, Motivation And Skills**

Given the need for specialists, professionalisation of armed forces is likely to increase. Recruitment, retention, morale and motivation are key to a successful professional force, however it is equipped and whatever its function. They are also areas that are proving difficult for many armed forces, and they are too large to address individually in any detail in this paper. Suffice it to say that the key to success in all these areas appears to be a perception, among the military and the public at large, that the armed forces know what they are for, can do what they are tasked to do, and are not profligate of people or money. Even so, as in the British armed forces for example, recruitment and retention are likely to remain problematical where there are other attractive options in civilian life. Service in the ranks in the UK is now likely to be seen less as a lifelong career and more as an interesting and useful experience for a few years. Pay does not seem to be a material factor in the length of time people serve.<sup>7</sup>

Within the military, retention and morale depend on several factors. First, that personnel are properly trained, resourced and equipped. Secondly, that people are decently paid and have a good social foundation. This means not just that the soldiers and their families are housed and cared for, but also that frequent deployments or remote postings do not impose intolerable strains upon military families. The cost of these measures is high, and even where they have been factored into military budget calculations, the temptation to spend instead on easily measurable pieces of equipment rather than hard-to-measure (and sometimes, surprisingly, even harder to justify) morale-maintenance measures has been hard to resist. Hence the need to think these things through and present the arguments convincingly to the public and to politicians.

Thirdly, they depend on a belief, both at the collective and the individual level, that professionals are being used in an appropriate way. This means an acceptance by the military and by policymakers of a flexible, building block-style box of capabilities, military and civil, which can be matched to tasks. It must also be recognised that, in facing today's threats, no unitary military force can do it all; the building blocks will include other agencies and actors, sometimes outside government control, who must be treated as professionals in their turn.

The building block model also implies that troops can be trusted to take decisions locally, and that probably means a flatter, more modular hierarchy and more time spent developing decision and management skills lower down the command chain. This complements rather than contradicts the current vision of network-centric or network enabled capabilities, though that vision, if loosely thought through or poorly implemented, also offers a great deal to much scope for micro-management that will hamstring the local commander.

Professional armed forces will be competing in the marketplace for skilable, adaptable, intelligent manpower, primarily at junior levels, and will turn out people who are used to dealing with a variety of professionals, including foreigners. These opportunities should make useful selling points to those the military needs to attract. It will also enable personnel to use those skills in the civilian economy when they leave. This is the country's gain, boosting the economy and ensuring it can pay for defence, even if it appears to be the military's loss in the short term.

Whilst a military career, with its almost unique ethos of serving and defending one's country, is not just another job, its distinctive identity cannot be taken for granted. Attention

will have to be given to ways of developing and maintaining a corporate sense of purpose across such a modular structure, and to unit cohesion within it, both in action and in training or 'rest' periods. Military units in action epitomise group psychology in situations of stress, and groups seem to function most successfully where individuals know and trust each other; they will cover each other's weaknesses almost instinctively and follow a leader they know much further than they will a stranger. Modularity has natural lower limits, probably between the 5-30 man mark. Units and individuals will continue to require a shakedown period for maximum effectiveness, but this may not be long where the general cooperative will is high. However it goes almost without saying that units and individuals experienced in building block-style deployments will become effective much sooner than those who have never operated outside their 'family group'. That many Russian vehicle crews met for the first time only hours before going into combat in Chechnya in 1994-96 contributed significantly to the failure of those operations. It was a lesson that has been a priority in the development of small unit tactics in the Russian military ever since.<sup>8</sup>

Even so, sustainability in action and repose ('peace and war' seems to be a less valuable dichotomy these days) will remain a problem. Experienced people will leave and take their experience with them. Bemoaning this fact will not alter it. Encouraging them to move into a reservist role will not solve this problem either. Reserves may be used for a different purpose, or recall to active service may disrupt other commitments too much for it to be done cost-effectively or with a good grace. Even in the Russian/Soviet system, where easy-to-use equipment was deliberately designed to capitalise on reservists' longevity of experience, keeping those skills mobilisable has proved almost impossible. Giving new recruits the chance to learn from their seniors' experience in the field before they retire may pay better dividends. If so, this needs to be factored into force structures, training and deployments. 'Meet the veterans' talks are unlikely to be as effective as learning from them on the job.

## **Conclusion**

This paper makes no apologies for focussing on manpower rather than technology. Technology alone will not ensure any country's security, but it often looms larger in budgetary discussions than spending on the people who are to use it. Much ingenuity is demonstrated in arguing the case for this or that new capability, and tweaking the cost estimates and in-service dates, often to the detriment of the basic question of where the added capability fits into the overall scheme of security policy or government priorities. Although new 'toys' are a useful boost to morale, manpower is by comparison the poor relation.

A realistic costing basis needs to be developed and adhered to for all aspects of what is decided to be the armed (and other) forces' core business over a multi-year time frame – and if it can't be afforded in the light of other government commitments, that core business and ways of achieving its goals need to be rethought. Smoke and mirrors accounting and relying on the unfortunate regular recurrence of international crises to bale out the defence budget do the armed forces no favours in the long run. The military budget should be congruent with a country's international security policy, not a hostage to it. And a country's economic prosperity should not be a hostage to either.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed analysis of the types of asymmetric threats and potential responses to them, see: C J Dick, *The Future of Conflict: Looking out to 2020*, Conflict Studies Research Centre paper M30 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2003), especially pp.3-32.

<sup>2</sup> James Sherr, in *Ukraine: The Pursuit of Defence Reform In an Unfavourable Context*, Conflict Studies Research Centre paper 04/08 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2004) argues that this jeopardised Ukraine's entire foreign and security policy; but it was hardly noticed in the rest of Europe.

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, Dr Graeme P Herd, *The Causes and Consequences of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan and Iraq*, Conflict Studies Research Centre paper 04/22 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2004), pp.4-5 and pp.16-19.

<sup>4</sup> NATO troops will be deployed as trainers, not as part of the multinational force. The relationship between the two was left for later definition. See Daniel Dombey, 'Compromise by NATO Opens the Way to Iraq Training Mission', *The Financial Times*, 13 July 2004, p.5.

<sup>5</sup> 'No country uses unguided rocket-propelled missiles for peacekeeping forces. This is about supplying Kokoiti with arms and military equipment.' Vano Merabishvili, Georgian National Security Council Secretary, *Rustavi-2 TV, Tbilisi*, in *Georgian 0800 gmt 7 Jul 04*, BBC Monitoring Service.

<sup>6</sup> Slovene and other presentations at the NATO advanced research workshop 'The Challenge of Defence Transformation in Europe', Brdo, Slovenia, 27-30 May 2004. The Czech armed forces in particular seem to be spreading their effort thinly (and maybe therefore vainly) over a huge range of tasks allotted to them by legislation. See other chapters in this volume for national detail.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example the results of the UK MOD's continuous attitude survey, available in an obsolete form on <http://www.mod.uk/issues/dms/>. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, Liberal Democrat spokesman Paul Keetch said: 'Morale is clearly a matter of perception, but perception counts ... The MoD has well-documented problems with retention, overstretch and unsuitable equipment which can all impinge on morale.' [Http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2705771.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2705771.stm).

<sup>8</sup> This does not mean that the Russians have solved the problem, simply that they recognise it. For comparative experiences in the first and second recent Chechen Wars see Michael Orr, 'Better or just not so bad? An Evaluation of Russian Combat Effectiveness in the Second Chechen War', in A C Aldis (ed) *The Second Chechen War*, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 40 (Shrivenham, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute in association with the Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000), pp.83-103.

This page intentionally left blank

## Author Index

Aldis, A.	103	Malešič, M.	v, 1
Dunay, P.	47	Moskos, C.	19
Edmunds, T.	v, 9	Park, B.	91
Jakobsen, P.V.	35	Ratchev, V.	57
Jelušič, L.	83	von Bredow, W.	27

This page intentionally left blank

This page intentionally left blank